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SUMMARY 
This thesis, to which I have given the general title Conscience 
Conscientiousness and Virtue, is intended primarily to defend the claim 
that conscientiousness alone is morally goodo In order to establish 
this conclusion, I discuss concepts of virtue 2nd the virtues, and try 
to show that, while the mopal virtues have a vital part to play in the 
life of the morally good man, they do not stand as rivals to conscient-
iousnesso Virtues possess moral worth precisely in so far as they are 
pre-dispositions develop~d and utilised by ,the morally good, or 
conscientious, man, in response to the moral demm1d. Having shown that 
a virtue can best be understood as a pre-disposition 'vhose value consists 
in the contribution it makes in the pursuit and maintenance of a good life, 
I turn to a discussion of the nature and value of conscientiousnesso 
First, it is necessary to deal with various misunderstandings about the 
nature of conscientiousnesso It then becomes possible to put fo~vard a 
positive theory of its uniQue value, in terms of its role in the life of 
the morally eood man o Finally, I argue that it is the activity of 
conscience in the moral agent which confers validity on moral judgments, 
and that in order to respond to the ,demands of morality, it is essential 
to accept and act upon the judgments which are authenticated by this 
activity. 
1. 
INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis, I intend to explore the relationships between goodness, 
virtue and conscientiousness, and to defend the proposition that conscient~ 
iousness alone is morally good. The discussion falls into two parts. 
Part I is concerned particularly with problems about the nature and value 
of virtue, especially moral virtue, while in Part II the argument is 
directed towards conscientiousness. 
The claim that conscientiousness alone is morally good (and in general 
the Kantian position that nothing but the good will has unconditional worth) 
is not a popular one. It has been attacked by philosophers and laymen many 
times, most often on the ground that it is incompatible with ordinary ideas 
about virtue. Two related objections are made in terms of virtue, and while 
I think that both objections are ill~founded, it seems to me that they are 
worth considering in some detail, for on closer consideration it can be seen 
that an identification o~ conscientiousness and moral.goodness enables us to 
place the virtues in a framework where they fit, whereas a straightforward 
defence of the virtues leaves us with a more or less arbitrary scale of 
values." 
The first objection comes from those who prefer to think that conscient~ 
iousness is some kind of second~rate substitute for the virtues. It is the 
(morally) poor man's virtue. Such a man can act as though he possessed the 
virtue of, say, benevolence, but the truly virutous man is the one who really 
is benevolent. This objection is, I shall argue, based on a mistaken notion 
of conscientiousness and also on a mistaken'notion of benevolence. And if 
we examine the assumptions underlying the objection, we shall find a serious 
confusion of basic concepts, and a dangerously naive view of the nature of 
virtue. The force possessed by the objection derives, not from argument, 
but from an unthinking emotional reaction to the suggestion that, say, 
2. 
conscientious beneficence is morally good. A conscientious man acts from 
a 'sense of duty' and nobody wants to be helped for duty's sake, but for 
his .2!:!!!. sake. But it can be seen that this view of the motive of conscient-
iousness is distorted. The conscientious man does, certainly, help someone 
in trouble because he conceives it to be his duty to do so. But in being 
aware of his duty to help, he is not unaware of the individual in need of 
help, but on the contrary must, if he is to act conscientiously, recognize 
not only that, but why, it is his duty to help." This recognition involves 
recognition of the status and value, as well as the need, of the person to 
whom he gives assistance. Accordingly, it will be argued that conscientious 
action is loving action, and that the truly benevolent or loving agent is 
the conscientious agent. Conscientiousness is thus not a substitute for the 
virtues, but could rather be said to inform them'" 
Secondly, it is sometimes objected that, although conscientiousness 
is indeed morally good, it is simply one among many virtues, and does not 
reign supreme over the virtues. This objection can also be shown to rest 
on a misunderstanding of the nature of both conscientiousness and the 
virtues~ For to object that conscientiousness is not supreme among the 
virtues is to suppose that it is of the same logical kind as those things 
such as courage which are normally held to be virtues, but this supposition 
is mistaken. I shall argue that conscientiousness cannot be evaluated on 
the same scale as virtues such as courage, for it is a logically different 
. 
sort of thing, and is itself the source of the moral value of the virtues, 
in so far as something like courage can be said to possess moral worth 
only when it is informed by conscientiousness. 
In order to answer these objections, it is necessary to examine 
closely the concepts of virtue and conscientiousness~ 
In :fart I, I shall discuss virtue and the virtues.' First, we need 
a general discussion of virtue, goodness and moral value. This discussion 
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will be followed by a consideration of various specific virtues, which will 
be shown to be "pre-dispositions", i.e. dispositions cultivated by the 
consoientious agent who sets himself to aot in the right way at the right 
time. Finally, I shall turn to the question of the relationship between 
virtue and suoh motives as love and oonscientiousness. 
This discussion leads us to Part II, in which I discuss conscience 
and oonscientiousness. First, I deal with some misunderstandings of the 
nature of consoientiousness, suoh as those displayed by Nowell-Smith in his 
Ethics.: Through a survey of the mistakes made in this context, we can 
reach a more positive view of the nature of conSCientiousness, which is 
manifested by a moral agent when and in so far as he does an action which 
he sincerely, after due consideration, believes to be morally right. This 
definition of conscientiousness makes it necessary to distinguish between 
'objective duty' and 'subjective duty'. The former is that which is 
. objectively demanded by the situation, while the latter is that which the 
conscientious agent, rightly or wrongly, conceives to be his duty. It 
will be argued that if the notion of moral worth is to make any sense at 
all,wa must define moral goodness in terms of subjective duty. This leads 
to a discussion of the possibility of knowledge of right and wrong, since 
the authority of conscience may more easily be defended if we can also 
depend on its reliability. I shall therefore consider the status ~CA 
justification of moral judgments, and argue that on the whole conscience 
.!!!. reliable, but that even when it is mistaken,' it still has authority. 
But a judgment can be called a moral judgment, the offspring of conscience, 
only when it is reached after due deliberation by the conscientious agent. 
Moral virtue attaches to conscientious action, but not to action which the 
agent merely happens to think right. 
Finally, in the concluding seotion., 'conscientiousness and goodness' 
I draw together the conclusions which have been reached in the arguments 
40 
of Parts I and II, and show the identification of moral goodness, or virtue, 
with conscientiousness. 
5. 
PART I. VIRTUE AND THE VIRTUES. 
Chapter I 
Moral Goodness and Virtue. 
Few modern philosophers have concerned themselves with questions 
about goodness and virtue. One reason for this is, I think, that an 
adequate account of virtue must be based upon a metaphysic of human nature, 
and that most philosophers now avoid this kind of account, partly because 
a grand metaphysic is too sweeping for those with an analytical turn of 
mind, and partly because the influence of Moore is still sufficiently 
strong for philosophers to avoid the risk of the 'naturalistic fallacy' 
which is incurred, it is suspected, by anyone basing CUl ethical account 
on a natural concept. 
There is, however, one philosopher who has offered an account of virtue 
in the course of his examination of the various kinds of goodness, viz. 
I 
von Wright in his Varieties of Goodness. In Chapter VII, 'Virtue') von 
Wright describes his task as one of 'giving shape to ~ concept, of a virtue,2 • 
. The concept he shapes is one of a virtue as a trait of Character3 which is 
needed for right choice4, where the right choice is one which enables us 
to avoid harm ('The goodness of the virtues is that they protect us from 
harm and !!2i that they supply us wi th some good' 5) • Al though I think that 
this concept is too negative p and will argue below for the view that virtues 
-are positively beneficial, I find von wright's account illuminating, and 
useful as a starting-point for my own. 
I 
von Wright - Varieties of Goodness. 
2 
-do- p.138 
3 
-do- p.l44 
4 
-do- p.145 
5 
-do p.151 
6. 
As he points out, it is necessary to distinguish between two different 
uses of the word ''virtue''. 'There is one meaning of ''virtue'' which admits 
of a plural, 'tvirtues"o This meaning is in question for example, when we 
call courage a virtueo There is another meaning of 'tvirtue" which lacks 
the plural. This is (USUallY) in question when virtue is contrasted with 
vice, or when - as is sometimes done - to do one's duty is said to be 
virtueo,6 He goes on to say that it is not the second meaning with which 
he is concernedo Rather, he is 'dealing with that meaning of "virtuous" 
which is the display or practising of virtues, and not (directly) with that 
which is virtuous as opposed to vicious conduct or character'. 
Now, I think it is clear that this kind of distinction has to be made. 
When we say, for instance, that courase is a virtue, we are not saying the 
sort of thing which might be expressed by "to do one's duty is virtue". 
However, although the distinction must be made, it would be dangerous to 
suppose that the two senses of 'virtue' can be kept apart. I do not think 
it is possible to deal with 'that meaning of ''virtuea'l which is the display 
or practising of virtues' without at the same time dealing with 'that which 
is virtuous as opposed to vicious conduct or character'. This point is 
not made in total opposition to von wright, whose parenthetical use of the 
adverb. 'directly' suggests that he is well aware of the relation between 
the twoo What I do want to argue is that, although it is valuable to 
of 
distinguish the two meanings, and to provide an analysis ..w. the virtues, 
I do not think that such an analysis can be regarded as an adequate treat-
ment of 'tvirtue" (the ti tIe of the chapter from which I have quoted). \!hat 
is needed is a discussion which deals with the conceptual relationship 
between displaying or practising virtues, and possessing a virtuous character. 
In order to clarify this relationship, however, it is undoubtedly 
valuable to consider particular virtues at some length. For It Is necessary 
6von wright - VarIeties of Goodness, p.138. 
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to make .further distinctions between types of virtue, and to determine the 
nature of 'a virtue' before it is possible to say how goodness, conscient-
iousness and virtues do, or might, inter-relate in a moral life. 
Another important task is to establish in what sense benevolence is 
to be regarded as a virtue, since benevolence (or love, or sympathy) is put 
forward as a serious rival to conscientiousness. But when we use the word 
'virtue', neither be~evolence nor conscientiousness spring immediately to 
mind as examples of virtue. One reason for this may simply be that 'virtue' 
is an old-fashioned word, and has come to be associated with the qualities 
which were praised by those who used the word. Another reason m~ be that 
when we do use the word, we tend to do so to name the particular virtues, 
rather than virtue as such. But whether or not we tend immediately to 
think of benevolence as a virtue, I think it is normal to say that at least 
in some sense of 'virtue' benevolence is somehow at least related to 
virtue. When we undertake an analysis of virtue and the virtues, then, it 
is essential to leave room in our scheme for such qualities as benevolence. 
Now that these preliminary points have been made, the general point 
and nature of the analysis I propose to make should be reasonably clear. 
MY chief aim is to sort out the relationships between various senses of 
I~irtue' and various virtues, so that it will be possible to erect a frame-
work in which the virtues will fit comfortably, and to place oonscientious-
ness and also benevolence either in, or in relation to, this framework. 
In attempting to erect such a framework, it is very important to 
keep an open mind. It is all too easy to find. certain characteristics 
common to most of the accepted 'virtues' and then to regard these as 
defining characteristics, so that some of the accepted virtues are shown, 
by a tempting but illegitimate move, not really to be 'virtues' at all. 
If some virtues do not fit into the framework, we must either scrap the 
framework (and E2i the virtues), enlarge the framework, or admit that there 
8. 
is no ~ framework into which all the virtues will fit. For we must not 
assume that virtues which could not be assimilated into a single scheme 
were not, after all, virtues. I stress that it is important to be willing 
to do this, not because I think it will in fact prove necessary, but because 
I am struck by the oddness of von Wright's dismissal of what does not fit 
his framework. For instance, he says, !tIt is ••• doubtful whether justice 
fits the conceptual pattern of a virtue, which I have been outlining, and 
thus also doubtful whether justice, on our definition, is to be counted as 
one of the virtues at all ". 7 What appears to me to be doubtful here, is not 
whether justice is to be counted as one of the virtues, but whether a 
definition which exoludes justioe is an acourate definition. If we find 
the definition a satisfactory one up to this point, we should not rule 
out justice, but it would be open to us to say that perhaps justioe is a 
different ~ of virtue from those which fall under the definition. At 
any rate, we must guard against an undue attachment to any tentative 
definitions of virtue. 
Traditionally, the four chief virtues have been tested as wisdom, 
courage, temperance and justioe. In some ways this is, as has been recog-
nized, an odd list. The virtues which are grouped together seem to be 
different in important ways. Wisdom, for instance, seems to be primarily 
connected with the intelleot, and for that reason is sometimes described as 
an intellectual virtue. Temperance and justice, on the other hand, are mare 
closely connected with morality as it is generally understood. Courage, 
again, seems to be a special case. It is not really an intellectual virtue, 
and yet it seems that sometimes we might not want to say that it is a moral 
virtue either. Whether or not we describe courage as morally good seems 
to depend to some extent on the type of situation in which it is displayed. 
And yet, on further consideration, it is not surprising that the 
traditional cardinal virtues should be diverse. Indeed, it would be more 
7 p.l49 
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surprising if there were more similarities than there are - though there 
are similarities and important ones. In connection with the diversity of 
the cardinal virtues, we may refer again to von "''right, who says 'The Greek 
arete ••• which it has become customary to translate by 'virtue', has a 
much wider connotation than the English word ••• when, however, we call 
courage, generosity, or justice virtues, we are using the word 'virtue' 
very differently from that meaning of arete, which refers to an excellence 
of its kind. To see this clearly is, I think, of some importance. Aris-
totle, I would suggest, did not see guite clearly at this point,.8 
Now, I think we can say that both Aristotle and von Wright are wrong 
here, but that Aristotle's insight is more valuable than von Wright's. It 
might well be that we do not now think of man as having a .function in just 
the sense in which Aristotle thought we had, and that a virtue is not an 
excellence in quite the way in which Aristotle thought it was 0 But I 
think von Wright exaggerates when he says that in calling, say, courage 
a virtue, we are ''using the word 'virtue' ~ differently from that 
meaning of arete, which refers to an excellence of its kind. It 
Without adopting a functional theory of m~an, we can nevertheless 
make sense, and use, of Aristotle's idea of excellence of its kind. In 
discussing the particular virtues9, I shall argue that it is some idea 
like this which underlies our use of the term 'virtue'. In order to see 
10 
thiS, we may briefly consider the virtue of courage. 
Part of what we imply when we describe courage as a virtue, is that 
when we describe a man as courageous we mean that this man is, in so far 
as he is courageous, admirable as a man. Courage is an admirable quality 
for human beings to possess, and when we judge that someone is a coward, 
we judge that he is poorer as a human being than those people who are brave. 
8 p.137 
9see Chapter 2 below 
10for a full treatment of courage, see chapter 2. 
10. 
This point, it will be seen, can be generalized to cover the rest of the 
traditional virtues, and indeed may seem to have more force with regard 
to other virtues than with regard to courage. With regard to courage, it 
may be objected that we consider it to be very much a physical, and 
consequently an animal, virtueo Our use of similes like 'as brave as a 
lion' suggests that when we praise a brave man we do not praise him so 
much as a human animal, but rather as a human animal. 
In reply to this objection, two points may be made. First, the 
objection loses a great deal of its force unless we accept an Aristotelian 
view of human virtue as connected with the differentiating characteristics 
of man.' The attack on my modification of the Aristotelian view therefore 
carries'little weight as an attack on Aristotle's own account. But in any 
case, it is this part of Aristotle's account which I want to reject. I do 
. not want to sa:y that a man is admirable as a man in so far as he possesses 
good characteristics peculiar to human beings, but rather in so far as he 
possesses good human characteristics. Something is a human characteristic 
if it is characteristically found among human beings, regardless of whether 
it is also found among other beingso (Fbr instance, the backbone is no 
less a human characteristic for being common to all vertebrates, a class 
wider than that of human beings). Thus, if something is a good quality, 
we may regard it as a human virtue, even though other animals may also 
possess that quality. Consequently, a man may be described as 'good ~ 
a man' if he possesses courage, a good human quality, even though courage 
is not peculiarly a virtue of the human animal.' 
Secondly, even if this account of physical courage is rejected, it 
does not follow that courage cannot be an admirable human quality. EVen 
if it is insisted that a quality is a human one only if it is peculiar 
to human beings, we can still speak of courage as a virtue, with the 
implication that a brave man is admirable as a man. For al thol.l€h, as I 
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have argued, we do regard the characteristics which human beings qua 
animals possess, as human characteristics, we also do, in our assessments 
of human beings, consider that where rationality can come into play, it 
should do so. And of course, in some situations where courage can be 
displayed, rationality can come into play. In these situations, we do not 
expect a man to behave merely like an animal, albeit a brave one. We 
expect him to behave like a rational animal. Becauseof this, we counter-
balance our terms of praise such as t brave as a lion' by such terms of 
disparagement as 'mere animal courage t • Thus, when we feel that the 
situation is such that reason has something to offer, we do not admire 
the type of courage which does not involve reason. 
I think then, that it is safe to assume that the possible objection 
to describing a virtue as a property whose possession leads us to regard 
a man as admirable qua man, cannot be sustained~' Whether we accept that 
a basically animal virtue may count as a human virtue, or whether we main-
tain that human virtues are peculiar to human beihgs and connected with 
their differentiating characteristic of rationality, it is still open to 
us to say that Aristotle's account of virtue as an excellence is accept-
able, in so far as it is interpreted in terms of admirable qualities of 
human beings qua human beings. (Of course, the fact that this objection 
can be answered does not prove the case. A defence of the view will be 
put forward in chapter 2 below, in the course of a detailed consideration 
of the virtues). 
It is therefore established at least that the view that a virtue is an 
admirable human quality is at least logically tenable. However, this is 
not enough to differentiate virtues from various other qualities. Physical 
strength, intelligence, or artistic ability, may all be regarded as 
admirable human qualities, in the sense I have outlined so far, but we 
would hesitate to describ4 them as virtues. One way to draw a distinction 
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between virtues and other admirable human qualities is to show that 
virtues are not merely admirable but praiseworthy, whereas such qualities 
as strength or intelligence are not (at least not typically) regarded as 
praiseworthy. 
Nomally, praise is conferred on those qualities for which we hold 
the agent responsible. We do not praise him for being strong or intelligent, 
because we do not think of strength and intelligence as things which the 
agent has acquired for himself. If, by some effort, he has overcome some 
-handicap, we might praise him, but then we are not praising him for 
possessing e.g. strength, but for his effort in developing strength. A 
f:'V . 
quall ty is thus (as well as admirable) praiseworthy if it is one for whose 
development the agent is responsible. (Similarly, weakness may be balmeworthy 
if the agent has failed to develop potential strength). So, in.saying 
that a virtue is not merely admirable but also praiseworthy, we are 
suggesting that a virtue is something which has been developed by its 
possessor. He does not merely happen to be brave or just, but has developed 
the quality of courage or justice in himself.1 
This gives rise to two distinct, though related, questions. First, 
why do we praise an agent for developing virtues? And secondly, why does 
the agent develop various qualities, and in what circumstances is such 
development good? The answers to these two questions will enable us to 
show the relationships between virtues and goodness, and we shall see 
that virtues possess value in twQ different ways, or rather two different 
~though again related) sorts of value, viz .. moral and non-moral. 
Briefly, my answer to the first question is that we praise an agent 
for developing virtues because we regard virtues as contributing factors 
in the living of a good or complete life. Secondly, the agent develops 
various qualities which he sees himself as contributing to a good life, 
and insofar as he is motivated by his belief that certain qualities have 
value in this way, we may regard him as good, bedause of his motivation. 
These answers must be considered in rather more detail. A full 
answer cannot be given until the discussion of the various virtues is 
oompleted, and until types of motivation have been disoussed (see chapters 
2 and 3 below), but enough oan be said to indioate the lines whioh the 
answer will follow.' 
First, then, I am suggesting that our reason for regarding virtues 
as praiseworthy is that we value them as oontributing factors in a good 
life. Their value oan be explained by reference to the part that they 
play in such a life, which is itself regarded as valuable. At this stage, 
it is not possible to elucidate fully the concept of a good or oomplete 
life, since the interaction between this concept and the concept of 
various virtues is suoh that it can be understood only in terms of the 
virtue-concepts. However, it is possible at least to give a rough formal 
definition of a complete life as a human life in which various potential-
i ties are actualized harmoniously. Human beings are, as I have pointed 
out, animals, but that is not all. They also possess rationality, and 
what might best be termed sensibility~ This term 'sensibility' is 
intended to cover the human capaoity for feeling and emotion of every 
kind, and encompasses not only such things as sympathy and affection for 
other living beings, but also various capacities which can be called 
artistio. Artistic capacities are not oonfined to the creation ~works 
of art,l but include capacities for reacting or responding to beauty or 
ugliness in any context, natural or artifioial; Rational oapacities 
inolude ability to think, make judgements and decisions, put forward and 
follow arguments of various kinds, to oonceptualize, and in general to 
perform types of reasoning. There is no sharp dividing line between 
rational and sensible capacities _ rational capacities may well involve 
feeling, and sensible capacities reason - but it is useful to distinguish 
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them since they are in principle different sorts of things. Catching 
one's breath before a painting is different from, s03, working out an 
algebraic problem, though there is an area where we may not be able to 
distinguish sharply between, for instance, writing a novel and writing 
philosophy. 
Thus, the significant facts about human beings, as far as a concept 
of a complete life is concerned, are that they are sentient (capable of 
feeling pleasure and pain), sensible (capable of various types of emotion), 
and rational (capable of performing reasoning operations). A human being 
may therefore be said to live a good or complete life when he exercises his 
oapacities of sentience, sensibility and rationality, and exercises them 
harmoniously, by which I mean that one type of capacity is not developed and 
exercised to the exclusion of other types. In general terms, then, the 
complete life is definable in terms of the harmonious actualization of 
potentialities which can roughly be categorised as potentialities of 
feeling, emotion and reason. A more specific explanation of the concept 
will be offered later (see chapters 2 and 3 below). 
However, it need not be supposed that the concept is a closed one. 
Scope for individuality must be allowed, and ultimately each individual is 
responsible for his concrete interpretation of the general concept. 
Now, if a good life, or a complete life, is one in which various human 
potentialities are harmoniously actualized, the concept of a good life need 
not be a specifically moral concept. Fbr someone may lead a complete life 
and yet not be regarded as living a morally good life. So, in so far as 
virtues contribute to the attainment of a life which is admirable but not 
morally praiseworthy, those virtues are not, as such, moral ones. How, 
then, are we to distinguish moral from non-moral virtues? 
To start with, it should be pointed out that the distinction is in 
some sense one of form and not of content. That is to say, we cannot take 
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a couple of virtues such as oourage and justioe, and oategorize the 
latter as a moral virtue and the former as non-moralo Any virtue qua 
virtue is adm~rable and praiseworthy. Thus, in so far as oourage is a 
virtue, it is admirable and praiseworthy - admirable, or valuable, beoause 
it oontributes to the living of a oomplete life, which is valuable, praise-
worthy because it is something for which the agent is responsibleo (A 
disposition on which the agent is not responsible is not a virtue - the 
man who knows no fear does not exercise the virtue of courage, though he 
may act in a way which we should want to desoribe as in some sense courag-
eous). I am not, therefore, suggesting that courage is not good. In so 
far as it is a virtue, it is goodo But it is not necessarily morally good. 
Whether or not a virtue is to be counted as a moral one will depend on 
whether or not the agent developed that virtue for the right reason, or 
from the right motive. Another way of putting this is to say that a 
virtue is a moral virtue when and only when it has been oonsoientiously 
developed. (This notion will be more fully developed, and the claim 
defended, in section 2 below). 
I said above that the concept of a good life need not be a speoifically 
moral concept, but there is an ambiguity in this statement which must be 
resolved. Since a complete life!! a moral life, because human beings are 
moral agents, and live a complete life only if they exercise their moral 
agenoy, the concept (the proper full-blown concept) of a complete life is 
a moral concept. On the other hand, individuals may possess !!. concept of 
a good or complete life which is E2i a moral concepto Objectively, a 
complete life is a moral life. Subjectively, it need not be conceived in 
in a moral context. When I say, then, that the ooncept is not necessarily 
a moral one, I mean that subjectively it need not be moral, but an individ-
ual's non-moral ooncept of a good-life is incomplete if it lacks the moral 
dimension involved in the living of a germinely good life. 
16. 
This distinction sheds some light on the distinction which is to 
be drawn between moral and non-moral virtues. A quality is a virtue if 
it has been developed by an agent because that agent recognizes its value 
as a contributory factor in the living of a complete life. It is a moral 
virtue if it is developed by an agent who, possessing a moral concept of 
a good life, regards a good life as a moral goal, as something which a 
human being ought to pursue. Courage, for instance, is a moral virtue 
when it has been developed by an agent who, regarding courage as indispen-
sable in the pur sui t of the good life which he is morally obliged to pursue 
considers the development of courage as being itself a moral duty, and 
develops it for that reason. 
These various claims concerning the types of value possessed by 
virtues must be substantiated, but substantiation will not be fully possible 
until a more detailed consideration of various virtues has been completed. 
However, before I turn to this consideration, it is necessary, br~fly 
to offer an account of the nature of virtues. In other words, it is 
necessary to answer not only the questions 'How, and why, are virtues 
) va1uab1~ ~ but also the questions 'What ~ virtues,. (what is their 
logical status) and what role do they play in a complete life?' 
So far, I have used the vague term 'quality' when speaking about 
virtues. However, now that it is settled that something is to count as 
a virtue only when it is something for which the agent is responsible, it 
is possible to achieve a more precise terminology.' At this point, there-
fore, I will introduce the term 'pre-disposition' to name the class to 
which virtues belong. This term is used to indicate various points which 
must be borne in mind when we talk about virtues~ The first of these 
points is that a virtue such as courage involves a more or less settled 
tendency to act in certain ways in certain circumstances. A single 
courageous act may not be a manifestation of the virtue of courage, for 
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a man may be said to possess that virtue if he acts courageously fairly 
consistently when the opportunity is offered. Secondly, he possesses a 
virtue such as courage only if he is set in advance to act in certain w~s 
in certain circumstances. That is to say, the courageous man is prepared 
to act in the right way in a situation where courage is called for. Thirdly, 
a virtue is something for which an agent is responsible - he has pre-disposed 
himself to act in the right way in given circumstances. This is not to 
say that he has made all his decisions in advance, for, as we shall see, 
the conscientious agent is one with an open mind, and one who ~ his 
virtues (see Part II below). What I mean is that a conscientious and a 
virtuous man is one who is prepared to respond. to the demands of the 
situation. Thus, if a situation arises which is dangerou~; or appears to 
be so, the agent who is courageous will respond to the danger, or the 
11 feared situation, courageously. 
When I say that a virtue is a pre-disposition, what I mean is that 
an agent possesses a given virtue if and only if he has set himself to 
respond in the appropriate way with regard to the demands of the situation, 
For example, a situation of danger demands courage, while one of extreme 
desire demands temperance, and so on. But the situation cannot be categor-
ized in more specific terms, since differen~ sorts of action or refraining 
from action will count as courageous or temperate depending on just what 
the situation is, so that sometimes the courageous man will confront the 
dangerous object, and. sometimes, recognizing that discretion is the 
better form of valour, he will run away. To be pre-disposed to be courag-
eous is therefore to be resolved to react to danger in the most appropriate 
way. .And it is precisely in so far as it is a pre-disposition that 
courage is to be regarded as a virtue. 
llSee chapter 2 below. I am aware that this account is incomplete, but the 
concept will be more fully explicated,below. The points I am making are 
lOgical, or at least formal ones, and are not intended to cast light on the 
nature of a:ny specific virtue such as courage.' 
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Formally, then, we may define a virtue as follows: 'x is a virtue 
if and when x is a pre-disposition, i.e. when agent A has set himself to 
act x'ly in X, the situation-demanding-x'. This definition, although 
formal, is not vacuous, for it will enable us to decide which variables, 
in satisyfing x, are virtues. But we cannot do this until we have found 
out more about X, the situation-demanding-x. It will therefore be necessary 
to discuss various types of situation in which several virtues can be 
manifested, so that we can see how the formal definition may be understood 
in more concrete terms. 
Finally, though, before I turn to this discussion, I shall answer 
briefly the question, 'What part do the virtues play in the good life?' 
This question arises because of the necessity to settle the question whether 
virtues possess merely instrumental value or whether they possess value in 
themselves. It will be seen that an answer must be given in terms neither 
~ 
... 
of instrumental nor of intrinsic value, but rather"" terms of what I 
shall call contributory value. Again, the question and answer will be 
couched in fairly vague terms, as a full answer will depend on the conclus-
;0" ions reached in a discusS8Q of specific virtue. For now, I am still 
concerned with logical rather than concrete definitions. 
I said earlier that virtues are accepted as such because of their 
being contributory factors to the good life. When I say this, I do not 
intend to suggest that their value is merely instrumental, in that they 
are useful as a means to the end of the good life. They do possess instru~ 
mental value, since an agent pursuing the good life will find some virtues 
indispensable. But a good life is not merely an end to be pursued, but one 
which can be lived, and once an agent has reached the stage where he can be 
said to be living a good life, he must continue to be virtuous, This is so 
whether we conceive of the good life in moral or non-moral terms. If, as 
I have suggested, the good life is a moral one, then the agent who lives 
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a good life can only be said to do so if he exercises moral. virtues, 
since these virtues are among the potentialities which are harmoniously 
actualized in a good life. On the other hand, even if the concept of a 
good life is a non-moral life, the virtues (or some of them) still have a 
part to play in the living of a good life, since the pre-dispositions of 
courage, justice and so on are constituents of such a life. A coward, for 
instance, cannot live a complete life, since his cowardice will prevent him 
from doing many of the things that are involved in a complete life, whereas 
the courageous man will manifest courage in his living of the good life. 
This will be seen more clearly when courage is considered more fully. For 
now, I wish merely to stress that the exercise of virtues is involved in 
the living, and not just in the pursuit, of a good life. 
Now that the more general points about the nature and value of the 
virtues have been made, it is possible to turn to a more detailed discussion 
of various virtues, so that the position I am adopting can be more clearly 
explained and defended. 
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Chapter 2 
Virtues 
In this Chapter, I shall discuss in some detail the four 'cardinal' 
virtues of justice, wisdom, temperance and courage, and shall follow this 
discussion by a briefer consideration of various other virtues. I hope 
that this discussion will make it possible to clarify an~ substantiate my 
claims concerning the nature and value of virtues, and that furthermore 
some light m~ be shed on the problems arising from the apparent 'fashions' 
in virtues, since I intend to argue that a virtue cannot cease to be a 
virtue 0 , First, however, I want to show that the cardinal virtues are, as 
I have claimed, pre-dispositions, that they are necessary not only in the 
pur sui t, but also in the living, of a good life, that their value. depends 
on their relation to the good life, and that their moral value depends on 
the agent's motivation, and on his attitude towards the good life. 
1. Courage 
To start with, we may look more closely at the virtue of courage, which 
has already been briefly considered. So far, I have suggested that courage 
may be seen as a physical, and hence animal, virtue, and that it may also 
be seen as a more specifically human virtue, in that it may involve a 
rational response in certain sorts of situation.l A consideration of the 
types of situation in which we might say that courage is called for should, 
then, enable us to ~eQ more clearly what courage is, by showing us what it 
is a response to. 
First, we can take the case of 'animal courage'. If 'anima.l. courage' 
is not a misnomer, in other words, if a non-rational response in some 
situations may accurately be described as 'courageous', it must be the case 
that (non-human) animals can show coura.geo I do not think that this need . 
lSee p II above. 
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be denied, but it is important to establish what will, and what will not, 
count as a manifestation of animal courage. 
It is clear that courage is typically manifested in situations of (at 
least apparent) danger. FUrthermore, it is commonly accepted that courage 
is manifested in situations of fear. Hence the qualification of 'danger' 
by the term 'apparent'. A courageous action is also somehow appropriate. 
This point needs to be made because the other two conditions are necessary 
but not sufficient conditions of courage. The situation in which fear of 
some apparent danger is felt is. precisely the situation in which cowardice 
as well as courage can be manifested. So, taking the three jointly 
necessary and sufficient conditions into account, we can say that courage 
is shown when the agent reacts appropriately to feared danger. 
It is the idea of appropriateness which gives rise to difficulty when 
we consider the possibility of animal courage. The reason for this is not 
so much the obvious one that talk of appropriate responses suggests some 
power of judgment, but is connected with the fact that there may be two 
types of appropriate response to physical danger, both of which are 
describable as courageous, but only one of which is to be found in non,. 
rational animals. Roughly speaking, these responses are, on the one hand 
facing and coping with the danger, and on the other hand, running away. 
Animals are capable of both responses considered merely as actions, but we 
would be reluctant to say that running away could be a manifestation of 
courage in an animal. But if we refuse to call running away a manifestation 
of courage in an animal, should we not also refuse to call facing up to 
the danger a manifestation of courage? If so, it would seem to follow 
that animals cannot show courage, and consequently that 'animal courage' 
is a misnomer, when applied to the behaviour of human beings as well as to 
non-human animals. 
However, it would be a mistake to draw this conclusion, for the argu-
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ment from which it follows contains a disguised ambiguity in the term 
'courage'. When it is argued that there are two appropriate responses to 
a situation of physical danger, both of which may be manifestations of 
courage, it is suggested that the responses are, or may be manifestations 
of the same kind of courage. This is not so, As I said, running away 
from physical danger may be the appropriate response, and it may'bean 
act of courage. But the courageousness of the response does not reside in 
its appropriateness. It is quite possible to respond appropriately to 
danger by running away, without in doing so showing courage. It is brave 
to run away only when one is afraid to run awa::r. Running away is 
courageous, when it is' courageous, because one fears blame or scorn, and 
because one overcomes this fear. If, on the other hand, running away 
involves no danger or unpleasantness, it does not merit the description of 
courageousi The reason we are reluctant to describe animals as manifesting 
. courage in running away is that we are reluctant to attribute to them fear 
of this kind of danger (or unpleasantness). But if we want to say that 
animals can show courage in facing up to daiiger, there is no reason why 
we should not, for it does not seem odd to suggest that animals can be 
aware of, and fearful of, physical danger, nor, consequently, that their 
facing up to the danger is a manifestation of courage. It seems, then, 
that we do use the word 'courage' correctly to describe a particular kind 
of animal behaviour in the face of danger, but that only one of the two 
appropriate responses to that danger can be said to involve 'animal courage'. 
It follows that human beings may manifest animal courage in a situation of 
physical danger, but that this is restricted to the case where the human 
animal meets the danger, where he responds appropriately by facing it. 
(But it should be pointed out here that if I am correct in my classification 
of virtues as pre-disposi tiona, and in my analyses of the concept of a 
pre-di~position) the courage which animals show is not a virtue, since it 
is unlikely that animals set themselves to act in certain ways. Hence, 
it must sometimes be possible to act courageously without possessing 
the virtue of courage. And I see no harm in adopting this position, so 
long as we remember that the courage displayed by animals is non-virtuous, 
and that human courage which is mere animal courage must alao be non-
virtuous) .' 
When, therefore, we say that sometimes it is brave to rUn away, we 
do not mean that rurming away is a manifestation of animal courage. We 
mean rather that it is brave to run the risk of being called a coward, when 
one's appropriate response to danger might be misinterpreted as an act of 
cowardice ±ather than wisdom or prudence. In this case, the same conditions 
must hold if the agent is to be described as courageous. He must be in a 
situation of danger, he must fear the danger, and he must respond appro-
priately to the danger. But the courage is not physical or animal courage, 
because the danger is not of the type to which one responds with physical 
courage.. So while the same general conditions must hold if aI\Y act is to 
be described as an act of courage, we will classify the type of courage 
which is involved by reference to the kind of danger, and consequently the 
kind of fear, which is involved. 
It seems that some things can be recognised as, or believed to be, 
dangerou.,s only by rational beings. This seemed clear enough in the case 
of fear of being scorned or blamed for apparent cowardice. (Animals can 
fear punishment, but that is a different matter).- And fear of blame or 
soorn is not the only kind of non-physical fear of which a human being is 
capable 0' He is capable of fearing a whole range of dangers of a non .. 
physical kind, and consequently of showing non-physical courage in a wide 
range of situations. To describe these types of non-physical courage, it 
will be convenient to adopt the common term 'moral courage'. The word 
'moral' has no significance other than 'non-physical t. 
Like physical courage, moral courage is manifested by an agent who 
feels fear in a situation of apparent danger, and who responds appropriate-
ly to that danger. It is easy to underestimate the rrumber of situations 
in which moral courage is not only possible, but actually disp.layed, but 
there are recognized to be quite a number of ways of 'standing up for one's 
convictions' in a way which involves courage. For instance, one may risk 
losing one's job by refusing to undertake shady deals, one may risk going 
to prison for refusing to fight, one may defend religion (or, say, chastity) 
in a climate of scepticism. This kind of behaviour is recognized as 
courageous, and judged to be admirable. It is thought to be good that 
people should have standards, whether moral, religious or aesthetic, or 
even of etiquette, sportsmanship and so on, and that they should try to 
",I~ ~~!-to! .,ur opPIl)V~~ 
live up to those, standards~ven to those cases where we do not accept the 
standards. Someone without standards is, we think, poorer as a human 
being. The selfis:tJm.er.R man and the cynic lack something. And standards 
are, somehow, things we are expected to 'live up to'. Possibly something 
which was effortlessly maintained would not count as a 'standard'. It is, 
therefore, thought to be good that human beings should have standards of 
behaviour, that they should act in accordance with those standards, and 
that they should do so even when such action is difficult, and requires a 
display of moral courage. All of this is quite clearlY:Elated to some 
general idea of what it is like to be 'good as a human being'. Moral 
courage is recognized as a virtue because it is required by any human being 
who does not lack a valuable human characteristic - that is, to put it 
rather imprecisely, the characteristic of having standards of behaviour. 
Moral courage so far does seem to be describable as a virtue just 
because it is connected'with our ideas about what it is to be 'good as a 
human being'. The moral coward, and also the person who never has a:ny 
occasion to show moral courage beoause he has nothing to live up to are,. 
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significantly, said to 'lack something'. The idea of a 'complete human 
being' therefore appears to be involved in our attribution of the virtue 
of moral courageo 
But as I pointed out, it is easy to underestimate the number of 
occasions on which moral courage might be, and is, shown, and I think we 
underestimate here because we fail to realize how many things can be feared. 
Partly, too, the problem is that we think of courage in terms of danger, 
and then we apply the term 'danger' to a narrow range of situationso We 
speak of a 'danger' of losing one's job, of incurring scorn, and so on, 
but we do not speak of the 'danger' of, say, touching a spider. And yet, 
surely, one may be afraid of touching a spider, and may show moral courage 
in picking one up so, whether we extend our usage of the term 'danger' to 
cover such cases, or whether we say that it is appropriate to speak of 
'fearing' things other than danger, we must realize that moral courage is 
possible in the face of objects which are not objectively dangerouso 
What I propose to do now is to consider whether the kind of moral 
courage which is most regularly displayed is describable as a virtue in 
the sense in which the other types of courage can be shown to be virtues, 
i.e. in their relation to the idea that they are involved in the pursuit, 
or the living of a good or complete life. 
Now, the kind of courage I have in mind here is the sort which is 
displayed by most people quite often. Most people perform actions which 
they thoroughly dislike because they conceive'them to be necessary or 
right 0 The example of touching a spider is not as frivolous as it might 
sound - many people are afraid of spiders, but not all of them show ito 
People can fear heights, or crowds, or open spaces, or meeting other people, 
or they can fear responsibility or loneliness; We cannot assume that 
because many of these fears count as phobias, and hence as irrational, that 
they are rare. Severe instances of such fears may be comparatively rare. 
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For instance, there are not a great many people who dare not leave the 
house, but to a lesser degree many people dislike crowds. If it is 
possible to lead a fairly ordinary life while avoiding crowds, they avoid 
crowds. But if leading an ordinary life entails meeting crowds, they will 
put up with crowds in, s~, the supermarket at a weekend. Similarly, 
someone who is afraid of heights m~ sensibly avoid climbing mountains, 
but may climb a stepladder to wash windows or hang curtains. I should 
s~ that such people display moral courage, since they do what they are 
afraid of doing.~nerally, they do not overcome their fear simply because 
it is a fear, but because they intend to lead a normal life, and giving 
in to the fear would inhibit everyday living. 
The concept of a 'normal life' is an evaluative one, rather than a 
purely descriptive one. So people who overcome fears in order to achieve 
a normal life can be said to show courage in their pursuit of an end which 
they conceive to be worthwhileo They want to live as they think people 
in their situation ought to live, and they show courage in overcoming 
their fear because they believe that a life dominated by that fear would 
not be an ade~uate life. 
If this is accepted, it is reasonable to claim that everyday moral 
courage is valued because it contributes to the completeness or goodness 
of a 'normal human life t. It therefore is valued for the same kind of 
reason ~ physical courage and the moral courage which is displayed in 
living up to one's standards. The value of courage is thus held to lie 
in its connection with the pur sui t or achievement of what it is good for 
a human being, as a human being, to be. The coward is a poorer human being 
because, lacking courage, he does not become what he could, if he were 
bz.'-O!1lt brave." He does not lack courage alone, but the end to which courage is 
a means, or of which it is a parto For courage of this kind is necessary 
in the pursuit and in the living of a complete life. now it follows from 
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this that someone who was never afraid would not necessarily be the poorer 
for not having any occasion to show courage. But in practice, total lack 
of fear would suggest a lack of sensitivity or humility (such a person 
would never fear hurting other people, would not he afraid of responsibility 
or failure of any kind) and would, I should say, be the poorer for that. 
Now that this relationship has shown to hold between the concept of 
courage as a virtue, and the concept of a complete human life, I shall 
discuss the other three traditional virtues, to see whether the same 
pattern of analysis is appropriate. 
2. Wisdom 
First, I shall consider wisdom. A complication arises from the fact 
that different philosophers have meant different things by 'wisdom', but 
the important respect in which wisdom is held to be a virtue is that in 
which the wise man is one whose behaviour is governed by reason. He is in 
general not over-impulsive, he learns by experience, and on the whole leads 
an ordered life. If the wise man is like this, we can see the correlation 
between wisdom and prudence (which is the virtue in the Christian list 
of cardinal virtues corresponding to the· Greek wisdom. The other three are 
fortitude, temperance, and justice). A prudent man is reasonable and 
experienced (in the sense that he has learnt by experience) and wisdom or 
prudence can be best understood in terms of practical rather than 
theoretical reason. To some extent, the wise man is a man of common sense, 
rather than an intellectual or a philosopher.2 The wise man may, there-
fore, be equated with the prudent man, who does not usually act on the spur 
of the moment, but works out policies and on the whole pursues those 
policiell'~" 
~aturallY, one's view of the relation between knowledge and behaviour will 
affect one's account of the virtue of wisdom. Plato's wise man will, 
presumably, be the philosopher. But if we are uncommitted to a Platonic 
theory of knowledge, and to a Platonic conception of the relation between 
knowledge of the good and being good, we need not insist that the non-
philosopher cannot be wise in the relevant sense.' He may, indeed, be wiser 
than the philosopher. 
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While it is not usual for ordinary people to s8:J 'wisdom is a virtue', 
there is an admiring W8:J of s8:Jing • Jones is a very wise man' or • Smith 
is a sensible chap', which expresses approval of wisdom. I want to find 
an interpretation of such admiring descriptions (taken to be equivalent 
in all important respects to 'wisdom is a virtue') which fits the feeling 
behind remarks of this kind. Thus, in explaining in what sense wisdom is 
a virtue, I intend to explain what it is that prompts people to speak 
admiringly of Smith and Jones. 
r.fy interpretation of the claim that courage is a virtue followed the 
line that part of what is meant by this claim is that a man is, in so far 
as he is courageous, admirable, as a man, that courage contributes to the 
living of a complete human life. Its value arises from its relation to 
that life, and its nature as a virtue is to be explained in terms of its 
being a pre-disposition. I shall now ask whether this is the sort of 
thing which lies behind the claim that wisdom is a virtue. The question 
is whether the man who possesses the virtue of wisdom can best be under-
stood as a man who is, as a result of his own efforts, at least partially 
qualified to live a complete life. If wisdom is a contributory factor in 
the living of a complete life, its value can be said to lie in its relation 
to 'that life, and if wisdom is a pre-disposition, something for which the 
agent is responsible, it can be said to be a virtue of the same type as 
courage. 
First, then, does wisdom equip a man to live a complete life? It 
might be helpful to consider the related question, whether an unwise man 
is ill-equipped to lead a complete life. Are impulsiveness, thoughtlessness 
and so on hindrances to the achievement of a complete life? I shall argue 
that they are incompatible with its pursuit and with maintaining it. For 
to pursue a complete life must involve having some idea about what would 
constitute such a life, and formulating at least a rough plan of how to 
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attain it.; And once it is attained, it must be actively lived - slipping 
back must be avoided. 
Now if it is possible to show that the complete life is for each 
agent something to be pursued as an end, and maintained when it is 
achieved, and not a life which some people happen, by a lucky chance, to 
lead, then we can say that wisdom is essential to such a life. What we 
must show, then, is that the complete life is a goal, something to be 
sought rather than stumbled upon. Although the concept of a complete life 
is still vague, it is safe to say that it involves the idea of living one's 
life as a human being to the full. It was seen that phrases like 'being 
the poorer for ••• ' and 'lacking something' were used of people lacking 
courage, or lacking convictions or standards. So, in the discussion of 
courage it emerged that people do have some idea, though possibly a vague 
one, of what it is to be a complete or rounded human being, and that this 
idea is an evaluative one. It is in this sense that Aristotle's idea of 
the excellence of a human being can be tied up with ordinary modern ideas 
about life which most people have that to live a good life is to do what 
one can as well as one can. The concept of what people are gives rise to 
an idea of what it is good that they should be, i.e. that they should give 
expression to their essence. The concept of human potentiality, whose 
actualization is good, seems to be basic to our thinking about human beings. 
The concept of the complete human life is related to this, in that it is 
one in which human potentialities are actualized.' 
If it is accepted that the complete human life is an achievementJ 
in that it involves the actualization of potentialities, then it is clear 
that wisdom has value in just the way that I am suggesting. For in order 
to show this, it was necessary to show that the complete human life is 
essentially an end to be pursued and maintained, rather than something 
which one might, or might not, live fortuitously. But if the complete life 
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is one in which potentialities are developed and actualized, it must be, 
not only a goal, but one which is to he reached by the use of wisdom. 
Wisdom, as a virtue, is really a matter of governing one's behaviour by 
reason, of thinking out what to do, and acting in accordance with policies 
rather than impulse. Wisdom of this kind is necessary if we are to achieve 
a complete life, since we must decide what we are capable of doing and 
becoming, and then work out how we should set about pursuing this end. 
Inso far as people vary, the complete life will be something individual. 
It might be that we consider some things to be basic ingredients in such a 
life: if so, we must say that there is some general human goal. The 
complete life could be described as a theme on which there are as many 
variations as there are individuals. But neither the general nor the 
individual goal can be reached without wisdom.' We can s~, consequently, 
that wisdom is valued, and is valuable, in so far as it is an essential 
ingredient in the complete life. In this respect, it conforms to the 
account I have given of virtues in general, and of courage qua virtue. 
But the question remains whether wisdom is a virtue in that it is a 
pre-disposition, since it might be objected that people do not set them-
selves to act wisely in situations where wisdom is demanded, but rather 
are or are not wise as a result of heredity or environment or even of chance. 
This objection, while possessing prima facie plausibility, rests on an 
unacceptable view of what wisdom is - possibly there is an assumption that 
wisdom, like intelligence, is something beyond one's control. Either you 
have it or ~ou do not, but either w~ not much can be done about it. So, 
in order to answer the objection, and to show that wisdom i! a pre-dispos-
ition and a virtue, it is necessary to give a more positive account of 
what wisdom is. 
Earlier, I said that the wise man was reasonable, prudent, not 
impulsive, and in general, having learned by experience, regulated his 
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behaviour by reason. Two points must now be stressed. First, reason 
must not be equated with intelligence: what we have here is practical 
reason in any case, but reason as such is not the same as intelligence. 
Secondly, reason in the sense of reasoning ability is not the whole of 
wisdom; other factors, such as sensitivity, are involved. 
The man who possesses practical reason, or wisdom
J 
may be said to 
have lmowledge both of ends and of means. He can recognize what is good, 
and he can say what means are both effective and, importantly, legitimate. 
A minimum intelligence will presumably be necessary for this, for although 
recognition of what is good might not require intelligent thought, 
recognition of effective means to an end often will. Thtertwill, there-
fore, be some people who are not possessed of the intelligence necessary 
for wisdom. But these people will not be capable of living a complete life 
in the full sense. They should be able to actuat~their potentialities, 
but their potentialities will be limited. Consequently, the fact that a 
certain degree of intelligence is necessary for practical wisdom need not 
lead us to reject the view that wisdom is an achievable goal for poeple 
who pursue a good life. Anyone capable of pursuing such a life, i.e. 
anyone who possesses the basic potentialities which are actualized in a 
complete life, does possess at least the minimum intelligence required, 
/ttot only by wisdom, but by any human being capable of virtue. Intelligence 
is therefore a necessary condition of wisdom, but is not identical with it. 
I shall conte~ therefore, that wisdom is indeed something which the 
agent must acquire by his own efforts. Wisdom, I have Claimed, is 
concerned both with ends and with means. The wise man recognizes what is 
good, and can (at least usually) work out how he can effectively and 
legitimately attain what he recognizes as good. Although we cannot st~,t 
from nothing, and require at least some natural awareness of what is 
good, we can, by thought and practice, enhance our natural awareness. 
The wisdom which is concerned with ends entails taste, discrimination 
and judgement, and I would argue that all of these can be improved by the 
agent. What he must do in order to improve them is not easily specified, 
partly because the ends which can be recognized cannot really be listed. 
It is therefore useful briefly to consider an example. A given agent is 
aware of the value of artistic activity. He considers it to be good in 
itself, in so far as it involves stretching his imagination and his 
powers in general, and also to be good as something which can develop 
sympathy and fellow-feeling. His particular interest, we may suppose, is 
Ii terature. Now his initial recognition of the intrinsic and instru ... 
mental value of literature will depend on various factors, including what 
he has been taught. But if he is to get anywhere with literature, either 
as writer or as reader, he must build on the foundation which has been 
provided. What he gets out of reading, say, will largely depend on what 
he puts into it. Reading simply will not count as an artistic activity 
unless the reader puts his own work into it, for only if he is willing 
to stretch his imagination will it be stretched. FUrthermore, reading 
can count as an artistic activity only if what is read can count as a 
work of art, and ultimately the judgment that this poem is a work of art, 
and that that novel is not, must be made by the reader himself. He may be 
guided by the opinions and judgments of other readers and critics, but in 
the last analysis he must judge for himself. So he must be aware, not 
only that artistic activity, or literary activity, is good, but also 
that this or that work is good, bad or indifferent. His judgments will 
to quite an extent depend upon comparison, on openmindedness and willing-
ness to learn, and .in general on an educated taste. The important point 
to be stressed here is that an educated taste is a taste or power of 
discrimination which the connoisseur himself has educated. If he likes 
only what he is told he ought to like, he does not possess educated taste. 
He can make distinctions but he cannot himself discriminate true value. 
Acquiring taste, discrmination and judgment therefore involves hard work, 
but if the end is recognised as worthwhile, the hard work will also be 
recognized as worthwhile. Thus, as far as this example is concerned, 
the awareness of the value of an end (viz. literary activity) intimately 
involves awareness of the nature and value of various sub-activities (ioe. 
awareness of what will count as literary activity, which will depend on 
a value-judgment concerning what is to count as literature), and involves 
also a recognition of what must be done if the activity is to be practised 
to the full, and a willingness to do whatever must be done. 
Someone who makes these judgments, and acts in accordance with his 
judgments, can be said to possess practical wisdom as far as one sort of 
activity is concerned, and he possesses it as a result of his own hard 
worko Now, I want to maintain that this holds of practical wisdom in any 
sphere of activity. I would also maintain that the activity of the wise 
man cannot be restricted to any single sphere since virtue consists in 
living a complete life and not a biased one. The man who knows all there 
is to know about literature does not count as wise unless he also knows 
other things, in particular, the moral good. One of the important facts 
about human beings is that they are capable inf moral activity, and the 
person who remains unaware of moral value fails to actualize one fundamental 
human potentiality. So the practically wise man has an awareness of what 
is morally good, and is capable of regulating his life in accordance with 
the moral demand. 
But people do not have this kind of awarness of the moral or a:ny 
other good, unless they cultivate it. Just as practice was seen to be 
necessary in the development of literary taste and judgment, it is 
necessary also in the development of moral judgment." For example, someone 
who consistently hardens his heart in the face of the suffering of others 
will most probably end up by becoming unaware of others' suffering, and 
by discounting its importance from a moral point of view. On the other 
hand, someone who cultivates sympathy for others will be all the more 
likely to judge that actions which cause suffering are wrong, those which 
alleviate it right, and will not only make this general judgment but will 
also recognise spec·ifie. cases of actions which cause suffering and are 
therefore wrong. In a moral judgment of this kind, it is clear that there 
are elements of both reason and feeling, and in developing a power of 
judgment it is necessary to develop both one's ability to feel and one's 
ability to reason. 
An agent who does develop both reason and feeling, with the result 
that his value-judgments are reliable, can be said to possess the virtue of 
wisdom. It-.4Qunts as wisG~ae-what--4a involved i~iable, ean '6e 
--said to pooeeeo the viFtue of wisdom. It counts as wisdom because what is 
involved is reliable judgment, and as a virtue because it is developed by 
the agent himself, as something which contributes to the living of a 
complete life, in relation to the agent's own goals and in terms of his 
other-directed actions. For as I pointed out earlier, one of the important 
facts about human beings is that they are capable of moral judgment and 
acti vi ty, and a human being who fails to develop his moral potentiality 
cannot be said to live a complete life. But it is largely through the 
development of wisdom, involving as it does reason and feeling, that the 
agent develops this potentiality, so its value does not reside simply in 
its contribution to the agent's personal development, but also in its 
contribution to the agent's development as a social and moral being. 
It follows from this that wisdom is a virtue in the same way as 
courage, as regards both nature (for it is a pre-disposition) and value 
(since it is a.contributory factor in a complete life). Now that this is 
established2, we may turn to a brief discussion of the third of the trad-
2Since the argument here depends on the concept of judgment, this position 
cannot be fully established until the interpretation of the value of judgment 
is established. For a discussion of judgment, see Part II, Chapters 3 and 
4 below. 
itional virtues, viz. temperance. 
3. Temperanceo 
The two main elements in the idea of temperance are, I think, the 
idea of self-control and the idea of moderation. Problems notoriously 
arise in connection with the notion of self-control, but there is a common 
use of the term which we all understand without finding it necessary to 
refer to division of the soul, higher and lower selves, and so on. In this 
ordinary usage, self-control is nearly as closely related to wisdom as it 
is to temperance. It involves doing what is necessary to achieve one's 
ends, even when the adoption of means to those ends is not easy. In 
Kantian terms, he who wills the end wills the means, and the self-controDed-
man will show that he really does will the end (rather than merely want it 
or wish for it) by using the means to his end. He shows self-control when 
he pursues his long-term goals at the expense of thwarting his immediate 
desires. Self-control can therefore be seen as an aid to wisdom and 
courage in the pursuit of a complete life. (Of course, if self-control 
is to count as an element in temperance, and consequently as a virtue, 
it must be manifested in the pursuit of good or acceptable ends o Self-
control can be put to a bad use, but qua virtue, ioe. as a contributory 
factor in the good or complete life, it is essentially directed to ends 
which are involved in such a life. Thus we see the inter-action of virtues, 
since self-control goes along with wisdom, which enables the agent to judge 
the value of ends, and the efficacy and legitimacy of means to the ends.) 
Self-control, then, as an eiement in tem~erance, is an element in 
virtue, if and when it has been cultivated by the agent3, and contributes 
to the pursuit and living of a complete life. 
So is moderation. Taking t~to excess is regarded as harmful in 
3~e idea of self-control essentially involves the idea of deliberate 
development by the agent, since self-control can be manifested only when 
there is something (e.g. desire) to be controlled. - Consequently, self-
control cannot be a natural or accidental quality, but requires develop-
ment and cultivation by an agent. 
various ways, depending on what it is that is taken to excess. Immoderate 
consumption of alchol - intemperance in the popular sense - is bad for one's 
health, if, that is, it is indulged i~eqUentlY. Obviously, from the 
'human animal' point of view, physical health is a good thil!l in itself, and 
it may also be considered to be a necessary condition of mental vigour or 
spiritual strength. So anything which is, in excess, bad. for the physical 
or mental health of a human being, should be taken in moderation. The 
temperate man is moderate, then, in the sense that he avoids taking things 
to excess, even when he is tempted to do so. He is not someone whose 
desires are always moderate, for then he would not practise moderation. 
Temperance, as a virtue, is manifested by someone who moderates his desires 
and actions, not by someone who has fewer or weaker desires ~:~ most 
people 0 
We should not restrict the idea of moderation as a virtue to activit-
"ies which are as such harmful or neutrai (for example, cruelty or drinking). 
Activities which are in themselves good can be harmful in excess. One can 
~ock too hard, spend too much time on enjoyment, and so on. (Cf. 'All work 
and no play ••• ·). Here the relation of the idea to that of a complete 
life can again be seen. A life entirely devoted to work, even congenial 
work, is thought to lack something essential - not only enjoyment, since 
one may enjoy one's work, but range or scope of activity. Similarly, while 
one can enjoy oneself in many ways, a life devoted to enjoyment is 
generally held to lack something. The attitude often taken towards play-
boys is not always moral disapproval, or even disapproval at all, but 
something closer to pit Yo They are missing something in life, some kind 
of extension of ability that is not required in a life of self-indulgence. 
So moderation is, one way or another, quite intimately connected with 
the concept of a complete life. Some kinds of immoderation are physically 
harmful, some are mentally harmful, and thereby limit the possibility of 
, 
the achievement of the good life. But an even more important element 
in our evaluation of moderation comes out when we consider moderation 
in work and pleasure. That is, moderation is an essential part of a 
complete life, because if one spends too much time on one sort of 
activity, one just does not have time for other sorts of activit yo The 
complete life is a balanced one. HUman beings are capable of doing many 
things, and unless a particular pur sui t is especially rewarding it may be 
thought that one pursuit is not enough. Too many pursuits are of course 
equally damaging, since if one attempts too much, one may end up not 
really doing anything. (This bears out some of what I said in connection 
wi th wisdom, which was seen to enable an agent to co-ordinate his ends 
and activities). 
However, when it is said that one pur sui t is not enough, the proviso 
unless a particular pursuit is especially rewarding needs elaboration. Fbr 
it may seem that there is an ideal which constitutes a counter-example to 
my claim that a complete life, which is essentially a balanced one, is 
the end which people do pursue, or think that they ought to pursue. This 
ideal might be called the ideal of dedication, and examples of people who 
pursue it are provided by some artists, by religious, and in general by 
people with vocations. So, for instance, a particular painter or composer 
who devotes all his time and resources to painting or music may be said 
to pursue and achieve a life which is recognizably good, without being 
complete and balanced in the way that I have characterized a good life as 
being. 
It seems that there are two courses of defence hereo The first is to 
deny that the life of the dedicated artist, or monk or whatever is good, 
since it lacks balance. The second is to admit that it is good, and 
re-formulate the relation between goodness and balance, in such a way that 
it will still be possible to maintain that a good life is complete in the 
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sense defined earlier. 
Now I think that it would be both tendentious and false to say that 
a life of dedication to a worthwhile end is not good, and that the ends 
l\ot 
of the dedicated artist and religious areA worthwhile. Accordingly, I 
shall follow the second line of defence, and attempt to show that the 
dedicated man does lead a complete life in the sense defined. 
I defined a complete life4 as one in which human potentialities were 
actualized, harmoniously. The value of balance and moderation therefore 
emerged as attaching to their contribution to the harmonious integration 
of ends and means in a complete life. But it seems that a life dedicated 
to one pursuit does not require balance and moderation in this way, since 
the dedicated man concentrates on the actualization of a single potential-
ity, e.g. the artistic. However, this appearance is misleading, for we 
cannot Qi~r reflection suppose that the painter develops a single talent, 
that of painting, and the composer the single talent of composing. Elther 
we must say that painting and composing involve the actualization of more 
thEiU one potentiality, or else 'c that the potentialities involved are 
complex. I am inclined to say that both of these alternatives are true. 
First, we may consider the claim that the potentialities involved in 
painting or composing are complex. Now to make the minimum claim, it is 
obvious that there are two ele~ents in the ability to paint, viz. the 
ability to see, and the ability to transfer to canvas what one sees. (The 
ability to see might have to be taken metaphorically, to cover what is seen 
in the mind's eye, as well as what is seen by the eye, though I am inclined 
to think, that the painter, however abstract his painting, must be able to 
see literally, since he must have the materials from which to abstract his 
'vision'). It is not enough to be able to put brush-strokes on canvas. 
The painter paints something, and however abstract the 'somthing' may be, 
4see p. '). ~ above. 
I1\Q i;Q.r" ilL 
its mankind is what has been observed. On the other hand, it is not 
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enough to be able to be, since the ability to frame a perfect landscape, 
portrai t or idea does not make a painter of someone who cannot transfer 
what he has seen or framed into a visual mediumo Similarly, the ability 
to compose is compounded of at least two elements, the ability to hear, 
and the ability to transfer what is heard dWilillto a musical medium. And of 
course in both cases, there are numerous 'abilities involved without which 
the activity of p~nting or composing cannot be perhaps - the ability to 
move one's hand, for instance, and also to keep one's hand steady. These 
physical abilities are at least necessary conditions of painting and 
composingo It is, anyhow, clear that the potentiality for painting, and 
that for composing, are complex, and involve different sorts of abilityo 
So the painter who is dedicated to painting must concentrate on developing 
various talents and skills, since otherwise he would simply not be 
dedicating himself to paintingo 
But it is also the case that a life dedicated to a pursuit such as 
painting invol ves the actualization of more than one potentiality, al bei t 
a complex one. That is to say, any human being who intends to dedicate 
himself to an art must develop capacities, dispositions, and so on, other 
than those which are required specifically for that arto For example, he 
must develop some form of discipline, since otherwise the likelihood is 
that he will not make the most of his talent. He must discipline himself 
to work even when he does not want to, to practise forms of painting which 
he does not particularly enjoy, and so on. But to say this is of course 
to say that he must develop some form of self-control, and to that extent 
be temperate. It might well be necessary also for him to develop some 
moral courage, as his art might demand that he should risk unpopularity, 
ridicule, and even '\BXious privations. Consequently,' although someone may 
devote his life to a pursuit called 'painting', it is not the case, and 
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cannot be the case, that he practises only one activity, or develops only 
one potentialityo If he did, he would never make a good ~ainter nor a 
dedicated one o 
It follows from this that, although people possessing a predominant 
talent may dedicate themselves to developing that talent, and may be said 
to lead a good life in doing so, it is still not the case that a good life 
can lack some range and balance. The artist may have to subordinate 
various activities and capacities to the primary talent, but in subordin-
ating them, whether by supressing them or by making use of them in his 
primary activity, he is compelled to achieve a harmonious balance of 
potentialities. In so far as his life involves this kind of complexity, 
and a deliberate organisation on his part of the elements of the complex, 
his life is good and complete in the sense I have defined. 
Finally, however, it must also be pointed out that, if my argument 
concerning the necessity of the actualization of moral potentialities is 
valid, then anyone who is to be said to lead a complete life must accept 
that he has moral commitments, and so whatever is necessary to fulfil them. 
He must therefore develop certain forms of capacity to judge morally, 
develop a certain sensitivity to the needs, claims and desires of others 
as well as of himself, etc. For this reason, we would have to deny that 
the artist who failed to accept his moral agency could lead a complete life, 
for he would fail to develop the moral capacities which are necessary in 
such a life. 
The life of an artist, or of any man dedicated to one demanding sort 
of life can therefore be seen to be good in so far as it is complete o For 
a complete life is one in which various potentialities, including moral 
ones, are harmoniously actualized, and dedication to art (or religion or 
medicine or teaching) must involve the development and control of various 
capacities, skills, and potentialities. It can be seen, then, that the 
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artist (or the man dedicated to any life) does not really raise ins~­
able problems for my thesis. Although his life is directed to a primary 
end, it must nevertheless possess balance and harmony among subordinate 
ends and among means to the ends, if it is to be described as a good life. 
It has been seen also that the life of the artist (that is,of the 
genuine or dedicated artist) is essentially a temperate one, since the 
artist must be disciplined, and therefore self-controlled, and must also 
practise moderation, in subordinating, controlling, and making use of, 
various desires, needs anq. abilities to the primary end. We may now say, 
therefore, that temperance is a virtue if and in so far as it involves the 
development of self-control and moderation on the part of an agent who 
recognizes the valuable contribution they make in a good or complete life. 
It is important not to be misled by the diversity of forms of self-control 
and moderation into supposing that some forms of life can be good without 
them. They are manifested in different ways in different sorts of life, 
but they are nevertheless involved in a:ny good life~' 
The third of the traditional virtues, temperance, can therefore be 
analysed in the same way as courage and wisdom. It is a pre-disposition 
(or a number of complementary pre-dispositions) developed by the agent, 
and is valuable for the part it plays in the pursuit and practise of a 
complete life. Three of the four traditional virtues can, then, be 
understood in terms of the concept of a complete life, and that concept 
itself can be better ~asped when we have understood why these virtues 
are considered to be virtues. 
4. Justice 
The fourth of the traditional virtues, justice, remains to be 
considered. It will be remembered that von '.[right rejected =-Q because 
it did not fit~s 'conceptual pattern t5, and it is possible to sympathize 
5 . 
See Ch. 1, p. 8' above. 
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with this reaction, since it does not look as though justice will fit 
easily into the framework I have erected. But we must not for that reason 
say that justice is not a virtue, nor must we be too ready to pull down 
the framework or to erect a separate one for justice. 
The concept of justice can be shown to be related to the concept of 
a complete life, but it is not related to it in quite the same way as the 
other three traditional virtues are. Those virtues can be described as 
'personal virtues', in that they are necessary conditions of an individual's 
attaining and retaining his goal, and also in that they are possible 
'desert-island' virtues. Justice, on the other hand, is an inter-personal 
virtue. It could not be a 'desert-island virtue' and its value lies not so 
much in the contribution it makes to the agent's own development, but in 
the part it plays in his relations with other people. That does not mean 
that it bears no relation to the 'comppete life'. It means rather that we 
must add another dimension to that concept. 
Now in order to discover in what sense justice is a virtue, that is, 
to discover what is its nature, and in what sense it has value, we must 
first discuss the manifestations of justice. For if we are to say what 
a just man is, and why we regard just men as good, we must first know 
what a just action is. Once we have discovered this, we will be able to 
say in what sense justice is an inter-personal virtue, and hence in what 
sense justice is a virtue. 
In my approach to a solution of these problems, I shall assume that 
it makes sense to. talk of justice as being manifested in certain kinds of 
action in certain types of situation, just as courage, temperance and 
wisdom are. By speaking in this way of the manifestations of Justioe, it 
will be possible to ooncentrate on what types of situation call for justice, 
and hence to place the goodness of just action, without first being 
committed to a particular position on the nature of justice in the 
individual (and it is in terms of justice in the individual that we must 
understand justice to be a virtue). Once the nature and value of just 
action has been determined, it should be possible to discover in what 
sense justice in the individual is a virtue, i.eo' what it is that is 
manifested in just action. 
The types of situation which call for, and indeed make possible, the 
manifestation of justice are, clearly, social situations. If the manifes-
tation of justice is thus restricted to the social situation (an assumption 
which will be defended later,) it follows that both the nature and value 
of justice are intimately connected with its inter-personalityo It is not 
simply that certain types of action are good in the social situation, but 
that those types of action cannot even be performed outside such a situationo 
Thus, the inter-personality of justice is a function of its nature and 
not merely of its goodness. But that is not to say that its inter-
personality is irrelevant to its goodness. If justice is possible only 
in the social situation., then it is ~ only in the social situation. 
That, at least, is true of its manifestations. But we must leave open 
the possibility that there is some sense in which justice as such (e.go 
:t a disposition) could be described as good independently of its 
manifestations, and hence outside a social situationo" At any rate, we 
may assume that goodness of this kind must be related to the goodness of 
the manifestations of justice, and that the goodness of justice may be 
understood in terms of the goodness of its manifestations. 
To say, then, that justice is an inter-personal virtue is, in the 
first place, to say something about the nature rather than the value of 
justice. A consideration of the inter-personal nature of justice should 
enable us to pin-point its goodness, rather as recognition of the kind of 
situation which calls for courage enabled us to pin-point its goodness. 
But the matter is rather more complex in the case of justice, because we 
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must discover whether or not justice, though essentially inter-personal 
can be personally good, and if so whether it is only secondarily so. More-
over, we must discover whether justice is, whether personally or inter-
personally, good in the same sense as the other virtues were seen to be, 
ioe. in contributing to the completeness of the individual human life. 
First, however, it is necessary to consider th4 inter-personal goodness 
of just acts. FOr the answers to the questions I have posed about the 
possibility of justice's being personally good will, in part, depend on the 
conclusions reached about its inter-personal goodness. If we can answer 
the question what it is about justice in its manifestations in a social 
situation which leads us to call those manifestations good, we will have 
succeeded in showing where the inter-personal goodness of justice lies. 
For those manifestations are, precisely, manifestations of social, or 
inter-personal justice. 
To start with, we may find it easier to approach an answer to the 
question by considering the other side of the question, viz. what is held 
to be bad about injustice? (I am looking here for an interpretation of 
ordinary reasons given for condemning injustice, not endeavouring to provide 
a detailed account of this difficult topic). The concept of justice is 
one with which most people operate within the fields of distribution and 
punishment, and it is most often employed within the fields of unjust 
distribution and punishment. Justice is often taken for granted, but 
injustice is not. 
We can distinguish between two types of injustice in distribution, 
viz. anjust distribution of benefits, and unjust distribution of rights. 
There is, I think, a clear enough distinction here in ordinary language, 
marked by the difference in emphasis of the terms 'unfair t and 'unjust t 0 
It is unfair, we might say, to distribute benefits unevenly, but unjust 
to distribute rights unevenly. Thus, it is considered unfair to give one 
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child more chocolate than another, but unjust that the advantages of 
. education should be unevenly distributed. In the case of 'unfairness' 
in the colloquall sense, if the child has a right to anything, it is not 
to the commodity which is being distributed, but to a fair share of that 
commodi tyo In the case of 'injustice' the child has a right to the 
commodity, e.go of education, and not merely to the same chance as otherso 
To take a marginal case, we might consider it e1 ther unfair or unjust for 
a parent to give a bicycle to one of his children and a bar of chocolate 
to another. Since the child does not have a right to the commodity 
(bicycle or chocolate), we might say that the wrong lies in the distribution 
and is thus a case of unfairnesso But we could say that he is being 
deprived of something to which he has a:right,viz.' parental attent1~ri or 
love, and if we look at the matter from this point of view, it seems natural 
to describe the treatment as unjusto 
It seems to me, therefore, that a distinction can reasonably be 
drawn between injustice and unfairness (which is of course a kind of 
injustice), and that the drawing of the distinction gives us two kinds of 
reason for condemning distributive injusticeo It may be condemned on the 
ground that benefits should be distributed equally among equals, and that 
unequal distribution is therefore bad, even though one would not condemn 
~ failure to confer any benefits on anyoneo Secondly, it may be condemned 
on the ground that each person has a right to what is being distributed, . 
and that the gains of some lead to the losses of others o Thus it is 
unjust to deprive some children of the education to which they have a 
right, in order to give a special education to others. It is not only 
the distribution which is wrong, but the deprivation in itself is wrongo 
So we seem to find two different types of injustice, which are bad 
in two different ways. There is the injustice of favouritism ('unfairness') 
and the injustice of deprivation ('injustice')o However, I am inclined to 
say that the favouritism type df injustice is real injustice, and that 
it is by an extension of the concept that we ca~ deprivation unjust. 
It is only when the injustice arises in a situation of distribution, where 
one person is deprived so that another may benefit, that the wrong is an 
injustice. When we describe deprivation as such, outside a context of 
distribution, as unjust, I think we are using the term 'unjust' as equival-
ent to 'wrong'. (The point would be, therefore, that, in the Aristotelian 
sense, we are concerned with particular rather than general injustice6). 
If so, then what is fundamental to the concept of distributive injustice is 
the notion of evenness of distribution, rather than that of the granting 
of rights. 
Up to now, I have deliberately used the nonc~mmittal adjective 'uneven' 
to qualify the noun 'distribution', but of course the term usually used 
is 'unequal'. It is, though, difficult to decide what is to count as 
• ~quality of distribution, since its use is often confined to those 
cases where the uneveness in distribution is held to be unjustifiable. 
Thus 'just treatment' is equated with 'equal treatment' which is identified 
with 'like treatment of like cases and unlike treatment of unlike cases'. 
One's use of the terms 'just' and 'equal' is therefore governed by one's 
judgment as to what is to count as like and what as unlike. So in order 
to get at what is usually meant by the term 'injustice', it is necessary 
to see what people tend to count as relevant likenesses and unlikenesses. 
Again, we may distinguish two types of distributive injustice, this 
time between unlike treatment of like cases, and like treatment of unlike 
cases. The example of the parent giving unfair shares of chocolate to 
his children is a case of the first. Why is this condemned? Primarily,. 
I think, it is because it involves treating the child as though he were 
something which he is not. It is denying hiJll the treatment which is 
6See Nicomachean Ethics Bk. V. 
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appropriate to his situation and status, which are in this case definable 
in terms of his relation to his sibling. It is true that it is important to 
treat a child as an individual, but this should not involve ignoring his 
'context' which includes his relationships with other people. His 
individuality is to some extent determined by the situation in which he, 
as an individual, finds himself. This suggests that the notion of a 
complete human life is relevant to the idea of this kind of distributive 
justice. To a great extent, it is up to the indiidual to make what he 
can of his life, but he does not start from nothing. His development must 
take place in accordance with certain factors in his environment, and two 
of the most important of these factors are his relationships (literal 
blood-relationships) with the people in his environment, and the way the 
people in his environment treat him. 
Thus, in order to give a child a chance to develop naturally, it is 
important to give due weight not only to his specific individual 
characteristics, but also to the pattern of relationships of which he is 
the centre~ In a certain type of society, where the small family unit is 
the norm, it is generally accepted that, say, a father should not merely 
treat a child as .!!!:. child, but as h!E. child. Opinion may vary quite widely 
-- 1 
about what counts as treating a child as one's own, from paying the nanny 
to devoting most of one's time to the child's education, entertainment 
and so on. But this variation is not worrying. The important point is 
that a given parent has his own ideas about what it is to treat a child 
as his own, and that though this treatment may vary in accordance with 
differences among the children (in age, sex, and so on), there is no 
reason why in general the ideas about what it is to treat a child as one's 
own should vary from one child of one's own to another. 
A father with two sons Ordinarily treats the boys as his sons, and 
the father/son relationship affect~ the treatment •.. Given that the father 
has some idea of what kind of behaviour is appropriate to this relation~ 
ship, his idea applies equally to both his sons. Often, giving presents 
or treats to his sons is seen as part of this behaviour. It is~a father 
that he wants to give special pleasure to his children. Consequently, 
where the treatment arises specifically from the parent's view of the 
parent/child relationship, there is no room for discrimination, though 
of course discrimination in accordance with the specific needs and capabilities 
of the individual child is appropriate. But its appropriateness is deter-
mined by the differences between the children, and not by the relationship, 
and when the behaviour is of the benefit-conferring type, there is no 
difference between the children. (I am not concerned here with punish-
ment, where the child might be deprived of a treat as a punishment.) It 
seems, then, t~t in such a situation, treating the children differently 
involves using two analogous relationships as though they were different. 
However, if this shows anything, it seems to be that such behaviour is 
unreasonable rather than bad. Its badness is concerned not only with the 
fact that the relationship is unreasonably used, but with the fact that 
the child himself is aware of whqt is going on~ As I pointed out, it does 
not matter much (within certain limits, which are not relevant here) what 
views a parent has about the behaviour appropriate to a parent/Child 
relationship, but it does matter that he himself should hold consistent 
views and should act consistently with those views. The child's relation-
ship with his parents is not merely the direct child-parent one, but is 
mediated by his other relationships so that his father is not merely ~ 
father, but also his brother's father. If he is aware that his relation-
ship with his father gives rise to treatment different from that.arising 
from his brother's relationship to his father, the probability is that 
his development will be adversely affeoted. 
But it is important not to let the idea of a 'complete life' which 
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has so far been employed blind us to other elements in this situation. 
The notion of a complete life is, I think, still relevant, but we need 
to widen the concept. There is a sense in which the complete life is a 
goal to be pursued, and this is important. But there is also a sense in 
which at a:rr:r time in one's life one may make the most of what one has, 
and failure to do this means that, at the time of failure, one's life is 
incomplete. The child who is unjustly treated is lacking something ~:e, 
and suffers from an inadequate relationship with his father, and in that 
sense his life is at present incomplete, as well as its being true that 
his development might be stifled. 
The generalize, to treat anyone with whom one has a specific type of 
relationship without due regard for that relationship, is to make too much 
of the individuality of that person, and not enough of the framework in 
which he leads his life. It involves disregarding an important part of a 
human being's existence, viz. that part in which he has certain relationships 
and ties, and is what he is as an individual because of what he is in 
relation to other people. 
It is reasonable to conclude, then, that injustice of this type, i.e. 
injustice in the conferring of 'pure' benefits, is condemned, at least 
partly, because it involves a failure to take this kind of consideration 
into account, and involves a restriction on what the individual can make 
of his situation in that it involves an artificially limited view of what 
that situation is. It involves an under-estimation of the complexity of 
relationships which go to make up an individual human being's llfe, and a 
consequent limitation on what the individual can make of his life. This 
is not the sole reason people do give for condemning injustice, but I think 
it underlies most of the reasons which are given. 
. . 
Having aonsidered the type of injustice which is involved in unlike 
treatment of like cases, we may now turn to that which is involved in like 
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treatment of unlike cases. There are similarities between the two 
types, and a vast borderline between the two extremes, but it is conven-
ient to treat them in isolation. The field of education offers fruitful 
eXamples for anyone concerned with notions of justice, and I shall draw 
on some of these examples in my discussion of the injustice of treating 
unlike cases alike. 
Education is to a great extent Goncerned with special cases. In 
forming a policy concerning the distribution of educational resources, it 
is necessary to consider many different kinds of ability and a vast range 
of abilities within those kinds. Some children are fairly good at most 
things, some very good at most things; some good at some and poor at 
others.' Anyone concerned with education is presumably particularly 
concerned to help children do what they are capable of doing as well as 
they can, and this involves helping the handicapped child to do simple 
things fairly well, as well as helping the talented child to do difficult 
things very well. If, as seems to be commonly supposed, this is the aim 
of the educator, it is glaringly inappropriate to offer the same kind of 
education for all. The education which'is offered must be geared to the 
capacities of those to whom it is offered.' If the teacher·treated all 
children as if their capacities were the same, therefore, he would 
necessarily fail in his aim, and would deprive many children of the help 
which it is his declared intention to give so, as far as education as such 
is concerned, the kind of justice which involves treating unlike cases 
differently is more relevant than that which involves treating like cases 
c<JtL1Se 
alike (though the latter kind 1s demanded when it is relevant of ~), 
since there are ~~1s~ilarities, and many basic dissimilarities. 
The point of education, then, is not to get all children to achieve 
the same standard, but to help all children reach the highest standard 
they' are capable of reaching, and if an educational system is unjust, it 
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is more likely to be so in that it ignores the differences in capability 
than in that it ignores the likenesses. The badness of this kind of 
injustice is very obviously related to the concept of. the complete life. 
The child who suffers from educational injustice is deprived of the 
opportunity to achieve what he is capable of achieving. 
However, i {"is in this that the badness of the injustice lies? It is 
wrOng to deprive any individual of such educational opportunities, and it 
is wrong because of the difficulty it creates for him in his pur sui t of 
a complete life. But the injustice lies rather in the failure to provide 
for some individuals what is being provided for others, and this is not so 
obviously connected with the complete life concept. Again, it appears to 
be the discrimination as such which is contemned by the epithet 'unjust', 
and not the deprivation of the individual who suffers from that discrimination. 
The badness of this type of distributive injustice as such, appears, like 
the other type, to be connected with relationships and the place of the 
individual wi thin a given framework, in this case the social framework. 
The kind of thing which I have in mind here is borne out by the common 
use of the phrase 'second-class citizen' to describe people who are 
treated as though they were inferior to other members of SOCiety. It is 
the idea of apparent inferiority that is important.' People in society are 
held to be unjustly treated not when they are treated merely differently, 
but when the difference in treatments indicates some belief that these 
people are not so important as others. The discrimination occurs, or 
appears to occur, as the result 'of a value-judgment about people or their 
contribution to society. 
One reason for condemning unjust discrimination in education, qua 
discrimination, is therefore that this involves an unacceptable assessment 
of value, possibly in an area where ~ assessment of value is possible. 
It is one thing to say that certain people's contributions are valuable, 
and therefore that they should be enabled to make those contributions, 
and'rewarded for maldng themo Thus we can defend the expenditure of 
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large sums of money on educating and training doctorso But it is quite 
another thing to say that some people are more valuable than others. Con-
sequently when, say, children of lower intelligence are not given full 
opportunities to develop their potentialities, the injustice is condemned 
because these children are being judged, and found wanting, as peopleo It 
is felt that the authorities consider them not worth the efforto This 
may not always be true of course - if discrimination is necessary because 
of limited resources, the basis for discrimination may be a consideration 
of the returns that education might bring. But when the difference in 
treatment does pre-suppose a value-judgment of the human being, or is made 
in such a way that it appears to, it is then held to involve an unacceptable 
and unjust discrmination between people, and a society which is run in 
accordance with some such principle of discrmination is held to be an 
unjust societyo In such a society, people are prevented from attaining 
a complete life, and prevented from doing so because it seems to matter 
less that some people should attain such a life than that others shouldo 
In a rather different way, then, it does seem to be the case that 
injustice is condemned because it involves a basic discrmination in 
judgment where no such discrimination is possible. A judgment is made 
about the relative importance of the human fulfilment of different people, 
when this is equally important in every caseo Thus the judgment itself 
is about human fulfilment, and the result of the unjust judgment is a bar 
. . 
to the achievement of such fulfilment 0 Justice in action may therefore be 
seen as good in that it involves the opposite - it is based on a 
recogni tion of the equal importance of human beings and their pur sui t of 
a complete life, and just treatment within society makes it possible 'for 
everyone to pursue this goal. 
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Very briefly now it is necessary to consider justice in the fie~d 
. , 
of punishment. Can justice in action here be seen to be good in the 
same way? The first condition for a punishment's being just is, of course, 
that thd person punished should be guilty. Secondly, it is generally held 
that the severity of the punishment should be in proportion to the gravity 
of the offence. These are, I think, the main considerations which are 
brought into an assessment of the justice of punishment. ~~ether or not 
a particular punishment is justifiable may depend on other considerations, 
but the judgment of its justice basically presupposes the i~portance of the 
guilt of the person punished and the fittingness of the punishment to the 
crime. 
Now clearly these two considerations are connected with the justice 
of discrimination. ~fuen we decide who is to be punished for an offence, we 
are entitled to discriminate only between the innocent and the guilty, and 
when we decide on the severity of the punishment, we must decide to what 
extent we are entitled to treat the offender differently from other people, 
both from the innocent and from other offenders. It is because discrimin-
ation is involved in these ways that punishment is a matter of justice, and 
not only of 'rightness as such. And I think that it is at this basic level, 
where questions about punishment are seen to be questions about justice, 
that the idea of the good or complete life can be brought in again, and in 
various ways. Fbr a start, the offender is someone who has, in a manner 
which is to be condemned, interfered with other people's lives. Secondly, 
punishment involves interfering with someone's life, both directly and 
indirectly. The punishment itself ~ whether it is in the form of 
imprisonment, a fire, or corporal punishment, is a direct form of inter-
ference, while the attempt to reform or deter the offender is an indirect 
form; the intention here is to change the direction of the offender's life. 
An unjust punishment may therefore be seen as one which involves a disregard 
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for the importance of human fulfilment, in one of various ways. An over-
lenient punishment may involve an under-estimation of the gravity of the 
original offence, while an over-severe one may be condemned because it 
rates the good of society or the good of the victim of the offence too 
highly in proportion to the good of the offender. And some kinds of 
punishment may be condemned because they involve a failure to consider 
the autonomy of the offender, and thus fail to allow for the part G£ the 
individual's own decisions and choices must play in the pursuit of a 
complete life. 
I do not think that it is necessary to go into this question in much 
greater detail. For as I suggested earlier, I think that any questions 
about punishment other than the most basic ones concerning its object 
(victim) and the justifiable extent of discrimination against its victim, 
are really questions about justifiability, or general moral rightness, 
rather than about justice as such. It is precisely because justice as 
such is concerned with discrimination and its justification that it can be 
seen as good in relation to the complete life of the individual. The 
relation is twofold. First, injustice involves discrimination between 
. individuals in a way which is unacceptable in virtue of its illegitimate 
assessment of the comparative worth of the quality of individual human 
lives. Secondly, because of this assessment, it erects a block to the 
achievement of a complete life. At a basic level, this holds of injustice 
both in distribution and in pubishment. Where considerations of other 
, .. 
types apply, I think we have moved away from the concept of justice 
towards a more general concept of moral rightness • 
. Inter-personal justice in action, can, then, usefully be analysed 
I 
: a' in terms of the concept of the complete life. It is possible, though, 
to see justice as a virtue in the individual, as the other three tradit ... 
ional virtues are? 
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So far, I have been concerned with justice as manifested in action, 
and therefore particularly with the considerations which may be held to 
underlie our judgments as to the justice of actions or policies of action. 
Since justice in action is possible only in an inter-personal situation, 
it followed that in a primary sense the goodness of justice must be an 
inter-personal goodness. The goodness of justice in this sense has been 
seen to tie up with the concept of the good life of individuals, in that 
it is good in so far as it involves a recognition of the equal importance 
of the good life for all individuals, and avoids discrimination where no 
difference exists. Thus, justice as manifested in action is connected with 
the concept of the good or complete life, but especially with the idea of 
the good life of other people, whereas courage and so on were essentially 
concerned with the good of the agent. 
However, we speak not only of just actions or policies of action, but 
also of the just man. The question arises therefore whether the just man 
• 
is simply one who performs just actions or has a just policy of action, or 
whether he is more than that. Is there, for instance, a sense in which the 
just man could still intelligibly be described as a just man in a desert-
island or non-social situation? And is there a sense in which we may say 
that it is personally good to be just, as it is personally good to be brave, 
wise and temperate? 
First, it is intelligible to speak of a just man in a non-social 
situation? There is one sense which could be given to this concept, but 
I don't think that in the end it will do. I am thinking of the interpre-
tation of 'just' as a description of a behavioural disposition. In this 
sense, a man could be described as just even when he had no opportunity 
to perform just actions if it were the case that he would, given the 
opportunity, perform just actions. If there were other people around, 
such a man would give equal weight to their claims to have an opportunity 
to pursue a good life. In rather the same way, it might be thought, we 
can say that a man can be just even when he is asleep, since the same man 
waking performs just actions or has a policy of just action. But this 
second case is rather different. We know what it means to say that the 
just man is just even when he is aieep because we know what it means to 
say that he is just when he is awake. But I don't think we do know what 
it means to say that the man on a desert-island would be just if he had the 
opportunity, nor consequently, what it means to say that he is dispositionally 
just. Now, we can make sense of the claim that he would be just if ••• in 
one way, namely by thinking of him as a product of society who has been 
cast away on a desert-island, for then we would mean that he was just when 
he had the opportunity, and probably will be just when he has the oppor-
tuni ty in future. 
But if we don't mean, when we say that a man id dispositiona1ly just, 
that he was just and will be just in future, but have in mind rather a man 
who has always been outside society and has always lived on his desert-
island, then we don't, I think, know what it means to say that such a man 
is just in any sense. This is because such a man could have no concept of 
justice, and while he might, if he lived in society, acquire this concept, 
we cannot say that he now, possessing no concept of justice, ~ just, even 
dispositiona1ly. 
, This kind of dispositional account of the virtue of justice seems to me, 
therefore to be meaningless. It is possible to give some kind of dispositional 
~ 
account, but it must be one concerned with actual, and not with hypothetical, 
dispositions. That is to say, if we want to say that a just man is one who 
is disposed to act justly, we must mean by this either that he ~ act 
justly when the opportunity arises, or that he is prepared to act justly 
if the opportunity arises, but not that, lacking a concept of justice, he 
would act justly if the opportunity arose. In this dispositional sense 
(which is of course pre-dispositional, depending as it does on prepared-
ness), the man on a desert-island could not possess the virtue of justice. 
Nor do I think that there is any sense in which we could describe as just 
a man who is not and never has been in an inter-personal situation, and 
has consequently had neither the opportunity to act justly nor to acquire 
any concept of what it is to act justly, nor, therefore to become prepared 
to act justly if and wh~n the situation demands. 
This does not mean that justice cannot be a personal virtue, but only 
that if it can be, it is still possible only in an inter-personal environ-
ment. Here, I think that a consideration of various notions connected with 
selfishness can cast some light on the notion of justice. The man in the 
extreme desert-island situation can be ~ither selfish nor unselfish. He 
cannot worry about, or do things for, other people, for there are no 
other people. Nor can he think that he is more important than other people, 
since he does not know that there are other people. But one could, 
perhaps, make sense of the claim that a man in a desert-island situation 
was self-centred~, Being self-centred does no~ necessarily mean putting 
oneself above other people, but rather thinking too much about one's own 
comfort, and that sort of thing. Thus we could envisage two men on two 
desert-islands, one of whom was more self-centred than the other. Perhaps 
he worries about his health, or thinks about his own reactions to his 
environment rather than seeing the environment as something separate 
from himself. One man might be found by his rescuters to be an expert 
on desert-island flora and fauna, while the other is an expert on the 
edible and poisonous properties of the plant and animal llfe of the island. 
Now I think that if we relate the concept of justice to the two 
concepts of unselfishness and unselfcentredness, we can discover a sort 
of fringe sense in which a man on a desert-island could be described as 
-just. But it is hardly close enough to the centre afthe concept of justice 
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for us to say that such a man really is justo 
The just man in society is one who is prepared to give due weight 
to the importance of the claims of others to the good lifeo His concern 
is especially to regard all people as equally important in this way. He 
is, therefore, not the same as the unselfish man who is willing to balance 
the claims of others against (or even rate them above) his own, for the 
unselfish man could still be unjust. But though justice and unselfishness 
are not identical, the just man must be unselfish - his own claim must 
count for him as everybody else's does. ' The just man does not discriminate 
at the basic level of the judgment of the relative worth of the good of 
individuals, and he does not, therefore, discriminate in favour of himself. 
But he could still be self-centred, irhe self-centred man is fond of himself, 
but he doesn't necessarily put himself before others in either judgment 
or action. Nevertheless we could say that unselfcentredness was 
conducive to justice, since the man who is not unduly fond of himself 
should find it easier to be unselfish. He has the right temperament for 
justice. 
But there is another sense of 'self-centred' by which we mean that 
the self-centred man values himself highlyo . This kind of self-centredness 
is, as we shall see, directly opposed to the moral attitude. It is 
acceptance of one's role as a moral agent, and adoption of a moral attitude, 
which enables the naturally self-centred man (the one who is fond of him-
self) to be unselfish and justo 
Now the second kind of self-centredness, the high valuation of oneself 
which is opposed to the moral attitude is·not, I think, possible for the 
man on a desert-island, nor is i~opposite, i.e~1 lack of self-centredness, 
or in other words the adoption of a moral attitude in relation to other 
people. This kind of self-centredness (and its opposite) is an attitude 
which is possible only in an inter-personal situation, where there are 
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other people whom one might rate lower than oneself. 
We can now see why it is not possible either to be just, or to have 
a just disposition, outside society. It is not possible to be just, 
because to be justly pre-disposed, one must acquire the concept of justice, 
and this concept cannot be acquired in complete isolation from other 
people. And it is not possible to have a just disposition, because to 
be just in this sense is to have adopted a particular attitude towards 
other people. It is not a matter of caring about people or things other 
than oneself- that is unselfcentredness, but not the kind which is to be 
equated with justice. It is a matter of being unselfcentred in a particular 
way, viz, by being prepared to regard the lives of other people as equally 
important, in relation to each other's and in relation to one's own. 
The virtue of justice can therefore be seen to be a pre-disposition 
we have seen that it is misleading to think of it as a disposition unless we 
stress that it is an acquired disposition, a question of disposing oneself 
to consider other people. And the value of justice lies in its relation 
to the good life of people within society. In discovering this we have 
discovered also the nature of justice. That is, it is an attitude, one 
adopted towards other people, and involves a preparedness to consider the 
good life as equally important for every individual. In other words, 
,. 
justice qua virtue is a pre-disposition concerned with the equal claim to 
importance of each individual •. 
Finally, without yet going into detail, it should be pointed out that. 
there might be a way in which justice could he regarded as a personal virtue, 
since to be just is partly to have adopted a moral attitude, and if we 
regard the development of one's potentialities as a moral agent as a part 
of the complete life, we may. say that in becoming just, a human being 
becomes something that it is good that he should be,.7 •. 
7See Part I, Ch. 3 below. 
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5. Recapitulation 
Now that this conclusion has been reached, we m~ reconsider briefly 
the nature and value of the other three traditional virtues. It can now 
be seen that, qua virtues, all four of the traditional virtues are pre-
dispositions, and are valuable in so far as they contribute to a good or 
complete life. 
First, then, courage was seen to be manifested in a situation where 
the agent fears an apparent danger, but recognizes that he must face the 
danger if he is to achieve his goal of a good life. Thus, the brave man 
is not only the man who ~ face danger, but one who is prepared to do 
so when it is necessary in his pursuit of a good life. He values the good 
life more highly than he values an easy life, and having decided what is 
a good life for him is willing to adopt the means to his endo So courage 
involves a judgment of the value of a particular kind of life, and a 
preparedness to act in accordance with one's judgment. Having established 
his priorities, the brave man is ready to live in accordance with them. 
Consequently, when we say that courage is a virtue, what we mean is that 
the man who possesses this virtue has adopted an attitude towards the good 
lifeo He is, in other words, pre-disposed to be courageous. 
Wisdom also is a pre-disposition. A man was said to be wise in so 
far as he formulated some judgment concerning what constituted a good life 
for him, and formulated some policy of life, whereby he knew what he must 
do in order to achieve such a life, and was willing to stand reasonably 
by his policy. So this virtue again is a conscious one, and not simply a 
disposition or an inclination. What is required of the wise man is that 
re should possess, in Kantian terminology, a rational will. He judges what 
is good, and sets himself to act in accordance with the judgment. He too 
adopts a particular attitude with regard to the good life, and is pre-
disposed to think before he acts, and to act in accordance with his judgment. 
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Finally, we may reconsider temperance under the heads of self" 
control and moderation. Self-control may immediately be seen to be a 
pre-disposition in the relevant sense. Since being self-controlled is 
essential to living wisely, the main point to be made here is that one 
recognises that the pursuit of a good life necessitates a willingness to 
overcome one's inclinations, and to avoid too much impulsive action which 
might jeopardize the achievement of one's long-term aims. So having judged 
that certain things are part of his good, the self-controlled man sets 
himself to do what is necessary in order to achieve that good, and decides 
to be ruled by reason rather than by inclination. This too is, in the sense 
defined, to have a pre-disposition to be self-controlled. 
As for moderation, it too may be regarded as a pre-disposition in so 
far as it is a virtue. Some people may be naturally moderate in desire, 
but qua virtue, moderation is a part of temperance and is tied up with 
self-control and an attempt at balancing one's life. Moderatioh, considered 
as an element in temperance, is a pre-disposition, since one judges some 
kind of harmony and balance to be good, and sets oneself to achieve such 
a balance even when one is tempted to move towards an extremeo 
The fourtrad1tional virtues, justice, courage, temperance and wisdom, 
can therefore be seen to share important characteristics with regard both 
to their nature and to their value. As to their nature, they are all pre-
dispositions. Their value derives from the relations they bear to a good 
or complete life, whether of the individual or of other peopleo These 
virtues can be said to constitute the hard core of virtueo 
6. Minor Virtues 
But though these virtues are central, they are not the only oneso 
There is a comparatively large group of what might be called 'changeable 
virtues', that is, virtues which are rated more or less highly by different 
people at different times, or which can even cease to be regarded as virtues 
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at all. They are neither cardinal nor constant, and yet it has not 
seemed odd to describe them as virtues. 
Among these virtues, we find ch~ty, thrift, generosity, magnificence, 
hUmility, pride and many others. Now I think that once it is recognized 
that the concept of a virtue is closely connected to the concept of a 
good or complete life, we find it easy to see both why these have been 
regarded as virtues, and why there has beeh, as it were, a fashion in 
such virtues. For it is certainly the case that ideas about what kind of 
life is a good life vary from one age and place to another, and that 
changes in judgment about the nature of a good life, and consequent shifts 
of attitude towards certain kinds of life, are precisely what have given 
rise to different evaluations of humility, magnificence and so on. It will 
not be possible to deal really adequately with this question, though a 
detailed study would be fascinating, for an adequate survey would require 
, 
complex historical and sociological research. But it is possible by 
reference to one or two of these virtues, to indicate the lines which 
such a survey would follow. 
The assessment of chastity, for instance, as a virtue, may be said 
to be dependent upon three factors, all of which are subject to change. 
The first is religious belief, which may be modified or rejected~ The 
second is a belief in the value of a'small family unit, of monogamy, and 
faithfUlness within marriage, and other beliefs concerning marriage which 
• 
might be based on religious beliefs. (I'm thinking here of, say, different 
beliefs about the part played within marriage by sexual relations.) Thirdly, 
there are various social and medical advances which can render chastity 
obsolete as a means to an end of avoiding unwanted pregnancy, or sexually-
transmitted diseases. 
Because these various factors determine the individual's classification 
of chastity a& a virtue, ~ change in these factors can affect the classif-
ication. (Alternatively, they can lead to a change in belief as to the 
kind of behaviour which is to count as a manifestation of the virtue of 
. 
chastity. ,For sometimes the name of a virtue is retained, while the 
relevant beliefs and(naviour alter. T?is may to some extent depend on the 
convenience of retaining a word with persuasive force. Thus, some people 
migh~ suggest that fidelity to one's partner is a manifestation of 
chastity whether or not one is married to that partner.) A rejection of 
certain religious doctrines can be one factor which leads to a rejection 
of the classification of chastity as a virtue at all. ' So can a change about 
the. nature, function or value of marriage - and all sorts of changes are 
possible here: one may ce~e to belief that marriage is socially or 
economically worthwhile, or may think that marriage has more to it than' 
the procreation of Children, and so on. In these two cases, changes in 
belief about the nature of a good life, or elements in it, lead to changes 
in belief about the value of something which is held to contribute to that 
life. Conversely, it may be that one rejects one's previous conception of 
the good life because one changes one's view of something like chastity -
a life of chastity may be seen as incomplete, because it lacks fulfilment 
in parenthood, or a full expreSSion of love, for instance. But the two 
concepts, of a good life, and of chastity as virtue or non-virtue, are 
~ :-
very closely related. In the third case, of course, the person who 
j 
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previously found chastity good as a means to an end"not change his eval-
uation of the end. He has found a means which he prefers. 
If, then, we see a virtue such as chastity, in relation to the 
concept of a good or complete life, we can see how changes in the assess-
ment of such virtues comet about in accordance with changes in the 
concept of a good life or with changes in the possible means to the 
achievement of such a life. 
These conclusions may be borne out by a brief consideration of another 
changeable virtue, thrift. Two important considerations govern the 
assessment of thrift as a virtue. One of them is primarily concerned with 
the concept of a good life, but in this case the concept itself is governed 
by various social and economic factors. The person "rho values thrift is 
in general someone who rates security as an important part of the good 
life. He prefers to do without non-essentials so that he can enjoy peace 
of mind knowing that he will never be seriously in want. Furthermore, he 
may value self-sufficiency, so that although he need not feel insecure, 
he prefers not to depend for his security on state assistance. Thus, 
such a man's concept of a good life includes the qualities of i~depen~ 
dence and self-sufficiency. Within some kinds of society, however, this 
sOEt of idea may seem inappropriate: this is what I mean by saying that 
the concept is partially governed by social and economic factors. For 
instance, one may continue to rate security highly, but not caring about 
self-sufficiency, be willing to depend on the state. Alternatively, thrift 
may not seem to be an effective means to security, so that although we 
would like to save for old age, the rate of inflation might make one think 
it more sensible to spend what one has while one can get something for it. 
FUrthermore, an insistence on self-sufficiency may appear inappropriate • 
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.Again, inflatlon may make it impossible" In any case, it might be argued, 
depending on the state is not like 'accepting charity', since one has 
made one's contributions. And one may take the view that since so many 
people receive state assistance, it would be unfair to oneself to refuse 
it. In such cases, one's evaluation of security and self~sufficiency 
change because of various social factors, and a change in the evaluation 
of these virtues leads to a change in one's evaluation of the contributory 
virtue of thrift. On the other hand, the evaluation of security and self-
suffieiency may remain the same, but thrift be down-graded because it is 
seen not to be an effective means to their achievement. We cannot, there-
fore, entirely divorce the soci~-economic factors which govern the 
evaluation of thrift from the other factors, such as a desire for security 
and self-sufficiency. But we can see how both sets of factors are related 
to the concept of a good life, and how the nature of the society one lives 
in may force one to change either one's views as to what kind of life is 
good, or alternatively the policy one adopts to achieve such a life. 
Thrift, can, then, be described as good in so far as it contributes to 
a life which is regarded as good, and it may be rejected along with a 
rejection of the value of such a life, or alternatively may be rejected as 
an unsatisfactory means to the attainment of such a life. (Of course, there 
are other reasons for valuaing thrift, eogo regarding wastefulness as sinful, 
believing one must do one's bit for the under-privileged countries, and 
so on, but these reasons are still related to one's ideas of a good life.) 
It can now be seen that because the concept of what constitutes a 
good life may, and indeed must, change in accordance with changes of belief 
of various kinds, and with changes in social, economic and technical 
spheres, it follows that there are bound to be changes in assessments of 
some of the non-cardinal virtues, and that these assessments can be 
. 
expected to take place in accordance with assessments of certain kinds of 
life, and beliefs about the means to the achievement of such kinds of lifeo 
These virtues are policies, ways of life, or in the defined sense pre-
dispositions to behave in certain Wtys when the situation demands it, and 
policies and pre-dispaitions must be changed in accordance with changes in 
the ways of life to which they contribute. 
The concept of a good or complete life is now seen to be useful in 
eliplaining both the nature and value of virtues, both cardinal and other-
wise. Armed with this concept, and with the conclusions I have reached 
concerning the nature and value of the various virtues, I shall turn now 
to a discussion of benevolence and consCientiousness, in order to discover 
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in what sense they might be virtues, and to discover what role they have 
to play in a good life. This discussion will enable us to advance our 
investigation of moral goodnesso 
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Chapter 3 
The Relationship Between Virtue and Virtues 
In this chapter, I propose to examine the parts which are played by 
love and conscientiousness in a virtuous life, and to establish the source 
of their value. This will make it possible to clarify the concept of moral 
goodness, and will provide a foundation for a theory of conscientiousness. 
A useful starting point is provided by the controversy between 
philosophers who want ,to define moral goodness in terms of conscientious-
ness, and those who define it in terms of love. The latter argue that 
conscientiousness is either a second-rate substitute for love and the 
virtues, or at best is just one virtue among many. Love or benevolence, 
it is said, really is ,the supreme virtue. The benevolent man does not 
need to be conscientious. Virtue comes naturally to him. I shall argue 
that the whole disagreement is based on a misunderstanding, and that love 
and conscientiousness are not rival contenders for the title of supreme 
virtue. but that both of them possess a unique value. Conscientiousness. 
however. possesses a unique moral value. 
Obviously, part of the defence of the value of conscientiousness can 
be based on an attack on the idea of virtue 'coming naturally'. Enough 
has been said about the virtues to enable us to say that a virtue is not, 
and cannot be, merely something that 'comes naturally'. :But a full 
defence of conscientiousness cannot be mounted until we have reached some 
understanding of the nature and value of benevolence~' 
To start with, it is essential to sort out just what is meant by the 
term 'benevolence'. Commonly, I think that benevolence is held to be a 
kind of good feeling towards mankind in general. A benevolent man is one 
who likes other people and who cares about their welfare. However, 
philosophers who speak of 'benevolence' tend to have one of two distinct 
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meanings in mind. Some of them mean 'love', and others, holders of a 
more Kantian position, mean 'beneficence', i.e. practical as opposed to 
pathological love. 
I intend to attack both the views which m~ be represented by the 
statement that benevolence is the supreme virtue, viz. that love is the 
supreme virtue, and that beneficence is the supneme virtue. It should be 
remembered that the views which I am attacking are, when fully stated, 
to the effect that love or beneficence as opposed to conscientiousness are 
supreme 0 There are two ways, not incompatible, of attacking these viewso 
First, it may be shown that love is !!2i the supreme virtue. My argument 
for this will be based on the claim that the concept of a supreme virtue 
on which this kind of view is based is fundamentally confused. Secondly, 
it can be argued that, though there is !!. sense of 'supreme virtue' in 
which benevolence can be said to be supreme, its supremacy in this sense 
is not incompatible with the unique moral value of conscientiousness. Thus 
benevolence is not a rival to conscientiousness. 
First, we may consider the claims that love is the supreme virtue, 
and that it is therefore somehow superior to conscientiousness. And by 
'love' we may understand either practical or pathological love. In so far 
as it is possible to separate these two, practical love may be identified 
with beneficence, and will be considered below~< Here, I intend to discuss 
the claim that pathological love is the supreme virtueo 
The argument against this can be stated very brieflyo Basically, it 
is to the effect that pathological love is not a virtue at all and there-
fore cannot be the supreme virtueo If the analysis of virtue that I have 
offered is accepted, it is clear that pathological love cannot be a 
virtue, for virtues are pre-dispositions, whereas love is an emotiono 
There are two possible replies to this argument. The first is that love 
is, in an appropriate sense, a pre-disposition. 
First, then, it is suggested that since love is, after all, a virtue, 
it cannot be the case that virtues are pre-disposi tionso Now I think that 
if we accept this argument, we commit ourselves to an untenable position 
with regard to virtues other than loveo For if the essence of virtue is 
to be found in love, it follows that the other 'virtues' which I have 
discussed, and which have for centuries been regarded as cardinal virtues, 
are not really virtues at all o Since love is just not the same sort of 
thing as justice, courage, and so on, an insistence on the virtuousness 
of love rules out the virtuousness of the traditional virtues. Thus if 
love is not a pre-disposition we may reject the second reply made above, 
and with it a great deal of. support for the first. 
That love and the traditional virtues are quite different sorts of 
thing can easily be seen. The essence of pathological love is th~t it is 
an emotion or feeling. Not only is it essentially an emotion, it is 
essenti~ly natural, in the sense that it is not something over which we 
have full control. We may be able to subdue it, or channel it, but we 
cannot turn it on or off to order 0 The traditional virtues on the other 
hand are in the first place essentially Fe-dispositions and not emotions, 
and in consequence are essentially non-natural, not only in that we can 
choose, or set ourselves to be, brave or just, but in that courage or 
justice are virtues only when they are adopted like thiso The difference 
between love and the traditional virtues is therefore located at a very 
deep level 0; 
It may be suggested, however, that the distinction I am drawing is 
based on a mistaken idea about the nature of emotion, and the sense in 
which it .is describable as natural. Love, it might be argued, is not an 
uncontrollable gush of feeling, but is a human development of a mere 
primitive animal feeling, which my argument mistakenly identifies with 
love. But if this is so, how are we to determine at what stage the primitive 
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feeling becomes love? Surely it is more accurate to say that there is a 
range of feelings,~om the very primitive to the humanly developed, .. 
which may all be called love. I am not denying that emotions may be 
specifically human, but I do want to maintain that it is unrealistic to 
,-, 1 
distinguish feelings felt by animals and feelings felt by human beings. 
The important point, anyway, is that although love m~ not be an uncon-
trollable gush of feelingt,:it is in an important sense outside our 
control, i.e. in that it cannot be turned on and off. If love is a 
development of a more primitive animal feeling, it has its roots in that 
feeling. It is not a development in that it is separable from its root, 
but ia that in every human being the primitive feeling may grow and 
develop into a controllable emotion. 
If this is so, pathological love is still importantly different from 
the traditional virtues, which were seen to he pre-dispositions. The 
feeling from which love develops is still a primi~ive form of the same 
feeling.' But in the case of the pre-dispositions which are ,virtues, the 
pre-disposition is not a development of a more primitive form of the same 
pre-disposition. It is rather a controlled response to a feeling which is 
different from the pre-disposition. Courage involves settIng oneself to 
face what one fears, temperance to doing without some objects of desire, 
and so on. If pathological love were the same sort of thing, one would 
expect it to involve, say, setting one self to be nice to people from 
whom one recoils. But this simply is not what pathological love is, even 
in a sophisticated form. 
I think we can admit, then, that love is, in the most important 
respects j different from the traditional virtues.' It follows from this 
that if one maintains that pathological love is the supreme virtue, ene 
is committed to denying that the traditional 'virtues' are really virtues 
at all.-' For love and, say, courage, are of such essentially different types 
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that we cannot say that one of them is the supreme thing of its kind, and 
that the other is an inferior thing of the same kind. Comparison is not 
possible. 
We are left, therefore, with the choice between saying that love is 
not a virtue and saying that the traditional virtues are not virtues. Now 
since it is possible to identify both the nature and value of traditional 
virtues in terms of the part they play in a good life, it would be pe~verse 
to deny the name of virtue to those pre-disposi tiona which are describable 
as virtues because they share a property or properties which render them 
good for man. One would need a very good reason for taking this step, and 
the wish to describe pathological love as a virtue is not a good enough 
reason. Given the choice between love and the traditional cardinal virtues, 
it is only reasonable to choose the latter. 
Since pathological love is not a virtue at all, it cannot be described 
as the supreme virtue. What this means of course, is that pathological 
love cannot be described as the supreme virtue among others. But this is 
not to say that there is ~ sense in which love is describable as a virtue. 
But if we do maintain that there is a sense in which love is a virtue (as 
we might say that in some sense practical love or conscientiousness are 
~irtues), we shall have to distinguish between different kinds of virtue, 
in terms both of nature and of worth. One type, for instance may be seen J 
to possess moral worth, another type some other kind of worth. 
For the time being, however, it is enough to show that pathological 
love cannot be the 'supreme virtue' since it is not in the relevant sense 
a virtue at all. But a more serious contender, it may be thought, is 
practical love. Nany philosophers might object to the preceding argument 
on the ground that when they say that love is the supreme virtue, they are 
speaking of practical love. This claim makes better sense than the 
previous one, and I shall attempt to show that, provided the claim is 
properly understood, there is not necessarily any disagreement between 
the supporter of practical love, and the supporter of conscientiousness. 
E1ther practical love is a virtue among others (even the supreme one), or 
it is a virtue of a different kind, or even not a virtue at all. In none 
of these cases is it a rival to conscientiousness. If it is one virtue 
among others, it is no more a ~ival to conscientiousness than courage, 
temperance and so forth. If it is a virtue of a different kind, or not a 
virtue at all, it is still not superior to conscientiousness, since it is 
different from that, too. 
First, let us adopt the suggestion that practical love is the supreme 
virtue among others. This means that, while it is superior to courage, 
temperance, justice and so on, it is the same kind of thing, and may be 
graded according to the same criteria. To see whether this is a tenable 
position, we must consider the nature, and the source of value, of practical 
love. 
What is practical love? It is, essentially, a way of doing rather 
than a way of feeling, compatible with practical love but not dependent 
upon it. Sometimes it is suggested that to show practical love is to act 
as if one felt patholoeical love for the person helped. This is, I think, 
misleading, since there is no one particular way of showing pathological 
love, and since even harming someone may tn some circumstances be a way of 
showing pathological love. For instance, a jealous outburst does not show 
that what is felt is not love. There is no need to equate 'love' with 
'good love'. Of course what a possessive mother feels for her child is 
love - that's why she is possessive. But in so far as her actions are 
harmful, she does not show practical love. Consequently, I prefer to keep 
the ideas of pathological and of practical love apart. We may, I think, 
follow Kant in defining practical lo~ in terms of helping others, and of 
treating them as ends and never merely as means. In New Testament terms, 
loving one's neighbour means doing as much for him as one does for one-
self, and recognizing that as a human being he is of equal importance to 
oneself andotherso If we define practical love like this, we can~hat 
J\ 
love is, in the sense defined, a pre-disposition, since one ~ts oneself 
a policy of loving action in accordance with a value-judgement of human 
beings. That is, one sets oneself to help other people because one recognises 
that they are important. It should be noted that, although practical love 
is not based on pathological love, and does not involve acting as if one 
fel t pathological love, i t ~ involve some degree of tacto Even if one 
helps other people in a spirit of grim. duty, it matters that they should not 
be hurt, and therefore it is true to s~ that carrying out one's duty in an 
overtly reluctant manner is bado I think it is this idea which underlies 
the common assumption that in showing practical love one acts as if one 
felt love. The truth of the matter is that in showing practical love, one 
sets oneself n2i to show dislike or reluctance o Tact is part of the 
attitude or pre-disposition. 
So far, it looks as though practical love does not differ very much 
from justice. It is a pre-disposition, it involves setting oneself to 
help people, and it is based on a judgment of the e'lual importance of 
individual human loveso But though there is this strong similarity between 
love and justice, the only way in which they may be identified is by 
making justice a part of love, for they are not co-extensiveo Justice, as 
-IS 
we saw, te an inter-personal virtueo But love must be both personal and 
inter-personal, if the Kantian definition of it is to be acceptedo The 
formulation of the categorical imperative by which Kant expresses the 
command of love runs, 'so act as to treat human! ty, whether in your own 
person or in that of a:ny other, always at the same time as an end, and 
I 
never merely as a means'. The important reference here is to your own 
person'. Practical love is not manifested only by recognizing the 
lSee Grundlep;ilng 
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importance of other people, but also by recognizing one's own importance. 
Some kinds of self-sacrifice are not justifiable in terms of practical love. 
If you and I are of equal importance, then you are as important as I, but 
I am also as important as YOU o 
It follows from this that while justice, as being essentially concerned 
with methods of distribution and consequently as heing essentially inter-
personal, is not a possible desert-island virtue, practical~ve is, since 
if it is possible at all to treat oneself as an end, one may do this on a 
desert island as well as within society. 
Thus, practical love can be said to share with the other virtues the 
characteristic of being a pre-dispositiono Its goodness can also be 
explained in the same terms as the goodness of the other virtues, ioeo, 
in terms of its relation to the good or complete lifeo Where it differs 
from the other virtues is in the relation it bears to the complete life, 
both of the individual and of other peopleo 
Kant argues that treating people as ends - showing practical love -
has both a positive and a negative aspect. Negatively, one treats someooe 
as an end in so far as one refrains from treating him merely as a means 
to some other endo We recognize that he too is an individual with aims 
and purposeso In other words, as a rational being, he has a concept of a 
good life, and seeks to harmonize his ends in a systematic whole. Not 
only does he seek fulfilment in this w~y, he has a right to do so, and a 
duty to do so when he is tempted to go for the short-term gains to the 
detriment of his long-term ends. Positively, we treat others as ends by 
making their (morally acceptable) ends our own. In this sense, practical 
love means that we should not just avoid hindering other people, but should 
exert ourselves on their behalfo 
The same applies to the display of practical love in the sphere of 
self-regardo I treat myself hegatively as an end when I refuse to gratify 
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my inclinations when their gratification would jeopardize the fulfilment 
which my rational nature demands o Positively, I treat myself as an end 
by pursuing fulfilment as a rational beingo 
Thus Kant analyses practical love in terms of positive and negative 
respect for the attempt to actualize the rational potentialities of human 
beings, whether those potentialities are one t s Oim or someone else' so 
This seems to me to be an acceptable analysis of the concepts which 
underlie the idea of loving one's neighbour as oneself. If, then, we do 
accept this analysis, it is easy ~o see both why practical love resembles 
a virtue (in nature and in value) and also why it is misleading to 
describe it as the supreme virtue, thus implying that it is of precisely 
the same type as other virtueso 
Since practical love is a pre-disposition, and one which is valued 
because of the contribution it makes to the search for the complete life, 
it is similar to, and valued for the srune kind of reason as, other virtues. 
But it is sufficiently different from them to lead us to deny that it is 
one, albeit supreme, among others. For it can be argued that practical 
love emcompasses the other virtues, or that courage and so on are aspects 
of practical love in different sorts of situation, whether the virtue in 
question is personal or inter-personal, since practical love can be eithero 
Thus, we can say that practical love is not ~ virtue, or the supreme 
virtue, which would suggest that we could sometimes have to choose between 
love and, Sa::! courage or justice, but rather is virtue as such. The 
particular virtues are particular forms of loveo Being just is one way 
of showing practical love for others, being brave or temperate a way of 
showing practical love either for oneself or for other people. So is 
being wise. For wisdom, as we saw, involves knowledge both of worthwhile 
ends, and of effective and legitimate means to those ends. Thus, in planning 
wise policies of action, either I show prudence, which is one way of showing 
self-love, or else respect for others, in recognizing the importance of 
other people and helping them to pursue their ends, or at least refraining 
from hindering them. So we may say that it is because justice, courage 
and so on are ways of showing practical love that they are seen to be good, 
and practical love is seen to be good because it governs the pur sui t of 
the good life for oneself and others. 
Hm·/ever, it looks as though I have amended the opposition's case in 
such a way that it presents an even greater threat to my own. If practical 
love encompasses the particular virtues, does that not make love and virtue 
identical? And in that case, where does conscientiousness come in? It 
would surely be too neat a solution to identify love and conscientiousness. 
At this point, it is necessary to remember that a distinction is to 
be drawn between the concept of virtue as such and that of moral virtue. 
A life may be good without being morally good, and a man may be (non~ 
morally) good in so far as he leads a (non-morally) good life. Now I have 
argued that a complete life is one in which human potentialities are act-
ualized, and that a genuinely complete life is one in which the moral 
potentialitgee is necessarily actualized. If the moral potentialities 
are not actualised, the life is good up to a point but not complete. It 
2 possesses worth but not moral worth • 
.J;earing this in mind, we can argue as follows. .AI though the value 
of practical love, as a pre-disposition which encompasses particular 
virtues, is indisputable, it does not follow that it is a rival to 
conscientiousness. Just as it did not make sense to call love the supreme 
virtue because comparisons between it, the generic virtue, and particular 
virtues.are impossible., it does not make sense to describe it as superior 
to conscientiousness which is, so to speak, in a different league. Neither 
does it make sense to speak of conscientiousness as the supreme virtue, 
since that implies that its value is not uniQue. Both love and conscient-
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iousness possess unique value. This is not self-contradictory, though I 
think the belief that it is underlies the attempts to rank love above 
conscientiousness in the same scale. But they are not in the same scale, 
and in their different spheres they each possess unique value. 
In order to defend my case, therefore, it will be necessary not only 
to Shovl that conscientiousness does possess a unique value, but also to 
show that it is a different kind of thing from, and therefore incomparable 
with, love, as far as its value is concerned. I do not propose to say very 
much now, since Part II below will be largely devoted to a discussion of 
this topic, but I shall indicate the lines which the discussion will follow. 
First, it is necessary to establish what is to be understood by the 
term 'conscientiousness'. As with the term 'love', my usage will be 
Kantian, though I am not suggesting that it is a statement of Kant's own 
position. Thus, in Kantian terms we can say that conscientiousness is 
manifested in acting for the sake of the law. But to avoidance reference 
to 'the law', which raises numerous questions not directly related to my 
enquiry, I shall use the formula 'doing what is right because it is seen 
to be right'. The conscientious man, therefore, is one who does the 
right thing just because it is the right thing to do. His will is good. 
Someone is to be described as conscientious in virtue of his motives for 
action, and not in tarms of his actions themselves, though it will be seen 
that the nature of the actions must have some bearing on our classification 
and assessment of the motives, and consequently on our application of the 
° to 3 term consc~en ~ous. 
In what way(s) ioes the conscientious man differ from the man who 
acts out of love? A point which must be stressed is that in practice, 
in his actions, he need not, and most probably will not, differ at all. 
Far from being incompatible, love and conscientiousness are closely related. 
3see Part II, ch. I and 2. 
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But they are not identical, and the criteria for the application of the 
terms 'Iovine' and 'conscientious' are differento Conscientiousness is 
manifested in doing what is right because it is seen to be right. Love 
is manifested in acting bravely, or justly, or whatever, in situations where 
a particular virtue is called for by the pursuit of the good life. Now if, 
in a particular Situation, it is necessary to continue one's pursuit of this 
end by the practice of, let us say, justice, if, that is, the situation 
demands the performance of a just action, then it seems to follow that 
the right action to perform is the 'just one o Therefore, both love and 
conscientiousness will, in such a situation, b~ruanifested through the 
performance of the just action. 
The difference between the loving act and the conscientious act is 
to be found in the motivation, though even here the difference is Chiefly 
one of emphasiso In the particular situation of the example, the one 
external action is the just action, the loving action and (usually) the 
conscientious action. But the action is just, loving, and conscientious 
in virtue of different characteristics. 
It is clear, to start with, that since the just act is the act that 
does not discriminate between equals, or does not fail to discriminate 
between unequals, an act is objectively justo Its justice does not depend 
on the motive or the will of the agent, but on the circumstances of the 
case.4 Of course, it may not always be easy, or even possible, to 
discover which the just act in a particular situation is, but that does 
not mean that we need deny that there ~ an act which is just, or least 
unjust, as being the one which lays weight as evenly as possible on the 
claims of all the individuals involvedo So the just act may be done from 
any motive, since its justice is not subjective, though of course if it is 
, 
done from a bad motive it is not the act of a just man. 
4see Part II, Ch. 20 
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Similarly, the act which is demanded by practical love in a 
partifUlar situation is capable of determination by objective criteriao 
For instance, the act demanded by love in the example under consideration 
is the just acto In another situation, it might be the brave or the 
temperate act, but in each case it makes sense to say that the situation 
demands a particular act of the agento 
Thus it is possible to determine what the virtuous act in a situation 
is, by reference to objective criteriao But, it will be seen, tr~s is not 
I 
necessarily true of the conscientious act, which depends rather on the 
agent's experience of the demands of the situationo5 However, even in the 
case of the just or the loving act, the motive is not irrelevant, for the 
virtuous man is not merely the man who performs objectively virtuous acts, 
but the mru1 with certain pre-dispositions, i.~o the man who has set 
himself to do the kinds of action he conceives to be good. A virtue is 
manifested in an action when that action is performed by an agent with the 
appropriate pre-disposition. 
At this point, it might be suggested that practical love and conscient-
iousness are after all merging into each other, since it now appears that 
an agent's motives determine the virtuousness of his actions, and he cannot 
be said to manifest the virtue of love unless he has the appropriate attitudeo 
Since conscientiousness is manifested in the performance of an action seen 
as right' , and performed because it is seen as right, and since practical 
love is mar~fested in the performance of actions perfo~med in pursuance 
of a virtuous policy, doesn't it seem rather hair-splitting to distinguish 
the two? 
In answerinc this question it is helpful to distinguish between the 
goal of conscientious action, and the goal of loving, or virtuous, action. 
We m~ say that the goal of loving or virtuous action is the good, while 
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the goal of conscientious action is the right. The difference is one of 
emphasis, primarily, since, as I shall argue 6 , the gooi and the right are 
explicable in terms of each other, and the good and the right action will 
often in practice be the same.. But they might not always be, and 
certainly at any rate there is an important difference in emphasis, in 
terms of which we can understand the difference between practicQLlove 
(= non-moral virtue) and conscientiousness (= moral virtue or goodness). 
The good, which is the goal of virtuous action, is, as I have 
explained, the good Dre, i.e. the actualization of human potentialities 
in oneself and in other people. Thus we can say that the end of the 
virtuous man is the human good. Now what is important here is that the 
virtuous man mayor may not see the human good in terms of morality. If 
he sees it in terms of morality, he will think of it as that at which he 
ought to aim. It will be a matter of duty. And he will recognize that 
moral as well as other potentialities ought to be developed. Such a man's 
goal is a moral good, and his motivation is morally good. He is, there-
fore, morally virtuous. He manifests both practical love ~ oonscient-
iousness, for his goal is the life of virtue which manifests practical love 
in the performance of particular virtuous actions, and his motivation is 
obedience to the moral demand. There is no split in this case between 
practical love and conSCientiousness, for the morally virtuous, or 
conscientious man does have as a goal the life of virtue definable in 
terms of practical love. But the virtuous man need not see the human 
good in terms of morality. He may m.ther see it as something valuable, 
as a worthwhile (or the most worthwhile) end, towards which he feels it 
worth making a contribution.. It is not that he thinks he ought to pursue 
his goal, but that it is a worthy cause to which to devote his life. For 
my argument, it doesn't really matter whether there are people who do see 
6 Part II, ah. 2. 
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the good in this way, though I think that there areo "lhat matters is 
that if there were such people, we would call them virtuous. And of course 
there is no reason to refuse to call them virtuous. They have decided 
what is worthwhile, they have worked out policies for aChieving it and 
they have set themselves to aim at it. In other words, they have the 
appropriate pre-dispositions, and they are virtuous. Thus one may be 
virtuous without feeling morally committed to the pursuit of the good, 
and this point may be expressed by saying that the goal of the virtuous 
man is the good. The man whose goal is the good in this sense is there-
fore virtuous, but non-morally sOo Although his actions manifest 
practical love, they are not morally virtuous o So although the conscient-
ious man manifests practical love in a life of moral virtue, the loving man 
need not be conscientious. His goal can be the good rather than the right. 
But, by definition, the goal of the conscientious man is the right. 
He performs actions which he recognizes as right because he recognizes 
them as right. in other words, he recognizes a moral de~and. The conscient-
ious man is, ipso facto, virtuous o He is the virtuous man who ~ see 
the good in terms of morality, and not merely in terms of a worthy cause. 
This is why it is tempting to assimilate practical love, virtue and 
Bd it I:{ 4 fY45 1-0. ke t;, do ~,be_cau~ IA.i'h4°l..L cC'Jt...z.sc.u~t.°ous.~.0 
conscientiousnesspinvolves practical love, and is virtue of a particular 
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kind, viz, moral, practical love/virtue is not necessarily conscientious, 
since it is not always moral. 
It should now be clear why I propose to defend the claim that 
conscientiousness alone is morally good. Virtue is of course good. 
Practical love, i.e. generic virtue, possesses the characteristic which 
leads us to call particular virtues good, i.eo a special relation to the 
good life, or human good. But it possesses moral e~odness only when its 
goal is the goal of morality, ioe. the human good seen as something at 
which we are morally obliged to aimo In other words, it is morally good 
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only when it is manifested by the conscientious mano But since practical 
love is possible without conscientiousness, we should reserve the title of 
moral good for conscientiousness which, I shall argue is always morally 
J 
It can be seen, therefore, that the main objections raised in the name 
of virtue to the claim that conscientiousness alone is morally good are 
ill-foundedo They assume that various specific virtues such as courage 
are the same kind of thing as love, and that love is the same kind of thing 
as conscientiousness. From this assumption follows the further mistaken 
views that the values of the specific virtues, of love, and of conscient-
iousness, are comparable, and that conscientiousness is inferior to love, 
with which it cannot really be compared. Conscientiousness is not superior 
or inferior to love, because its value is of a different kindo (Though it 
could perhaps be argued that moral value as such as superio~ to any other 
kind of value). 
Of course, the conclusions reached so far about conscientiousness have 
not yet been adequately defendedo FUrthermore, since they concern part-
icularly conscientiousness in relation to virtue, they are largely negativeo 
But now that some of the confusions which arise in discussions about the 
value of conscientiousness have been cleared up, it will be possible to 
begin a more detailed and positive discussion about the nature and value 
of conscientiousness o In Part II, I shall provide such a discussion. 
PARI' II. CONSCIElWE AND CONSCIENTIOUSNESS 
Chapter 1 
Conscientious~Some Misunderstandings 
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In Part I, I sought to show that love is not a rival to conscien-
tiousness, and that conscientiousness is not to be attacked by means of 
comparison with other virtues, general or specific. However, it is nec-
essary to consider some attempts to show that conscientiousness is not 
the supreme virtue, for they embody not only the mistaken assumption that 
love is ~ virtue among others, but also a misidentification of conscien-
tiousness with some other attitude, which may be like conscientiousness 
while being, in the most important respects, different from ito In an 
attempt to show what conscientiousness is, it is both necessar,y and useful 
to consider discussions which are based on such misidentifications. A 
mistake of this kind is made by Nowell-Smithl , when he seeks to show that, 
while conscientiousness may be valuable, it is not the supreme virtueo 
Interestingly, in his use of examples of 'conscientious action' he makes 
a double misidentification. A detailed discussion of these examples will 
enable me not only to show what kind of behaviour is not conscientious, 
but also to develop my more positive argument about the nature of conscien-
tiousness and conscientious actiono 
First, however, we may consider some usages of the term 'conscientious' 
in popular speech, and also in a more strict sense, so that various con-
clusions about the meaning and implications of the term may be applied in 
a consideration of Nowell-Smith's position. 
10 Non-moral conscientiousn~ss. 
Popularly, the adjective 'conscientious' is quite often used pejor-
~thics (Pelican) p.241ffo 
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atively, at any rate in an oblique way. In this usage, it is closely 
akin to the term 'scrupulous', and both terms are used implicitly to 
deny the possession of qualities which are regarded as valuable e The 
scrupulous man, in this sense, is the man who concerns himself so much 
with the nigglinc details of morals that he fails to respond adequately 
to the moral demand. He lacks breadth, and consequently is incapable of 
dealing with important moral problems, which require a flexible approacho 
The conscientious man (in the popular sense) is often scrupulous too, 
though conscientiousness and scrupulosity2 are not identical. Scrupul-
osity implies a deficiency, since it is incompatible with the qualities 
which are possessed by the morally freer, • more flexible moral agent. 
Conscientiousness also implies a deficiency, sometimes in the same way 
as scrupulosity, but sometimes (perhaps more often) in that in this pop-
ular sense conscientiousness is a substitute for virtues in which the con-
scientious man is lackinge 
It is important here to be clear about what the popular attribution 
of conscientiousness does implr, and what, less rigorously, it suggests. 
Unlike scrupulosity, conscientiousness is not necessarily a bad thing, and 
this can be seen if we consider the suggestions of deficiency carried by 
both terms. As I pointed out, scrupulosity may accurately be said to im-
ply a deficiency, since it is incompatible with qualities regarded as good. 
One cannot be both scrupulous, and broad, free or flexible, in moral mat-
terse It should be noted that this is so if we use the term 'scrupulous' 
in a general sense. Very often it is used adverbially to qualif~ such ad-
jectives as 'honest', and of course the scrupulously honest man may be in 
general morally flexible. But the man who is describable as 'scrupulous' 
in general (the man of scrupulosity) is one who is in general rigid, nig-
gling over trifles, and altogether lacking in an acceptable sense of prior-
ities. And so, in so far as the scrupulous man is rigid, he cannot be 
21 use 'scrupulosity' rather than 'scrupulousness' to name the niggling 
harmful attitude of the sort of person in question. 
85 
prepared to face wider moral issues in the right frame of mind, and over-
all cannot be expected to deal satisfactorily with questions about the 
relative importance of different moral issues. He is, therefore, morally 
deficient 0 
Conscientiousness, even popularly, is rather different. \Vhile des-
cribing someone as 'conscientious' suggests that that person is deficient 
in certain qualities, it does not imply it. In order to expand on this 
distinction between implication and suggestion, I shall take a non-moral 
example of the use of the term 'conscientious', vizo the example of the 
reference. 
It is usual, when one is writing a reference, not to be explicit in 
one's criticisms. Sometimes, in the case of a quality which is necessary 
for the job, the convention may be simply not to mention that quality if 
the applicant lacks it. Thus, since living-in maids, for example, had to 
be clean, hard-working and honest, one would, in writing a reference for 
a maid who had been idle, say merely that she was clean and honest. The 
prospective employer would gather from this that she was not hard-working. 
Similarly, if one wrote that she was clean and hard-working, it would be 
inferred that she was not honest. This method of getting across all nec-
essary information by judicious omission can be quite effective in cases 
where there is a small finite number of qualifications for the job. The 
matter of \'1riting a reference can, !:Iowever, be more complex, for various 
reasons. For instance, an academic tutor may not know enough about the 
non-academic qualifications of the stUdent., Alternatively, he may not 
know exactly what personal qualifications the job requires. Furthermore, 
different types of people may be equally fitted, in different ways, to do 
the job. The lack of one qualification may be compensated for by the pos-
session of another, but the referee may find it difficult to judge to what 
extent some qualifications off-set others. For these reasons, among others, 
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he has to compose a reference very carefully, but to help him he has 
access to a store of conventional terms or phrases which are usefully, 
though not rnis1eading1y, vague or ambiguous. One such term is, of 
course, 'conscientious'. (In a way, this is unfortunate, for philoso-
phers, like other academics, often write references for students, and 
are, I suspect, influenced in their philosophical views of conscient-
iousness by their familiarity with this specialised conventional attrib-
ution of ito) 
We may suppose, then, that a tutor is writing a reference for a 
student who has applied for a post in, say, the Civil Service. The tutor 
is not quite sure what a civil servant ought to be like, but may think 
that clearheadedness is important, while originality is not essential. 
Reliability and punctuality are presumably also important. For the pur-
pose of writing the reference, how is the tutor to differentiate between 
the student who always hands in a mediocre essay on time, and the one who 
arrives a day late with an interesting and well-researched piece of work? 
This is where he can make use of the term 'conscientious', but he must be 
careful about how he uses it. If the writer of the mediocre essay is not 
to blame for its mediocrity (for he n~y, after all, be punctual with his 
work because he spends little time on it), if, that is to say, he is not 
only reliable over handing in work, but also about preparine it, then 
the tutor can say that he is a conscientious student. 
Now this usage is, I think, what many people have in mind when they 
think of conscientiousness as a substitute. The applicant described by 
the referee as conscientious is not a particularly good student, but in 
so far as hard work and application can be used as means to the end of 
academic attainment, he may reach the level of attainment reached also 
by the brighter but less conscientious student. But conscientiousness 
even in this context is not really a substitute. The tutor may write as 
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though it were, but th~t is because he is trying to praise the student 
so far as he can without conveying a false impression about his ability. 
The referee records his impressions as accurately as possible by stress-
ing the conscientiousness of the student, while refraining from comment 
on his ability. If he thinks that in this case the student will get on 
as well through hard work as a brighter student would, he must say so. 
otherwise, it will be assumed that, althoueh the student possesses sterl-
ing qualities, he is not ver,y good at his subject. Thus, conscientious-
ness in a student is one thing, ability is another, and in the comparatively 
rare cases where conscientiousness can effectively act as a substitute for 
ability, it is necessar,y for the referee to say that this is so. 
On the other hand, we may consider the second type of student, that 
is, the one who hands in interesting and well-prepared work late. Just 
as punctuality on the part of the poor student was not necessarily a sign 
of conscientiousness, since it may have been achieved through skimping on 
work, so unpunctuality on the part of the good stUdent is not necessarily 
a sign of lack of conscientiousness. It may well be that he is consistently 
late in handing in his essays precisely because he works hard in preparing 
them and is reluctant to put punctuality above good work. If he finds that 
it takes him eight days, instead of the more usual seven, to prepare a good 
essay, it is not unreasonable for him to demand eight dayso (It would, of 
course, be more reasonable for him to explain the situation to his tutor, 
and to have a tutorial ever,y eight days instead of weekly; equally, it 
would be sensible for the tutor to suggest such an arrangement. Oddly, 
such a solution does not often seem to occur to either student or tutoro) 
At any rate, unless one regards punctuality as a necessary element in con-
scientiousness, one may, as referee, fairly describe this student as con-
scientious, though to avoid confusion with the first kind of student one 
must employ some such formula as 'Not only is he .00 (interesting, intelligent, 
,. 
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good at his subject), but also conscientious, hard working. e .' Now ~ 
use of the term 'conscientious l does suggest that conscientiousness is 
not just not a mere substitute for other qualities, but that it can be, 
and is, regarded as a valuable complement to them. The referee refers 
to the conscientiousness of the student because he wants to make it clear 
to the prospective employer that the student is more than merely good at 
his subject. 
Finally, in an extreme case, the referee may feel obliged to draw 
attention to lack of conscientiousness on the part of the student. If 
the student has a flair for his subject and is capable of good work, but 
is erratic in attendance at tutorials, fails to do background research 
(even if he presents original and good work without it), and so on, the 
referee may feel that his student is not a good candidate for the job, and 
will make this clear in his reference, whether explicitly or by omission. 
These considerations enable us to see more clearly to what extent, 
and in what way, the attribution of conscientiousness implies some def-
iciency in the person to whom it is attributed. The referee, we have seen, 
has, broadly speaking, three types of student to deal with in references. 
There is, first, the 'conscientious student'o The conventional use of 
the term 'conscientious' is such that the student who is described merely 
as 'conscientious' is understood to be not ver,y good at his subject. Sec-
ondly, there is the student who is 'not only good 000 but also conscient-
ious'. This formula may be used to commend the applicant highly. He pos-
sesses both natural ability and also qualifications of character, and may 
therefore be regarded as well-fitted as a candidate for the job. Finally, 
there is the student who 'has a natural flair for the subject'. If the 
referee says this, and stresses the student's ability, while saying nothing 
about his application to the subject, it may be understood that the student 
lacks the useful qualification of conscientiousness. These are, of course, 
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over-simplifications, but I want only to indicate how, in general tenns, 
formulae involving 'conscientiousness' in the popular sense are used, so 
that the relationship between conscientiousness in this sense, and def-
iciency in the conscientious man, may be clarified. 
There is, as the example shows, a use of the term 'conscientious' ac-
cording to which the conscientious person is understood to be deficient 
in some ability. In this use, conscientiousness may be considered to be 
a substitute for the lacking ability, depending very much on the particular 
case. (For instance, to confine the example to the case of students and 
academic work, beyond a certain point conscientiousness is no substitute 
for mathematical ability, but a student who is conscientious may do as well 
at a subject requiring an extensive knowledge of facts as a more intelligent 
student does.) Whether or not conscientiousness can replace the lacking 
ability, though, the suggestion conveyed by the use of the formula or con-
ventional term, 'conscientious' is that the conscientious person does lack 
some ability. But it must be stressed that this usage is a formula, and 
that conscientiousness as such is not incompatible with ability. Thus, 
the best student is probably both able and conscientious. This corresponds 
to the conventional use of 'honest' to describe the inefficient maid. 
Honesty is clearly compatible with efficiency, and a maid who is both hon-
est and efficient is obviously better than one who is merely honest, or 
one who is merely efficient. The non-conscientious, erratic but able stu-
dent is roughly equivalent to the maid who is honest and clean but not hard-
working.Honesty and cleanliness are compatible with hard work, but the 
maid who is described merely as honest and clean is tacitly accused of idle-
ness. 
So while there is this conventional use of the term 'conscientious', 
by means of which the referee tacitly accuses the conscientious applicant 
for a job of a lack of some ability, we must be aware that, even in the 
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conventional context of the reference, the attribution of conscientious-
ness does not imnly a deficiency. The convention works because it in-
volves not only the use of positive terms, but also the omission of terms 
which, it is knovrn, would be included if they had any reference. It is 
not the attribution of conscientiousness which damns the applicant, but 
the deliberate failure to attribute ability to him. In describing their 
students as conscientious, referees may be damning them with faint praise. 
But we must not let the damnation and the faintness blind us to the praise. 
Conscientiousness even of this type is Esood, but it may not be an adequate 
qualification for a job. 'iVe may say the same of academic ability. It may 
be a necessary qualification, but it is rarely sufficient. 
In this popular usage, then, conscientiousness is often stressed as 
a virtue which is found in people who are deficient in natural ability, but 
though it may be, and is, f01md in such people, it is also found in people 
who do possess natural ability. The conscientious student works hard. It 
may be that hml~ (or student) nature is such that most people work hard 
only if they have to, and hence that most conscientious students are untal-
ented ones who have to work hard in order to get through. But quite apart 
, 
from the fact that this seems an unduly pessimistic view of human nature, 
even if it is true, it is true only as a generalisation, and not univers-
ally. For it is a fact that some talented people do work hard,and that 
ability and conscientiousness are not only compatible, but complementary. 
The suggestion of deficiency carried by this use of the term 'conscien-
tiousness' is, therefore, just a suggestion and not an implication. That is 
to say, neither is it logically necessary that the (popularly) 'conscien-
tious' worker is untalented, nor is it a fact. 
2. Moral conscientiousness and dullness. 
Now that we can see that conscientiousness of a non-moral kind does 
not imply dullness, and that it is merely a convention that has lent a dull 
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flavour to it, we can turn to a consideration of conscientiousness (in 
the popular sense) in the moral sphere. The suggestion of 'dullness' 
carried by 'conscientiousness' is secondary. The primary suggestions 
(or even implications) are of reliability, and, especially, industry. 
My impression is that the important element in the popular attribu-
tion of conscientiousness is that of industry,3 but that the suggestion 
(merely) of dullness is also included. The morally conscientious man is, 
in the popular sense, the man who works hard at morality. Hence, it is 
supposed, he is dull and insensitive. The view that the morally con-
scientious man is dull in some way involves two presuppositions, neither 
of which need be accepted. The first is that hard work is boring, and 
makes a bore of the industrious man. The second is that morality, or at 
any rate duty, is distasteful, or rather that it is distasteful to do one's 
duty when one realizes that that is one's duty. These presuppositions 
are not essential to the view that conscientiousness equals dullness, but 
they do lend it a spurious support. 
As far as the first presupposition is concerned, the only sense in 
which it is true is this - that some people who work hard concentrate on 
a narrow area of work, and that they have no interests outside their work. 
Such people may have a tendency to talk shop, and some shop is boring. On 
the other hand, many hard workers have a wide range of interests,~thin or 
outside their work-areas; many of them do not talk shop, preferring to get 
away from their work in periods of leisure; and of those who do talk shop, 
some are and sooe are not, bores - the shop itself may be either. interest-
ing or boring to the layman, and the talker of shop may talk boringly or 
interestingly. So in general, we cannot accept that hard work turns a 
man into a bore. Nor does it make him insensitive (the accusation of 
3It will be seen that this element is also important in the 'real' as 
opposed to the I popular , meaning of conscientiousness. 
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dullness suggests insensitivity too). Any generalisations about hard 
work are bound to be inaccurate, for so much depends on the nature of 
the individual who undertakes it, and on the nature of the work to which 
he devotes himself. 
There is no reason to suppose that working hard at morality is more 
unfortunate in its effects on the worker than working hard at the prac-
tice of medicine, or teaching, or making cars. But there may appear to 
be such a reason, for it is, I think, supposed that hard work at morality 
is necessar,y only for those who are morally insensitive. For the morally 
sensitive, morality is more natural. Now here we must distinguish bet-
ween theor,y and practiceo If someone has to work ver,y hard at moral 
'theor,y', in other words, if he has to think a great deal about what he 
ought to do, and is not more or less immediately aware of what it is good 
or right to do in many situations, then there might be some truth ih the 
claim that such a person is morally insensitiveo But while it does seem 
to be true that quite often one can simply know what one ought to do, 
without devoting a great deal of thought to it, nevertheless I think that 
it is too easy to believe that morality is less complex than it is, and 
that moral duties are easily identifiable. Lack of thought about morality 
may be just as reliable a sign of moral insensitivity as too much thought. 
To take a simple example, we may consider the morality of telling a white 
lie to avoid hurting someone's feelings. Someone asks me (perhaps with 
reference to a new coat) 'Do I look all rig~t?' Now it ~ well be nec-
essary to think what one's reply ought to be in such a situation. Of 
course, if one likes the coat, there is no problem, but I am assuming that 
I do not like the coato I must, therefore, decide whether I ought to tell 
the truth, or whether to lie. There are, however, different ways of decid-
ing, some involving next to no thought, and some involving a great deal of 
thought. 
93 
3. Moral conscientiousness and Decision-r',~akinf). 
First, then, I may decide what I ought to say by appealing to some 
moral ruleo Holding a set of rigid moral rules relieves me of thought 
in the particular situation. If, for instance, I believe that one ought 
always to tell the truth, it will not occur to me to weigh the claims of 
truth-telling against the claims of avoiding the infliction of pain, for 
the claims of truth-telling are absolute. But I think it is true to say 
that most people would agree with me' that the person who always tells 
the truth, whatever the consequences, is morally insensitive. I wrote 
aboye that in the situation I am considering as an example, 'I must de-
cide whether I ought to tell the truth'. But for the person who makes 
it a rule always to tell the truth, no such decision is necessary. All 
. such decisions were made in advance, at the time of the adoption of the 
principle. Surely, though, only a morally insensitive person could block 
off future decisions in this way. Different situations require different 
responses from the moral agent, and one cannot allow for these in advance, 
at least if one adopts ruleo of such generality as, 'Always tell the truth.' 
Suppose, though, that the rule to which I refer is more specific than 
this. Realizing that telling the truth sometimes causes suffering, I make 
it my rule always to tell the truth except when doing so will cause suffer-
ing. This rule is ambiguous, for it is not clear whether I have made it a 
rule always to tell the truth except when it will cause suffering, but to 
lie when telling the truth would cause suffering, or whether I am leaving 
my decisions concerning truth-telling in the exceptional cases to be made 
at the time when the exceptions occur. If my rule is to be interpreted in 
the first way, then although it is more specific, it is just as rigid as 
the rule always to tell the truth. I have made it my rule always to lie 
in cases where telling the truth would cause suffering. Although the rule 
is rigid, its adoption shows less insensitivity on my part then did the 
adoption of the rule always to tell the truth, whatever the consequences, 
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since I have at least recognized that there may be two competing claims 
on me~ those of telling the truth, and of avoiding causing sufferingo 
But even so, I have made in advance decisions which might be better left 
for the time when they must be made. I have decided always to tell white 
lies in circumstances when frankness would be painful to the recipient of 
my frankness. But this might not always be the best thing to do. Sup-
pose my friend asks me whether her new coat looks all right. I can avoid 
hurtine her feelings by telling her that she looks nice, but circumstances 
might arise in which it would be better to hurt her feelings, not so much 
for the sake of the truth as such, but because of some further considera-
tion. She might, for instance, be going for an interview for a job, and 
it could be argued that I ought to help her, even at the risk of hurting 
her feelings, to look her best at the interviewo 
Thus, in these two cases, when I can avoid concentrated attention on 
what are usually minor moral problems, by arming myself in advance with 
rules which may govern my decisions, I do indeed save myself some hard work 
at morality, but I do not show myself to be morally sensitiveo Moral sens-
itivity may be, in such cases, more certainly indicated by a willingness 
to accept a cert~in amount of hard thinking in particular cases. (I am 
not arguing that anyone who adopts moral rules necessarily shows himself 
to be insensitiveo 1~ point at the moment is merely that, if the conscien-
tious man is the one who works hard at moral 'theory', it does not follow 
that he is insensitive to the demands of morality.) 
On the other hand, it can be argued that excessive concentration on 
particular cases may indicate some degree of insensitivity. As I said 
earlier, there are cases where it simply is clear what I ought to do, and 
the person who agonizes over his decision-making in such cases may demon-
strate an inability to distinguish between what is and what is not import-
ant. Such a person i~ proper~ to be described as over-scrupulous, and we 
have seen that scrupulosity is a fault. 
Both rigid adherence to rules (which saves work), and scrupulous 
attention to details in particular cases, are in the end bad in the same 
way. For both of them involve an inability to adapt oneself reasonably, 
an inability to be flexible enough to respond appropriately to particular 
situations. Thus both of them involve 'insensitivity' in the sense in 
which I am using the word. The morally sensitive man is the one who 
'sees' what he ought to do in situations where sight, or rather insight, 
is possible. I shall pursue this line of argument further when I turn to 
a more positive discussion of the nature of conscientiousness. For now, . 
it is enough to point out that the man who finds it necessar,y to think 
a.bout what he ought to do, and who may for that reason.be described as 
'conscientious' in the popular sense of the term, is not necessarily in-
sensitive. 
As I suggested earlier, the idea of 'working hard at morality' has 
application not only in the realm of theor,y, but also in that of practice. 
The conscientious man is sometimes rated below the lnaturally good man' 
because he does not always find it easy, or pleasant, to do his duty. He 
knows, or thinks he knows, what he ought to do, but he has to make himself 
do it. This is, no doubt, true. But it does not provide us with a point 
of contrast with the naturally good man, nor with an identifying feature 
of the conscientious man. (Neither is it a distinguishing characteristic 
of Kant's dutiful man, though Kant is consistently misinterpreted on this 
point. ) 
4. Moral conscientiousness and motivation. 
The argument about the conscientious man, who is supposedly to be con-
trasted with the naturally good man, goes something like this. The con-
scientious man is the one who acts for the sake of duty. Therefore, when 
he does what he conceives to be his duty, he does not act out of inclination~. 
Consequently, the conscientious man is one who acts against inclination. 
If, then, we ascribe moral worth only to the conscientious man, we com-
mit ourselves to the view that we can be morally good only when we do 
things we do not like doing o It follows from this that, say, the benev-
olent man labours under a great disadvantage, because he enjoys helping 
other people. This shows that he is acting from the wrong motive, and 
that he is not morally good. But since this conclusion is unacceptable, 
we must reject the premise from which it follows, i.e. the premise that 
the motive of duty is the only moral motive, and with relief we can say 
that the conscientious man, who looks for the unpleasant jobs, and ident-
ifies them with his duty, is not really morally good, and that moral 
goodness and misanthropy don't, after all, go together. 
This seems to me to be a fair, if succinct, statement of the argument 
underlying the rejection of the unique moral goodness of conscientiousness. 
But when the argument is put as succinctly as this, we can see its flaws, 
and recognize its weakness as an attack on conscientiousness. 
To start with, we may accept that the conscientious man acts for the 
sake of duty. (I prefer to say that he does what is right because he sees 
it.to be right but the difference is small, and does not matter at this 
stage.) It follows from this that he is motivated by a 'sense of duty'. 
To say this is to speak loosely, since it is hard to see quite how one Can 
be motivated by a sense, but if we take it to mean that he performs certain 
actions because he recognizes that he ought to, we may still accept the 
argument up to this point. Furthermore, it follows that he does not act 
'out of inclination'. That is to say, what moves him to act is not inclin-
ation, but a recoghition that a particular action is the one he ought to 
perform. But although he does not act out of inclination, that is not to 
say that he acts against inclination. All we can say is that the conscien-
tious man would act against inclination if the action he recognized as his 
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duty were not compatible with what he wanted to do. If he is benevolent, 
and if he recognizes a beneficent action as his duty, he is inclined to 
do that which he believes he ought to do. In order that his action should 
be describable as conscientious, it has to be the case that he does it be-
cause he recognizes that he ought to, and if he is to be described as mor-
ally good his motive must be the motive of duty (that is, if, as I am con-
tending, conscientiousness alone is morally good), but this merely means 
that he must not be motivated by inclination, not that no inclination to-
wards the action must be present. Now, it might in some cases happen that 
the actions of the benevolent man lack moral worth, where externally sim-
ilar actions performed by someone who lacks benevolence (permanently or 
termporarily), possess moral worth, since the benevolent man might be promp-
ted Qy inclination to perform the action which is his duty, and might go 
ahead and do the action without reflection as to where his duty lies. This 
conclusion may not be entirely palatable, but I shall argue that, palatable 
or not, it is true. At any rate, it is not as unpalatable as the absurd 
and fallaciously drawn conclusion that the benevolent man can never do 
good turns from a morally good motive. But it is this absurd conclusion, 
which does not follow from the premises, which has led some philosophers 
to reject the premises from whic~ they believe it to follow. Thus, unless 
they insist upon rejecting the milder conolusion that not all benevolent 
actions are (or need be) morally good, they have no reason to reject the 
premises that conscientiousness alone is morally good, and that conscien-
tiousness is manifested in actions performed for the sake of duty. 
The other element in the argument need not be accepted either. This 
is the corollary to the assumption that conscientious action is done against 
inclination, viz. that the conscientious man identifies duty with what is 
unpleasant. Of course, even if it were true that conscientious action is 
action done against inclination, it would not follow that duty is to be 
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found in whatever is unpleasant. If duty were always unpleasant, it 
need not be assumed that whatever is unpleasant is dutyo 
Yet another odd idea is involved in this sort of argument, viz o the 
idea that duty is unpleasant, or rather, the idea that the mere recog-
nition that one ought to perform an action renders one disinclined to 
perform that action. For it seems that only some assumption such as this 
can have led to the easy transition from the statement that the good man 
is not motivated by inclination, to the statement that he must struggle 
against inclination. The latter statement so clearly does not follow from 
the former, that it appears necessary to look for some explanation of the 
fact that many . .members of the anti-conscientiousness lobby think that it 
doeso And one possible explanation is that they themselves think that 
duties recognized as duties must be contrary to inclination. To be fair, 
however, there is an alternative explanation, to the effect that defences 
of dutifulness are identified with Kant's position in the Groundwork, which 
has often been misinterpreted~4 
There is, at any rate, no need to identify dutifulness with the per-
formance of unpleasant tasks, or to identify the conscientious man with the 
misanthropist. Accordingly, we need not look among the stoical people who 
face up to 'unpleasant reality' for examples of conscientious men. Admit-
tedly, conscientious men may face up to unpleasant reality, but if reality 
~ unpleasant, then that reflects no di~credit on the conscientious, but 
rather on the ostrich defenders of 'natural goodness'. 
A great deal more remains to be said on this~ It will be necessary to 
establish, not only the nature of true conscientiousness, but also that of 
natural goodness, in order to demonstrate adequately the falsity of the 
~or a discussion of Kant's position on motivation in the Groundwork see 
Ao Broadie and E.M. Pybus 'Kant's Concept of Respect' KANT SfUDIEN forth-
coming. 
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dichotomy between the two. The destruction of the argument which under-
lies the kind of misidentifia~ion of conscientiousness with which I am 
concerned here will be enough for my present purpose, which is to show 
that apparent counter-examples to the claim that conscientiousness alone 
is morally good are not genuine counter-examples. 
Now, we cannot argue5 that if a man habitual~ does something he dis-
likes doing, he must be acting from a sense of duty. Such an argument de-
pends on the assumption that there are only two kinds of motive, sense of 
duty and inclination. Now, if we understand the terms 'sense of duty' and 
'inclination' very widely, we might say that there are only two broad cat-
egories of motive. Eut since each category is divisible into two distinct 
types, which could give us four narrower categories of motive, we cannot 
ar~e from the absenCe of one Kind of inclination to the presence of one 
kind of Isense-of duty'. 
5. Cateeories of motive. 
Normally, the term 'sense of duty', as used in the expression 'motiv-
ated by a sense of duty', is understood to mean something like 'the recog-
nition that this is something one morally ought to do'. And normally, when 
we say that someone did something 'out of inclination' we mean that he did 
what he wanted to do, because he wanted to do it. Therefore, if someone 
does something which causes him distress, it is tempting to say that, since 
he did not want to do it, he must have done it because he thought that it 
was his moral duty to do it. In order to see that this does not follow, we 
may first distinguish another sense of 'inclination'. To be inclined to do 
something is not necessari~ to feel a desire to do it, nor to find the 
prospect of the action attractive. Not all inclinations are immediate inc-
linations. It is possible to act against immediate inclination from a 
motive of self-interest, and possible to do something distasteful because 
5As Nowell-Smith's argument seems to suggest, for instance, see below. 
100 
one sees that it will, in the long run, be for one's own good. We could 
call this motive some sort of 'inclination', for if we think of action 
done from inclination as designed to satisfy some want, we need not think 
of the satisfaction as immediate, nor of that which is wanted as something 
which is susceptible to immediate attainment. However, though the motive 
of self-interest may for these reasons be subsumed within the broad cat-
egory of motives of inclination, I ttJbik that speaking in this way is 
likely to lead to confusion, and prefer to distinguish between motives of 
self-interest and motives of inclination. 
This distinction gives us three categories of motive, viz. inclination, 
self~interest, and dutifulness. It is therefore clear that the existence 
of evidence which rules out immediate inclination as a motive for a part-
icular action does not provide us with a licence to infer that the motive 
for that action must be dutifulness. The action, distasteful or not, might 
have been performed from a motive of self-interest. 
But even these three categories are not exhaustive. Different kinds 
of dutifulness can also be distinguished. When we say that someone per-
formed an action because he thought it his duty, we do often mean that he 
did it because he thought that he morally ought to do it. But not all 
duties are moral duties, and someone may do something which he believes to 
be his duty without believing that the action is one he is morally bound 
to perform. Many duties, for instance, arise in the context of particular 
jobs or professions. A policeman, for instance, may have a duty to report 
people who park their cars on double yellow lines. This is one of his 
duties qua policeman. Now, it is possible to argue that a policeman has 
a moral duty to report people who park illegally, because in becoming a 
policeman he accepted that he would have to perform, in his capacity as 
policeman, various actions which a civilian would not have to perform. 
But the point is not that it is a moral duty to report people who park 
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illegally, but that, in the first place it is a professional duty for 
him to do this, and, in the second place, it is a moral duty for him to 
carry out the professional duties imposed upon him. Thus, we may dis-
tinguish between professional duties (or duties of a role), and moral 
duties. Externally, the actions which are demanded by one's professional 
status, and those which are demanded of one qua moral agent, may be ident-
ical. But often the reasons for saying that an action is a professional 
duty are different from those for saying that it is a moral duty. This 
distinction can be seen to be a genuine one if we consider the fact that 
sometimes it is possible at the same time to admit that a given action is 
both a professional duty, and one which it is morally wrong to perform. 
We can, for instance, say that policemen in some countries ~ave the prof-
essional duty of.enforcing apartheid, and that they have a moral duty not 
to discriminate between people of different races and colours. 
The categor.y of motives is now seen to be fourfold. There are motives 
of inclination, and motives of self-interest, and there are motives of moral 
dutifulness and motives of professional dutifulness. Thus, roughly speaking, 
I may perform an action because I want to do it, or in order to satisfy an 
immediate desire, or I may perform an action because I see that it is in 
~ long-term interest to perform it. Though both these motives are in the 
general area of wanting, they differ in important respects. And then, I 
may perform an action because, as a member of a particular profession I 
see that ~ membership of that profession imposes the performance of that 
action upon me as a duty. Finally, I may perform the action because I 
believe that I morally ought to do so. There may of course be overlaps 
among the categories, but that should not prevent us from seeing that mot-
ives may fall within any one categor.y without falling within any other. 
For instance, one's self-interest may overlap with the performance of one's 
professional duties, and in a given case it may be hard to discover whether 
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the agent was moved by self-interest or by (merely) a sense of prof-
essional duty. And equally, one may conceive oneself to have a moral 
duty to perform one's professional duty. But there need not be over-
laps in all cases, and it is, I think, important to distinguish the 
various categories. 
6. Types of motive and tyPes of duty. 
Undoubtedly it can be aruged that people do in general have a moral 
obligation to do what is required of them in their professional capac-
ities. For instance, we may say that a contractual obligation is in-
volved. In accepting a particular job, and a salary for doing that job, 
, 
someone incurs the responsibility of carrying out that job in the way 
which is laid down by the employers. If he accepts the salary, and fails 
to perform the job adequately, he does not fulfil his part of the contract. 
Sometimes, the employer may regard the methods of his employees as unsat-
isfactory in some way. To take the example of the policeman again, he 
may, like many members of the driving public, think that it would be bet-
~er for the police to concentrate on attacking serious crime, instead of 
spending so much time on booking motorists. Now, if the policeman thinks 
this, there are various things he might do. He might, for example, state 
his views as persuasively as possible to his superiors. He might try to 
work his way to the top of the organisation, so that he will be in a pos-
ition to accomplish changes. He might decide that the job is not what he 
thought it was, and therefore resign and do something else, or might even, 
having resigned, set himself up as a private detective so that he can do 
part of the job which he thinks the police ought to be doing. But he can-
not legitimately stay in his job and not bother to do the minor tasks, 
connected with motoring offences, that he is employed and paid to perform, 
if for no other reason than that he would be obtaining money by false pre-
tences, since if it were known that he was not doing what he was supposed 
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to do, he would not keep his job. 
The course of action which the policeman adopts will depend on 
various things, including his personality, his desire for steady employ-
ment, and so on. But one important factor is the nature of his disap-
proval for the current use of resources by the police. If, fo~ instance, 
what he feels is disappointment rather than disapproval, because he wanted 
to spend his time catching criminals, he will probably resign. But ijthe 
disapproves mor~lly of police policy (and is willing to stick his neck out), 
he is more likely to follow one of the alternative courses of action. Which 
of these alternatives he adopts will depend, at least partly, on the strength 
of his disapproval. If it is compar~ively mild, he may confine himself to 
stating his views. If he feels strongly that police policies are wrong, he 
may rather try to work himself up into a position of power, from which he 
can do something effective. Again, something depends on precisely what it 
is that he disapproves of. What I have in mind here is that he may feel 
strongly that there should be an attack on serious crime, but may not think 
that such an attack has to be organised specifically by the police. In such 
a case, he may adopt the alternative of setting up an independent attack on 
crime. But if his view is, not only that serious crime ought to be wiped 
out, but that it is the task of the police to wipe it out, he is unlikely 
to feel that he is carrying out his duty by 'offering himself as an alter-
native to the police. He will see his duty as lying in the reform of police 
procedures, which is to be achieved from inside the organisation. At any 
rate, if what he feels is disapproval and not mere disappointment, i~that 
is to say, he believes that it is morally wrong that police efforts should 
be directed primarily against minor offenders, he is unlikely to remain in 
the organisation but fail to carry out his professional duties concerning 
~fcr~ 
minor offenders. B,y doing that, he would not only fail to effect any ret~, 
but would also be acting dishonestly in failing to fulfil his contract. For 
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while he thinks that it is wrong that the police should concentrate on 
catching motorists rather than, say, stamping out protection rackets, 
he sees this as essentially a comparative thing. He thinks that the 
protection-racket offences are worse than the motoring offences, and 
that time and money spent on motoring offences are wasted, since they 
would be better spent on the protection-racket offences. The important 
point is that he does not think that it is in itself wrong to charge 
people with motoring offences, merely that it is wrong to do so when 
doing this is incompatible with doing something which he regards as more 
important. 
One can, however, think of examples of people who feel absolute moral 
disapproval of the actions which must be carried out in the course of their 
profession. In countries where there is some form of racial suppression, 
" 
a policeman may believe, not just that it is wrong to devote his time to 
preventing negroes, or Jews etc. from ehtering theatres and so forth, when 
he would be better employed in opposing serious crime, but rather that he 
ought not to limit the freedom of a:n:y racial groupo In such cases, while 
one may feel that ?e ought to take positive steps towards reform, and ~~kt 
bl~.e !...Un ~4Q;h'Jtvl~ lodD f,p) u:e ~ol Vldl: 
therefore condemn him for failing in his duty if he turned a blind eye to 
offences which in his view ought not to have been declared legal offences. 
Thus, even though his professional duty is to uphold racial discrimination, 
we need not say that he has a moral duty to do so, and might rather say 
that it would be morally wrong for him to perform his professional duty. 
Nor does it follow that he ought to resign. If he remains in the police 
force, he may be in a position to effect reforms, but even if he is not, 
we might think it better that there should be some small-scale opportun-
ities for flouting the law. 
It is possible to see, even from such a brief consideration of these 
examples (and of course many different examples could be cited), how com-
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plex the relationship is between professional duty and moral duty. It 
might be the case that one does not have a moral duty to carry out the 
duties of one's profession, and it might be that one has a moral duty 
~ to carry out the duties of one's profession. Thus, professional 
duty might be compatible or incompatible with moral duties of various 
sorts, and although, as I said, it can be argued that in general one 
has a moral duty to carry out the duties required of one in one's pro-
fessional capacity, it is clearly impossible to hold that professional 
and moral duties are always identical, or even compatible. 
1. The motives of the professional man. 
Now, someone in a particular profession may see the relationship 
between his professional and his moral duty in one of various ways. First, 
he may think that one morally ought always to carry out onets professional 
duties. Secondly, he may hold a modified version of this view, that one 
has a moral duty to carry out one's professional duties unless there is 
something morally objectionable in the performance of the duty. Thirdly 
(in connection with the second), he may think that, although the priorities 
of the professional code need changing, he ought to do what is expected of 
him, but at the same time work for reform. Finally, he may think that the 
duty is so morally objectionable that he ought not to perform it. 
Taking these alternative viewpoints, we can no~consider in what senses 
a man doing his professional duty might be said to be morally conscientiouso 
The first view that might be attributed to him is that one is always morally 
obliged to carry out the duties of one's profession. If he thinks this, 
and he regularly does carry out what he conceives to be ~is moral duty, 
whether or not he desires to do the requisite actions, are we to say that 
he is (morally) conscientious? 
I think we must say that he is E£! conscientious, and that the belief 
that he might be arises, not only from the misapprehensions I have already 
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aisoussed, concerning dullness, insensitivity, the unpleasantness of 
duty, and so on, but also from an undue stress on the manifestation of 
conscientiousness in action. Conscientious men are often thought of 
as men·of principle. I have no objection to this identification, but 
it is important to recognize that a man of principle is not just a man 
who always acts in accordance with his principleso A great deal depends 
both on the principles which are held, and on the method by which those 
principles have been reached. Unthinking acceptance of principles he 
has been taught, or has absorbed,. do not qualif.1 a man as a man of prin-
ciple. More will be said about this later, but for the time being, I 
think that it is pretty obviously true that someone who firmly believes 
in, and acts on, principles, is not necessarily a man of principle. One 
(true) example which illustrates this quite neatly is that of the child 
who was taught that it is a sin to whistle. This may seem as reasonable 
pn>~ (}'lM'\t.t.. ~; ... .l;~ 
as most adult pronunciations to a child of five. But suppose that the 
child had continued to believe that it was a sin to whistle, had always 
avoided whistling because she believed that it was sinful, and had ex-
r 
halted others to refrain from the sinful practice of whistling. One would 
be inclined to say, in such a case, not only that adherence to such a 
principle didn't count as evidence of being ~rincipled, but that it count-
ed as evidence of a lack of moral senseo· Someone who held to such a princ-
iple would appear not to know what morality was, and in so far as some 
idea of the nature of morality is a necessary condition of moral agency, 
and hence of conscientiousness, we must say, not that such a person has 
given inadequate confirmation of his conscientiousness, but that he has 
given adequate confirmation of his inability to be conscientiouso 
Mere adherence to principles, then, is not a sufficient condition of 
conscientiousness. We can now ask, then, whether the principle that one 
morally ought always to carry out one's professional duties, is such that 
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one can say that adherence to it is evidence of, or a manifestatioh of, 
conscientiousness. The principle is not as absurd as the principle that 
whistling is sinful. Nevertheless, since it is not morally acceptable, 
anyone's adherence to it would justify us in refusing to call him con-
scientious. 
As I said, two factors are involved when we tr,y to decide whether 
or not adherence to a particular principle affords evidence of conscien-
tiousness. One is the nature of the principle (not necessarily its sub-
ject-matter, but most often that), and the other is the method by which 
it has been reached. Thus, adherence to a principle which is clearly im-
moral would not, I think, entitle us to call a man conscientious, but 
would be more likely to lead us to deny that he is, though there might 
just be exceptions to this~Adherence to a principle which we might call 
'morally absurd', like the one about whistling, is evidence of a lack of 
moral discrimination. Thus the nature of a principle might be relevant 
to our assessment of the conscientiousness of the person who holds it. 
When I speak of the method b,y which the principle has been reached, what 
I have in mind is that a conscientious man, or in its special sense a 'man 
of principle', is one who holds, and acts on, principles which he has 
thought about, and has chosen, or at any rate re-affirmed. These two 
things are not unconnected. The nature of a principle may ·tell us something 
about the method by which it has been reached, though this works with ref-
erence only to absurd or unacceptable principles, since one may quite un-
critically accept a perfectly sound principle which one has been taught. 
Now, the principle we are considering, i.e. the principle which might 
be he1i by a professional man, is that one morally ought always to carr,y 
out one's professional duties. But someone who holds this principle is not 
5This will be discussed with reference to Nowell-Smith's Robespierre example. 
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conscientious 0 As I pointed out, if we are to accept adherence to a 
principle as evidence of conscientiousness, we must judge, not merely 
by behaviour, but by the principle itself. But if we think about the 
principle 'One always has a moral obligation to carry out the duties of 
one's profession', we can see that the principle is such that it cannot 
have been adopted in an acceptably critical spirito Ex-hypothesi, the 
principle is held to be universal, i.e. to lack exceptions. Yet it so 
obviously does have exceptions that we can say with confidence that any-
one who does not recognize those exceptions cannot have thought about 
the principle before accepting it. The principle states that anybody in 
any profession, job or role ought, without exception, to perform the 
duties required by the profession, job or role. Thus, we must consider, 
not only actual professions, jobs or roles, but hypothetical ones too. 
If someone were employed by a megalomaniac to avenge by torture and death 
all insults, real or imagined, offered to the megalomaniac, it would, ac-
cording to anyone holding the principle in question, be morally wrong for 
him to refuse to torture and kill someone who 'insulted' the megalomaniac 
by being better looking than the megalomaniac. Since no-one worthy of the 
name of 'moral agent' could accept this, it follows that a principle which 
entails it cannot be held by someone worthy of the name of 'moral agent'. 
However, it might be objected that such an argument is unfair. The fact 
that someone has failed to realize that his principle would commit him to 
saying something morally unacceptable in circumstances whose possibility would 
be envisaged only by someone with a wildly disorde~ed imagination, or by, a 
philosopher, does not entitle us to say that he is morally uncritical, let 
alone unworthy of the name of 'moral agent'. 
This objection may be accepted, but the argument stands. For even if 
we rule out hypothetical cases (and I don't really see why we should, since 
anyone who accepts absolute, universal principles lays himself open to 
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attacks of this kind), there are still enough real ~ases left to support 
the position. To take the most obvious example from real life, we may 
consider the professional duties of some of the Nazis. SOIDe of the Nazis 
were required, not only to kill the Jews, but to treat them with the ut-
most brutality. (It is not, after all, so different from the hypothetical 
case of the megalomaniac.) Thus anyone who says that one morally ought 
always to carry out the duties of one's profession, is committed to saying 
that it would have been morally wrong for a Nazi to refuse to treat the 
Jews in this manner. 
Suppose, though, that the professional man protests that his principle 
doe~ not hold in cases where it is possible to say that nobody should have 
entered the profession or accepted the role in the first place. If he 
says this, then it cannot be the case that he holds the principle to be 
absolute and universal. For he is making an exception to it by modifying 
the term 'profession' to 'acceptable profession'. His principle therefore 
becomes 'one morally ought always to carry out one's professional duties, 
when one's profession is morally acceptable'. He may of course take this 
way out, but since this modification is tbe,only means available to him of 
justifying his acceptance of a principle which no thi~ing moral agent 
could accept, we can say that, so long as the principle remains unmodified, 
acceptance of the principle demonstrates, not the conscientiousness but 
the a-morality (or even an extremely complex form of immorality) of the 
person who accepts it. If, then, we accept the first alternative among 
the possible formulations of the principle on which the professional man 
acts, we can say that, far from being conscientious, he has, in failing 
to think out the implications of his principle, committed himself to a 
view which could be held only by a moral freak o 
Another possible position for the professional man is that one has 
a moral duty to carry out one's professional duty unless there is something 
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morally objectiona!te in the performance of the duty. Or, connected with 
this, he may hold that, although the priorities of the professional code 
need changing, he ought to do what is expected of him, but at the same 
time work for reform. I do not think that either of these positions can 
be accepted or rejected as they stand. In order to judge of the morality 
of the stance of a given professional, we should have to know just what 
was entailed b,y the performance of his professional duties. If his prof-
essional duties are morally unobjectionable, we can agree that he ought, 
morally, to carry them out, since he has contracted to do so. If he can 
work for reform without performing illegitimate actions, again he should, 
morally, do so. Details are needed, however, before we can judge either 
what the professional man's motives are, and whether they are morally good 
motives or not. 
8. Nowell-Smith and conscientiousnesso 
Now that I have discussed these more general points about attacks put 
forward against the view that conscientiousness possesses a uniQue moral 
worth, I shall turn to a consideration of a specific attack made by Nowe1l-
Smith in his Ethics. 6 The preceding considerations will enable us to see 
that his forceful attack is misdirected, and in particular that his counter-
examples do not work. 
In Chapter 11, entitled I Conscientiousness ,1, Nowell-Smith argues 
against the Kantian view that distinctively moral worth is confined to the 
good will. He uses two main arguments. The second is directed against 
Ross, and I shall discuss -that later. 8 The first consists in the use of 
counter-examples, and it is this with which I shall be concerned for the 
rest of this chapter. 1tr defence against his attack will be that his 
6EthiCS. P. Nowell-Smith. Pelican. 
1p.245ff. 
8part II Ch.2 below. 
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counter-examples do not provide him with a conclusive refutation of the 
Kantian position on the good will, since they are not genuine counter-
examples. That is, I shall argue that, since his examples are not ex-
amples of actions of a man of good will (in the Kantian sense) or,of a 
conscientious man (in mine) and since they could work as counter-examples 
only if they were genuine examples of good will or conscientiousness, his 
case is not established. 
Nowell-Smith writes,9 "the tacit equation between conscientiousness , 
and moral virtue comes out well in Paton's treatment (i.e, in his edition 
of the GrundleC;lll1S) of the question whether moral virtue is the "highest" 
good. He contrasts conscientiousness with non-moral goods, ,such as art-
istic activity and knowledge; but he does not even raise the question 
whether conscientiousness is 'higher than l other moral virtues. Neverthe-
less it seems that this is an open question. 
"And it is also an open question whether conscientiousness itself is 
good without qualification. 1~ of the worst crimes in history have been 
committed by men who had a strong sense of duty just because their sense 
of duty was so strong •. I should myself have no hesitation in saying that 
Robespierre would have been a better man (quite apart from the question of 
the harm he did) if he had given his conscience a thorough rest and indulged 
his ta~or roses and sentimental verse. There is a stor,y ,of an Oxford 
don who disliked Common Room life and whose presence caused himself and 
others acute distress. Yet he attended Common Room assiduously because 
he thought it his duty to do so. He would have done better to stay at home. 
"In anS\'l€r to this type of criticism Paton says: "It is certainly 
true that good men may do a great deal of harm; and this harm may spring, 
not from officiousness and vanity (which belong to moral badness) but from 
9EthicS p.247-8• 
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mere silliness and stupidity. 11 But may not the harm also spring from 
their very conscientiousness? We might adopt the moral principle that 
conscientiousness is so valuable that a man ought to be conscientious 
no matter what harm he does; but it is quite another thing to say that 
J<Ji.M'-'2.. 
their conscientiousness is never the ~ of the harm that good men do. 
"Nor, I think, is the principle of the supreme value of conscient-
iousness one that we have any reason for accepting." 
Now one point that must be made here is that, as I have argued above, 
it is not the case that conscientiousness is the supreme virtue, but ra-
ther that conscientiousness uniquely possesses moral worth. This, too, 
is Kant's point. The good will alone possesses moral worth. Consequently, 
we should be on our guard against an attack which misrepresents the case 
for conscientiousness by supposing that its value is of the same sort as 
that of various virtueso 
However, on the assumption that Nowell-Smith is attacking the view 
that conscientiousness possesses unique value, we may consider his use 
of counter-examples in his attempt to show that there are occasions when 
conscientiousness is less valuable than some other motive, and even oc-
casions when it is positively bad. 
9. The Oxford Don. 
First, we can take his example of the Oxford don. As we shall see, 
this is not a genuine counter example, since it is possible to argue that 
the don is not morally conscientious. If he ~, however, we should have 
to deny that he would have done better (i.e. morally better) to stay at 
10 home 0 
This example may be discussed, and dismissed, very briefly. The don, 
we are told, considers it to be his duty to attend Common Room, though his 
lOSee Part II Ch.2 below. 
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presence causes distress both to himself and to others. On the basis 
of this, Nowell-Smith concludes that the don is conscientious, and that 
he would be morally better if he were not. 
But we have seen that it is a mistake to assume that every motive 
of dutifulness is to count as a manifestation of conscientiousness, since 
it is possible to hold that onets professional duty is in some sense 
morally objectionable. Now, since the donts performance of his profes-
sional duty causes distress not only to him but to other people, we would 
be justified in assuming that he had not bothered to cons~der whether or 
not he was morally entitled to perform his professional duty. If he has 
not even considered this, then of course his actions cannot count as mor-
ally conscientious. Alternatively, if he has considered the moral status 
of his actions, but has concluded that they are morally legitimate, we 
might suggest that his deliberations were inadequate, failing as they do 
to take into account the distress caused by them. In either of these cases, 
then, the don is not, or need not be, morally conscientious. But if he 
has fully considered his actions, and has decided that he is morally ob-
liged to do his professional duties despite the distress caused, then how-
ever wrong we think he is, we must admit that he is conscientious~ln that 
case, however, we cannot condemn him for acting on the basis of a conscien-
tious decision. For as we shall see,ll an analysis of objective and sub-
jective duties will lead us to conclude that a man really ought to do what 
he conscientiously believes he ought to do. And if this is so, then it is 
a mistake to say that the don would (or could) be morally better if he 
failed to act as he conscientiously believes he ought to act. 
Nowell-Smithts appeal to the Oxford don as a counter-example must there-
fore be dismissed. Most probably, the don is not conscientious, but if he 
llPart II, Ch.2 below. 
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is, then we cannot deny unique value to his motives. Nowell-Smith's mis-
take here is to fail to distinguish between different types of motive, 
each of which can be analysed in terms of ~ sense of ought, but not 
necessarily the moral sense. The Oxford don can therefore be dismissed 
as a red herring. 
There remains, however, the other 'counter-example' offered. by Nowell-
Smith, viz. that of Robespierre. It is, I think, this example which Nowell-
Smith would hold to constitute a more powerful weapon against conscientious-
ness. Though it does raise problems, however, the case is easier to answer 
specifically, since it is easier to place the motivation, and the character, 
of Robespierre, than it was to place those of the shado,T,1 don. 
10. Robespierre. 
Nowell-Smith expresses his case as follows. " ••• it is also an open 
question whether conacientiousness is Good without qualification. Many of 
the worst crimes in history have been committed by men who had a strong 
sense of duty just because their sense of duty was so strong. I should 
myself have no hesitation in saying that Robespierre would have been a bet-
ter man (quite apart from the question of the harm he did) if he had given 
his conscience a thorough rest and indulged his taste for roses and sent-
imental verse.,,12 
I do not propose to present a complete answer to this case at the mom-
ent. As I have indicated, special problems are raised for my thesis by the 
fanatic, and if Robespierre was not a fanatic, he came very close to it. 
Whether or not Robespierre 'would have been a better man ••• if he had 
given his conscience a thorough rest' must be resolved by reference to a 
discussion of the relatiOn between goodness and rightness.13 The general 
l;:thics p.247. 
l3See Part II ~.2 below. 
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position that I am defending in this thesis is that consdientiousness 
and moral goodness are to be identified. If this position is correct,' 
then it shows that if Robespierre is conscientious, he is to be des-
cribed as morally good, and that he could not have been morally better 
if he had failed to be conscientious. In the next chapter, I shall ar-
gue for this position. In the present chapter,'however, I am particularly 
concerned to dispel misunderstandings about the nature of conscientious-
ness, and one such misunderstanding is involved in Nowell-Smith's ready 
assumption that Robespierre was conscientious. 
In offering the apparent counter-example of the Oxford don, Nowell-
Smith depended, as we have seen, on a distorted view of the popular and 
conventional pictures of conscientiousness. In discussing Robespierre, 
he is, I think, depending on a distorted view of the Kantian picture of 
dutifulness. Now, when I say that there is a misunderstanding of the na-
ture of conscientiousness involved in Nowell-Smith's ready assumption 
that Robespierre was conscientious, I do not mean to suggest that Robespierre 
was necessarily not conscientiouso \1hat I mean is that the undefended as-
sumption that he was, and the failure to define what is to be understood 
by the crucial term 'sense of duty', suggests that Nowell-Smith has not 
considered the possibility that Robespierre was not conscientious. Cer-
tainly, an argument in support of the belief that Robespierre was conscien-
tious could be put fo~vard. But the absence of such an argument does sug-
gest that Howell-Smith does not conceive such~an argument to be necessary, 
and consequently that he takes Robespierre1s conscientiousness to be indis-
putableo From these indications, we can infer that Nowell-Smith's picture 
of the conscientious man has certain characteristics. 
One of these characteristics is that he is, in some sense, a 'man of 
principle'. Another (connected with the first) is that he will sacrifice 
anything (himself included) for the cause. A third (again connected) is 
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that very often he has a cause, probably a large one. After all, the 
'conscientious' man has committed some of the 'worst crimes in history'. 
Another cl1aracteristic of this kind of 'conscientious' man is that he is, 
in a special sense, 'incorruptible'. Robespierre himself was known as 
'the Incorruptible'. It seems to me that it is precisely because 
Robespierre possessed all these characteristics that Nowell-Smith takes 
him to be the apotheosis of the conscientious or dutiful man. I would 
suggest myself that, if one were to give a list of those characteristics 
to someone familiar with the English language, and ask him how he would 
describe a man possessing all of them, his reply would be, not 'a conscien-
tious man', but 'a fanatic'. 
I have already admitted that it is possible that some conscientious 
men are fanatics, and that a-defence of oonscientiousness must be able to 
reconcile this possibility with the claim that conscientiousness is always 
morally good. But it is not only not self-evident but clearly false, that 
fanatios are always conscientious. Thus, when I say that Nowell-Smith's 
introduction of Robespierre into his discussion involves a misunderstand-
ing of the nature of conscientiousness, what I have in mind is that Nowell-
Smith appears to believe that a man possessing the dintinguishing charac-
teristics of a fanatic is ipso facto, conscientious (or dutiful, in the 
Kantian sense.) 
This is, as I said, a misunderstanding. In the first place, I don't 
think that any normal usage of the terms 'fanatic' and 'conscientious' com-
mits one to the view that fanatios are always conscientious. This will be 
seen when we consider in turn the characteristics in virtue of which Nowel1-
Smith identifies Robespierre as conscientious. In the second place, Kant's 
own usage of the terms 'dutiful' and 'good will' makes it clear that fan-
aticism as such is not moral goodness, though Kant must, if he is to justify 
his opening statement of the Groundwork,that nothing except the good will 
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can be conceived as unconditionally good, be able to cope with the pos-
sibility that some fanatics might be men of 'good will'. 
Since I shall be referring to Kant several times in the subsequent 
discussion, I shall at this point briefly outline what he has to say 
about the good will and duty in the Grundlegunf,.14 The good will is 
the will of an imperfectly rational being who wills actions on object-
ively valid maxims, that is, maxims on which a totally rational being 
would necessarily act. Thus, the good will is not only the will which 
wills actions" for the sake of the moral law, but also in accordance with 
the moral law. If the actions were not compatible with the moral law, 
the maxim, or principle on which the action is performed, could not be 
objectively valid. It follows from this that, whenever a human agent c 
acts in such a w~ that his will can be described as good, it is not only 
the case that he acts for the sake of the law (or, as Nowell-Smith puts it, 
for the sake of duty, or out of a sense of duty), but also that his action 
is riflht. Now, if we grant that there is a moral law, by reference to 
which the rightness of actions may be determined, and that the human agent 
in virtue of his rationality can discover what is enjoined permitted and 
forbidden by that law, and finally that the will of that agent is good when 
he wills action for the sake of, and in accordance with, the law, then we 
• 
cannot say that terrible crimes can be committed out of a sense of duty, 
i.e. for the sake of the law. Clearly, we may not wish to accept all these 
presuppositions, at any rate without long consideration, or possibly even 
after such consideration. The important point here is that these pre-sup-
positions are all involved in Kant's claim that the good will alone is un-
conditionally good. Kant,15 therefore, could not have admitted that 
14esp • the first section. See, for instance, The Moral Law H.J. Paton pp.S9-70 
15At any rate, the Kant of the Grundle,~ne. He modifies his position in 
the 1htanhysic of Morals. 
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Robespierre's will was good if Robespierre's actions were crimes. For 
from the fact that the actions were crimes it follows that they were 
not in accordance with the law, and cannot have been performed on ob-
jectively valid maxims. Since, therefore, Kant's terms are very clear~ 
defined, and since Robespierrets will cannot (at least if his actions 
were crimes) be described as good or dutiful, it is impossible for Nowell-
Smith to assert that in Robespierre we find an example of a dutiful man 
who would have been morally better if he were not dutiful, and to take 
this as evidence that the good will is not unconditionally good. If the 
example is to work as a counter-example to Kant's claim on behalf of the 
good will, it must be the case both that Robespierre was dutiful in the 
Y.antian sense, and that his actions were crimes. But in Kantian terms, 
if,Robespierre was dutiful, he was not criminal, and if he was criminal, 
, 
he was not dutiful. We must, therefore, reject Nowell-Smith's assumption 
that this is a counter-example to Kant's claim in the Grundlegung that the 
good will is unconditionally gOOdo16 
I It is not· open to Nowell-Smith to reply to this criticism that he is 
attacking Kant's general position and that it is not enough to show that 
Kant's terms are defined in such a way that the attack misses its target. 
He is, indeed, entitled to attack Kant's general position, but to do that 
he must attack the presuppositions involved in Kant's argument. He cannot 
simply assume that they are false, and on this assumption show that Kant's 
theory leads to unacceptable conclusions. 
We may, therefore, reject Nowell-Smith's discussion of Robespierre 
in so far as that discussion is intended to be an attack on a position 
which Kant was supposed to, but did not, hold. However, it is necessary 
l6That Nowell-Smith's attack is directed against 
Grundle~ng is made clear on p.246-7 of Ethics. 
the Grundlegunz. 
Kant's position in the 
On po247 he quotes from 
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to consider whether it holds up as an attack on a more general position 
concerning conscientiousness. For it is of course possible to hold that 
conscientiousness is identical with moral goodness, and to describe one-
self as being in this sense a Y~ntian, without maintaining that conscien-
tious action is always right (or that dutiful action is, by definition, 
in accordance with the moral law). 
Even as far as this more general position is concerned, I think that 
Nowell-Smith's appeal to Robespierre as a conscientious man who could have 
been better involves a misunderstanding of the nature of conscientiousness. 
As I pointed out, there are several characteristics in terms of which 
Nowell-Smith seems to have placed Robespierre as a conscientious man. 
Typically, these are the characteristics of the fanatic rather than the 
conscientious man, and though we may admit that fanatics can be conscien-
tious, it is not true that they always are. If Nowell-Smith's attack is 
to have any force, therefore, it is necessary for him to show that the 
fanatical characteristics found in Robespierre are of the right type to 
justify him in calling Robespierre conscientious. Since he does not show 
this, I shall in the next chapter consider whether or not Robespierre is 
describable as conscientious. For now, I shall show merely that the ident-
ification of fanaticism and (at least one kind of) conscientiousness, is 
mistaken. In the course of this demonstration, some of the mere positive 
characteristics of conscientiousness will emerge, and will provide part of 
the basis upon which the rest of my argument will rest in the subsequent 
chapters. 
The cllaracteristics which apparently lead Nowell-Smith to describe 
Robespierre as conscientious are those I mentioned earlier.· In the first 
place, Robespierre is a lman of principle'. Next, he will sacrifice any-
thing for the cause (for such men have causes). Finally, he is 'incorrupt-
ible l • Thus, Robespierre believed passionately that what he was doing was 
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right, a~d nothing, whether alternative moral considerations, fear for 
his own safety, or hope of gain of any kind, could deflect him from his 
unswerving pur sui t of 'duty'. 
Now, some of these are, to repeat my earlier points, possible char-
acteristics of the conscientious man. More typically, they are charac-
teristics of the fanatic. They are not sufficient conditions of conscien-
tiousness, though they may, in circumstances which must be carefully de-
fined, be compatible with it. 
First, we may take the fact that Robespierre was a 'man of principle'o 
As I admitted earlier, in oy discussion of the Oxford don, there is a 
sense in which the terms 'conscientious man' and 'man of principle' are 
used interchangeably. But not all 'men of principle' are conscientious, 
since a great deal depends on how the principles were reached, and on the 
nature of the principles. We saw, for instance, that rigid adherence to 
the principle that it is sinful to lie was evidence, not of conscientious-
ness, but of lack of ability to tell the difference between right and wrong. 
Furthermore, even if the principle to which the agent adheres is in itself 
acceptable, it would not be usual to describe him as conscientious, if he 
had merely taken it, unreflectively, on trust. Other objections which were 
made to 'men of principle' included the fact that often such men are too 
rigid and unyielding in their application of their principles. If, then, 
it is reasonable to claim that a conscientious man has a certain degree of 
moral sensitivity and of flexibility, we might reaaonably deny that the 
rigid absolutist is conscientious. And I think that this demand for sens-
itivity and flexibility is a reasonable one. To be conscientious is, among 
other thines, to meet the demands of the particular situation. It will be 
remembered that my rough definition of conscientious action ~s laction 
which is performed because the agent recognizes it as right., and such 
action is performed by someone whose guiding principle is that he shall do , 
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what is right. He sees the life of duty as the life which is demanded 
of him. Now, it does not seem accurate to say that someone who has a 
fixed set of rules which he brings to bear on all moral problems which 
face him is, in the sense outlined, truly conscientious. There is a 
strong probability that this way of trying to lead a moral life will 
lead to mistakes, and in a case where a principle seems to apply but 
does not (cf. the earlier example of 'lying is wrong' or of 'lying is 
wrong except when the truth will offend someone, in which case it is ob-
\ 
ligatory. Either of these ready-made rules may not give the agent a cor-
rect answer to his moral problem in some cases), it would be incorrect 
to say that the agent 'recognizes something as right'. He sees what his 
principle demands, but if his principle is inapplicable, he does not 
really recognize what is right, nor do it because he recognizes it as 
17 
such. . 
This discussion misht suggest that I am reverting to the Kantian pos-
ition that conscientious or dutiful action is always objectively right. 
This is not intended as an implication of my view. What I do maintain is 
that if someone is to be described as truly conscientious,i.e.,to be de-
scribed as someone who is guided by the principle of doing right, of doing 
what is demanded of him as a moral agent, then we might expect him to adopt 
the best means of meeting the moral demand. But rigid principles and 
ready-made rules do not provide the best means. A more effective approach 
to the moral life is one which does involve flexibility, and a willingness 
in particular cases to see what is demanded of one. In a very general way, 
principles can be useful. One must have some idea of what is good and what 
is bad. Fixed sets of universal principles are, however, a hindrance 
rather than a help. 
17ThiS does not imply that an agent can never conscientiously perform a 
wrong action - just that he should try to the best of his ability to 
correctly recognize somethi~g as right. 
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If we rule out such principles, therefore, we are left with two 
senses in which the conscientious man may be described as a man of princ-
iple. First, he does guide his life by a general principle, or maxim, 
of duty. Secondly, he may be said to be a man of principle in that, 
once he has decided where his moral duty lies, he will not normally be .. 
deflected by non-moral considerations from acting as duty requires. 
If, then, Robespierre is qua rman of principle, to be described as 
conscientious, he must be a man of principle in the senses I have out-
lined, and not in the sense that he goes all out to act in accordance 
with rigid, ready-formed principleso The mere fact that he can be des-
cribed as a man of principle does not, therefore, entitle us to call him 
conscientious. 
This leads me to the second characteristic of the fanatic, viz. that 
if he has a cause, he will sacrifice anything for it. Now again, there 
is a sense in which the conscientious man has a cause for which he will 
sacrifice anything. That is, he has the cause of dutyo But this cause 
is significantly different from other causes. For by definition, there 
are ~ sacrifices that the conscientious man cannot make, viz. moral 
sacrifices. He cannot, as the fanatic does, do wrong that good might 
come. Since he does what he recognizes as right, he does not, in pursuit 
of some end, ignore the moral status of the means to the end. He may sac-
rifice gain, popularity, or even his life, but he cannot sacrifice the 
responsibility he has as a moral agent of deciding whether particular ac-
tions are right. But sometimes this is necessary for the fanatic, since 
often he can achieve his end only by performing actions which are morally 
wrong. Espousing a cause as the fanatic does involvelabdicating the res-
ponsibility of making moral judgments about the rightness or wrongness of 
actions which must be performed if the end is to be achieved o A judgment 
is made in advance, of course, to the effect that this end is so important 
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that ~~ means to the achievement of it is not only right but obligatory • 
. But someone who has real~ resolved always to do what is right cannot, 
consistently with his resolve, make such a blanket judgment to cover all 
his future actions and decisions. Thus, there are some lengths to which 
a conscientious man cannot go, since they involve his denying the princ-
iple according to which he leads his life. 
Consequently, before we accept that Robespierre is conscientious, we 
must know whether he is willing to make ~ sacrifice for the good of his 
cause, including the sacrifice of abdicating responsibility for deciding 
on the morality of the means to his ends, or whether he limits his sac-
rifices, as does the conscientious man, to the morally possible ones. 
Finally, Robespierre possesses the characteristic of incorruptibility. 
This can easily be seen to be a characteristic of the fanatic, and within 
limits, of the conscientious man. We do not expect someone who is conscien-
tious to be deflected from doing his duty by the prospect of gain. Indeed, 
I think we must admit that incorruptibility is, in itself, always good. 
Even if the consequences of somebody1s being corrupted would be immensely 
good, I do not see that we could say that he, the agent, was moral~ better 
for being corrupted. If a Nazi, for instance, could be bribed into letting 
Jews escape, clearly the consequences would be good, but even though one 
may abhor the code of the Nazi, I do not think that his giving in to temp-
tation, while retaining his beliefs, could in any sense be thought to im-
prove him moral~. Inco~ptibility, then, seems to be the one character-
istic of which the conscientious man shares with the fanatic. But while 
it may be necessary that the conscientious man be incorruptible, it is 'not 
sufficient •. 
The case for saying that Robespierre is conscientious is not, then, 
by any means proved. The characteristics which he possesses may qualify 
him as conscientious, but they may rather qualify him as a fanatic. Whether 
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he ~ conscientious remains to be considered in the following chapter. 
Several important points, both negative and positive, concerning 
the nature of conscientiousness have emerged in the course of this long 
discussion of the two counter-examples offered by Nowell-Smith. Briefly, 
they may be summarized as follows. The conscientious man is not a man 
who is deficient in any quality. Conscient.iousness is something positive 
which is to be best understood in terms of the notion of setting oneself 
to do onels duty. But there are more ways than one of setting oneself to 
do onels duty, and it seemed reasonable to suppose that.the truly conscien-
tious man adopts the most effective means to the accomplishment of a com-
plete life. Thus he will not be, as is commonly supposed, insensitive, 
but will try to make himself sensitive to the demands of morality. Nor 
will he be rigid. He will recognize that flexibility is necessary in fac-
ing moral problems, and will therefore try to avoid solving all problems 
. by the application of universal rules. He will not, in important respects, 
be like the fanatic who may be thought to resemble him, for though he is a 
man of principle, he is not-rule-bound. Though he has a cause, he will 
not sacrifice morality for that cause. 
The general picture of the conscientious man that seems to be emerging 
is not, then, the rather repulsive one which many people haveo In the 
first part, it was seen that conscientiousness is not incompatible with 
sensitivity and flexibility, but indeed requires them. The details of this 
picture will gradually be drawn in the course of the rest of this thesis. 
The next problem which requires a thorough discussion is that of rightness, 
and the possible relation between objective and subjective duty. It is nec-
essary to consider these concepts primarily because the claim that the con-
. 
scientious man does what he believes to be right may lead to difficulty in 
cases where his belief is mistaken, and where it might, consequently, be arg-
ued that although he is conscientious he is not morally good. The best 
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answer to this lies in a distinction between objective and subjective 
duty, and the next chapter will be devoted to a discussion of these, and 
related, concepts. 
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Chapter 2 
SUbjective and Objective Rightness. 
1. Introductory 
So fa:r, I have stresse~ that conscientiousness, whose nature is 
gradually becoming clea:r, is morally good, and that nothing else is morally 
good. I have considered various objections to this view, and have 
endeavoured to show that they are misplaced. For instance, the criticism 
that conscientiousness cannot be the 'supreme virtue' (a claim that I do 
not, in any case, make), arises from the mistaken assumption that 
conscientiousness is inferior to some virtue such as love, whereas we have 
seen that their values a:re not to be measured on the same scale. Another 
criticism, that conscientiousness is not only not of supreme value, but is 
sometimes in itself bad (apart from its consequences), was seen in the 
previous chapter to be based partly on unacceptable views of the nature 
of conscientiousness. Thus, we can say that Nowell-Srni th' s examples of 
the Oxford danand of Robespierre do not demonstrate the occurrence of 
conscientious acts which are bad, since it is by no means certa1nthat 
the acts were genuinely conscientious. If, as I am suggesting, a con-
scientious man is not merely a man who acts in accordance with his 
principles, but one who performs actions which be believes after due 
reflection to be right or obligatory, then we c~ at least say that 
Nowell-Smith's case is unproved, since there is no evidence cited by him 
to show that either the don or Robespierre reflected sufficiently on the 
rightness of their actions. What evidence there is is to be found in the 
actions themselves, and the actions are such that their performance 
suggests a lack of moral reflection on the part of their agents. 
However, while we may say that the opposition's case is unproved, 
it has not yet been shown,that it is false. If it miPjht be the case that 
Robespierre acted conscientiously, and might also be the case that 
Robespierre would have been a better man if he had acted otherwise, then 
it might also be the case that conscientiousness is not always morally 
good. The problem that has to be solved may be expressed like this. It 
seems as though people have, on various well-known occasions, performed 
grossly immoral actions in perfectly good faith. Robespierre might be 
regarded as one such person, and we may also suggest as candidates the 
Spanish-Inquisitors and the Nazis. If it is correct to say that con~-
scientiousness and moral goodness are identical, then it looks as though 
we must say that Robespierre, the Spanish Inquisitors and the Nazis were 
morally good, and that if they had failed to act in accordance with their 
moral beliefs, they would have been morally worse men. Since this seems 
an unacceptable conclusion, it looks as though we will have to abandon 
the premise from which it follows, and reject the previous identification 
of conscientiousness and moral goodnesso 
I propose to attempt a defence of this premise, however, by means 
of _an analysis of a distinction between objective and subjectiveright~ 
ness, and an interpretation of moral goodness in terms of subjective· 
hl<l. 
rightness. First, I shall argue that actions are describale as objectively 
right or wrong. Secondly I shall argue that they are describable -as 
subjectively right or wrong, depending on the aims and intentions of the 
agent. I shall then try to show that it is morally good to perform the 
subjectively right action, even when that action is objectively wrong. It 
will be seen, however, that although actions may be subjectively right 
and objectively wrong (and vice versa), subjective rightness is to be 
understood in such a way that there are not very many actions which are 
subjectively right and objectively wrong, or gross.' Those which are, 
however, must be described as morally good. 
It might seem that I am making my own position unnecessarily difficult 
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to hold by arguing that there is ~uch a thing as obje~tive rightness or 
wrongness. For if rightness were always subjective, there would be no 
such thing as the conscientious performance of wrong actions. I do not 
wish to take this line, however, for two main reasons. First, I think 
that to adopt it would be merely to push the problem back one stage, 
since there is so obviously a difference between actions like torturing 
unbelievers, and actions like helping the poor, that we would, assuming 
the non-objectivity of morality, have to distinguish between different 
kinds of subjective rightness, those which are and those which are not 
morally good. In the second place, I find the position that rightness 
and wroncness are always subjective untenable. 
2. Objective ri~htness. 
~fuen I'say that it is possible to describe actions as objectively 
right, wrong, or obligatory, I mean that it is possible to ascertain the truth 
of such statements as 'x is wrong', where x is an action, and to do so 
without reference to the aims, intentions, or beliefs of the agent. I 
do not mean to suggest that we can always be certain of the moral status 
of any and every action. If we could, the difficulty which arises from 
the possibility of a clash between objective and subjective rightness 
would not constitute such a hurdle for the defender of conscientiousness. 
Nor would the practice of morality be as complex as it is. It is, then, 
often hard, and perhaps sometimes impossible, for the agent to discover 
what we ought to do in a particular situation.' :But if it is correct to 
say that at least in principle it is possible to ascertain the truth of 
statements 'x is right, wrong, etc', then it is the case, first, that 
such statements have a truth-value, and secondly, that there are criteria 
by which we may judge the morality of actions. i 
At this stage, I do not want to discuss this point in gTeat detail, 
since I shall treat it fully when I come to talk about moral judgments.l 
lsee Part II, Ch. 3 below. 
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In the present chapter, the objectivity of morality will be assumed, 
in that I shall suppose that we could not attach any value at all to 
conscientiousness or moral goodness unless we thought that it was at 
least reasonable for a human being to try to do what he ought to do, and 
that he is not suffering from an illusion when he claims to be aware of 
a moral demand. 
Thus the general position underlying my discussion of subjective 
rightness is that, in any given Situation, the agent's beliefs about what 
he ought to do are either true or false. If he believes that x is obligat-
ory he might be correct or mistaken, and if he believes that x is permiss-
ible or wrong, he is correct or mistaken. To refer' to one of Nowell" 
Smith's examples~ we find a don who believes that it is his duty to attend 
Common Room. Whether it really is his duty, we do not know, since we 
are not in possession of all the factso But we can at least say that his 
belief does not render attendance obligatoryo If he is right in thinking 
he ought to attend, he is right because his belief is true, not because 
he has the belief. 
30 Subjective rightness, mistakes, and avoidability. 
Subjective rightness must therefore be distinguished from objective 
rightness. Fbr while the objective rightness of an action does not depend 
at all on the beliefs of the agent, its subjective rightness does. Unless 
we make the distinction between objective and subjective rightness ve;y 
clear,' and.'. unless we understand just what subjective rightness is, and 
what relation it bears to the beliefs of the agent, we run the risk of 
supposing that, since people can believe almost anything, then almost 
anything can be subjectively right. If we suppose this, we will rightly 
regard with suspicion the view that conscientious action, the doing'of 
what is subjectively right, is always morally good. It is by understanding 
what subjective rightness is that we will reach an understanding of the 
1;0 
nature and value of conscientious action. 
. vr~ From an objective standpoint, actions may be seen to be ob1igatiefi&, 
permissible, or wrong. Subjectively, also, they may be seen to be 
obligatory, permissible or wrong. There are therefore a number of 
combinations of subjective and objective rightness and wrongness. To take 
rightness as an example, an action may be: objectively wrong and subjectively 
right; objectively right and subjectively right; or objectively right and 
subjectively wrong. The possibility of the first combination is the most 
dangerous for conSCientiousness, and I shall discuss this first. The 
conscientious agent is one who tries to discover the moral status of his 
proposed actions, and who acts in accordance with the conclusions he has 
reached. Raving decided that an action is obligatory, he will perform 
it for the sufficient reason that that is what he has decided, and so on. 
Now I think that an important factor in establishing the value of 
conscientiousness is the phrase 'tries to discover'. An action is not 
to be described as subjectively right because the agent happens to believe' 
that it is right, or because he has cursorily decided that it is. It can 
be said to be subjectively right only if he has tried to discover its 
moral status.' 
When we try to find things out, it is always possible that we will 
2 
make mistakes. We might be responsible for our mistakes, which sometimes 
arise from carelessness or idleness. Sometimes, on the other hand, we are 
not responsible for our mistakes, even though it might be possible to say 
that if we had tried even harder, we might have been right. Something 
here will depend on the situation in which we have to carry out our procedure 
of discovery. If time is short~ we might be excused mistakes for which 
we would otherwise be held responsible, and indeed we might be blamed for 
2The mistake may be one of fact, or of value. But the point I am making 
apply e~ually to mistakes ,of both kinds. 
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achieving accuracy at the expense of something else. In an examination, 
w)(~J 
for instance, we would ~ higher marks to the students who made more 
mistakes ~~d also got more correct answers than we would to the one who 
got all his answers right, but answered only half the number of questions 
required. So although the first student; could have made fewer mistakes, 
we judge him to have allowed the wiser course in writing quickly. 
Similarly, people making moral judgments may make mistakes. Some~ 
times, they are not responsible for their mistakes (like the student who 
has never been taught how to solve a particular kind of problem) and aome-
times they are responsible in that they could have reached the right 
answer. But although we can in this sense say that people are always 
responsible for the mistakes they could have avoided, it does not follow 
that they are always to be blamed for the mistakes for which they are 
responsible. Thus, though we may insist that trying to discover the moral 
status of an action is an indispensable part of conscientiousness, we must 
be careful to keep our demand for effort within sensible limits. It would 
be a mistake, for instance, to demand that they should try to the best of 
their ability, in so far as this suggests that the ability of the agent is 
limited only by the limitations of his intelligence, perceptiveness, and 
so on. For the agent must be influenced by the limits imposed not merely 
by his own nature or talent, b~t also by those imposed by the situations in 
which the judgmen:t has to be made. 
So far, then, we can say that if an action is to be described as 
subjectively right, then the agent must have tried to discover what he 
ought to do. We can concede that he may have made a mistake, in which case 
the subjectively and objectively right actions will not coincide. But where 
he had made a mistake, it remains open whether or not the action is 
subjectively right, since the mistake may be totally avoidable, unavoidable 
in the Circumstances, or avoidable in the circumstances. Now it is clear 
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that in order to discover the subjective moral status of an action, when 
the action is objectively wrong, we must know what sort of mistake has 
been made. We must know whether the mistake was avoidable or unavoidabre, 
and in what sense it was avoidable or unavoidable. 
The total avoidability or unavoidability of a mistake is a matter of 
fact. That is to say, although it may be difficult to establish what the 
fact is, the question is one about facts rather than values. As we shall 
see, this makes total avoidability very rare (as I indicated earlier, I do 
not want to make too sharp a distinction here, but there is a common enough 
sense in which 'facts' are understood to be non-moral). If the mistake was 
totally unavoidable, we can establish this, if we can establish it at all, 
. 
1fY\ by reference to the unpossibility of the agent's reaching the right answer. 
It might be ,impossible for him to reach the right answer because he is 
unintelligent, or imperceptive, or uninformed, or it might rather be 
impossible because there is no avoidable means of discovering the facts 
needed for judgment. 
Circumstantial avoidabili tYt on the other hand, is not simply a matter 
of fact, but of value judgment. To say that the agent could not, in these 
circumstances, have avoided making this mistake is, paradoxically, quite 
often to say that he was right to make the mistake. It would have been 
stupid, or unwise, or imprudent, or even blameworthy, to have done what 
was necessary definitely to ascertain the truth. To say that he could, in 
these circumstances, have avoided the mistake, is to say that he should 
have avoided it. It is to suggest that he was careless, or lazy, or 
insensitiye, or, perhaps, biased. 
AI though the di vid1ng line is not easy to draw; it is important that 
we should be aware of what kind (un)avoidability we are attributing to the 
mistake of the agent with whose judgment we disagree. Only if we know 
this can we know whether we should describe his action as subjeotively 
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right or not. 
In the first place, if his mistake was totally unavoidable, if he 
could not possibly have avoided making the mistake he did make, then we 
can describe his action as subjectively right, since he acted in accord-
ance with a belief that he could not help holding. Secondly, if his 
mistake was totally avoidablel we can refuse to describe his action as 
subjectively right, since he did not try hard enough to discover what he 
ought to do. But while this is true on a general level, when we come 
down to particular cases, 'Ie will find it not so easy to judge the subjective 
moral status of the action. If we consider some of the reasons given for 
attributing total (un)avoidability to mistru{es, we can see that often we 
are attributing circumstantial rather than total (un)avoidabilityo That is, 
we are not stating a fact, but making a value-judgment. For example, we say 
that the agent could not help making a mistake because he was stupid, or 
imperceptive, or uninformed. Stupidity, perhaps, is unavoidable. But if 
the unavoidability of a mistake rests on an avoidable factor such as lack) 
of perception, or ignorance, are we really saying that the mistake was 
unavoidable? Surely we would want to say that the agent should not have 
let himself become so imperceptive or uninformed. If he had tried harder 
earlier on, he would have been in a better position now to make correct 
judgments 0 Thus, if a mistake is to be described as totally unavoidable, 
the unavoidability must arise from elements outside the ao~nt's control, 
not only present but past. As a simple illustration of the fact that we 
often do judge mistakes in this way, we may consider somebody who attempts 
to excuse some conduct which was meant.for the best but which caused offence, 
by saying 'Oh well, you know me, I'm always putting my foot in it'. The 
natural response to this is not to say forgivingly, 'I suppose you can't 
help it', but rather to say 'It's about time you learned not to'. The 
offence is not less blameworthy because it is one of many of a similar 
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type. Anyone might cause offence occasionally, but to do it frequently 
suggests a character-defect for which we hold the agent responsible. 
I~stakes in moral judgement are rarely totally unavoidable, since· 
the agent is often, in the long term, responsible for being the kind of 
person who makes that kind of mistake. But they are not often totally 
avoidable, either. It will be remembered that statements of total 
avoidability are statements of fact, not judgments of value. They suggest 
that the agent could have avoided the mistake, not that he should have. 
But the statement that he could have avoided it often includes some judg-
ments to the effect that he should have. After all, if a mistake could 
have been avoided, it is difficult to see why it should have been made, . 
unless we suppose that .the agent did or omitted something for which we 
blame him. He must have been careless, or thoughtless, or biased, or self-
interested. The statement of the fact of total avoidability can therefore 
be seen to be usually inseparable from a value-judgment as to the agent's 
method of attempting to ascertain the truth. 
Almost always, then, when someone makes a mistake in judgment, there 
is at least something for which we hold him responsible. This may be more 
or less serious, involving a judgment of character, or the imputation of a 
moment's thoughtlessness. There are, however two kinds of situation in 
which we might absolve the agent from any responsibility for his mistake. 
The first is that in which the circumstances were such that he had no 
access to the necessary source of information, by means of which he could 
have discovered the truth. Thus' if, for instance, a doctor decides that 
he ought to discharge a patient from hospital (this can be made into a 
moral question if we include some reference to, say, shortage of beds), 
and bases his decision on the foreseeable consequences of his action, he 
cannot be held responsible if one consequence of what he does if the 
suicide of his patient who has quite irrationally and secretly decided that 
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he has cancer. (The doctor can hardly allow for this kind of possibility, 
since any way of finding out whether patients have this kind of fear would 
presumably involve planting a seed of suspicion in the minds of patients 
who had never even thought of cancero) The doctor therefore decides 
reasonably on the basis of the information available to him, and even 
though he comes to the wrong conclusion, and can consequently be said to 
have made a mistake, the mistake was totally unavoidable, and could not 
perhaps even be called 'his' mistake o 
The second kind of situation in which we might regard a mistake as 
totally unavoidable is one in which the mistake arises inevitably, not 
from the unavailability of information, or from external factors at all, 
but from the character, ability, ,or beliefs of the agent where he is ~ 
responsible for his character. We hold people responsible for being care-
less, or insensitive, and therefore hold them responsible for mistakes in 
judgment arising from carelessness or insensitivity. But we do not hold 
them responsible for being mentally ill, or retar~edo Consequently, if 
mistakes in judgment arise from a condition for which the agent'is not 
responsible, we do not regard these mistakes as avoidable. 
vIe mB¥ now use the conclusions which have been reached about mistakes 
in judgment in an attempt to clarify the demand that an agent should 'try 
to discover' what he ought to do, if his actions are to be described as 
subjectively right, even though they are objectively wrong. 
If he is not responsible at all for his mistakes, we may say that his 
efforts to discover what he ought to'do were, though unsuccessful, sufficient. 
The doctor's action in discharging the patient was subjectively right. 
i.]hat if the mistake is unavoidable because of, say, mental illness? 
Suppose a madman, after thinking things over, decides to kill the man he 
believes to be systematically poisoning the reservoir which supplies water 
to a large city, are we to say that his action is subjectively right? 
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Perhaps it would seem more aoourate to say that he is not a moral agent 
at all. But if his deoision is taken on grounds which seem to him to be 
moral, because he believes he ou~ht to save the city's inhabitants, I see 
no reason to deny that he did what he really, after due reflection, 
believed he ought to do, and therefore that his action~ was subjectively 
right. If he is capable of any ooherent thought, the wildness of the 
premises from whioh he validly argues should not lead us to say he has 
. 
not made a judgment. If so, it follows that whenever anyone has tried to 
discover what he ought to do, and has made an unavoidable mistake in 
judgment, we may call his actions subjeotively right. 
If the agent is responsible for his mistakes, we must distinguish 
wi thin the class of avoidable mistakes those for which the agent is to 
bl~~e, and those for which he is not to blame. He is to blame for those 
mistakes which are made through carelessness, or insensitivity and so on. 
But in general he is not to blame for mistakes which arise through what 
might be called pressure of c[rcums~ces. If a man refuses to spend very 
much time on trying to find out what he ought to do in a trivial case 
because he rightly believes that he should concentrate on more important 
matters, we cannot blame him for his trivial errors of judgment. (I say 
'in general'·since there are obviously going to be differenoes in different 
cases here. Perhaps he could have made a quick and accurate judgment if 
he had not been insensi ti ve, for instance 0 But then the mistake a-ises 
partly from pressure of ciroumstanoes, and partly from a defeot in the 
agent's charaCter for which we do blame him.) If he is to blame for his 
mistake, we can refuse to call what he does subjectively right, but if he 
is not to blame, we can say that, so long as he tried to disoover what was 
right, his action was subjeotively right. 
This oonc1usion will enable us to disouss more fully the problems 
which arise from a conflict between subjective and objective rightness. 
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Since mistakes in judgment are nOt only possible, but common, it qui te-
often happens that someone performs an objectively wrong action believing 
it to be right. But it does not follow from this that people often perform 
objectively wrong actions which are also subjectively right. Sometimes, 
admi ttedly, we do, and it is necessary to consider &'Uch caseso But we do 
not need to account for objectively wrong actions performed in the belief 
that they are right by people who are to be blamed for holding such a 
, belief, since these actions are not subjectively right. Judged by the 
criterion of 'trying to discover', they are found wantingo 
Thus, when I say that conscientiousness alone is morally good, and' 
IS' 
that it is always good to perform the action which ~ believed to be 
right, or which, in other words, is subjectively right, I am not committed 
to the view that, whenever anybody does anything, no matter what, which he 
believes to be right, in any and every sense of 'believe', he is morally 
goodo Nevertheless, there are still problems, since it may not always be 
easy to discover whether the mistaken belief acted upon by the agent who 
performs morally wrong actions, are based on mistakes which could have been 
avoided, and for which the agent is to blame, or whether the mistakes were 
unavoidable, and the agent blamelesso The main problem does seem to arise 
in the case of fanatics, but it is to be found also in any case whether 
the mistalce arises from a defect in character~ I shall return to this 
problem in subsection 5 of this chaptero' 
40 Special Cases 
First, however, it is necessary to consider a separate class of 
subjectively right actions 0 , As I pointed out earlier, there are several 
possible combinations of the subjective and objective moral status of 
actions.' An action may be subjectively wrong and objectively right, 
objectively wrong and subjectively right, or objectively and subjectively" 
right (or'wrondo The same range of combinations holds for obligatorynesso 
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(I use the term 'right' to mean 'permissible' rather than 'obligatory'.) 
When an action is both objectively and subjectively right or wrong, no 
problems arise. But the possibility of an action's being subjectively 
wrong and objectively right gives rise to some interesting speculations. 
One possible example of such an argument is afforded by an agent who 
is, on moral grounds, a vegetarian. Presumably, not all vegetarians refuse 
to eat meat because they believe it to be wrong to do so. They might 
dislike meat, or might have special views about the nutritional value of 
various foods. But some people refuse to eat meat because they disapprove, 
morally of the practice of living on other animals. Now I should myself 
be inclined to say that there is nothing morally wrong about eating meat, 
(though I should give serious attention to the view that certain farming 
methods involve cruelty to animals, and that one ought not to eat the food 
obtained by such methods.) Thus, we can say, though a vegetarian would not, 
that it is not morally wrong to eat meat. Eating meat is objectively 
permissible. But if we assume that after careful consideration the 
vegetarian has decided that eating meat is morally wrong, then we nmst 
say that meat-eating is subjectively wrong for the vegetarian. 
However, in case this example is not accepted (since I might be 
mistru:en in my judgment that meat-eating is permissible), I shall offer 
another, which must be. Catholics, or at any rate most Catholics, believe 
that it is morally wrong to use artificial means of contraception. U1 tim-
ately, this believe is based on a Papal pronouncement: because the present 
Pope has officially announced that it is urmatural, and therefore wrong, 
to use artificial contraceptives, Catholics who accept that the Pope's 
official announcements on matters of morals are authoritative, are committed 
to accepting his authority in this matter, and to saying that it is, as 
the Pope says, objectively wrong to use artificial means of contraception. 
The matter is rather complicated by the fact that the Catholic church 
I; 
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recognizes the ultimate authority of the individual conscience, since it 
is possible for that reason for a Catholic to reject the Pope's teachingo 
However, it is clear that the Catholic must be very sure of his beliefs, 
and of his reasons for his beliefs, if he is to be described as genuinely 
conscientious in his rejection of the Church's teachingo 
On the other hand, we find many non-Catholics who believe conscient-
iously (that is, after due reflection, and after 'trying to discover', in 
the relevant sense, what is objectively right), that artificial methods of 
birth-control are not only permissible, but obligatory, since a refusal to 
regulate the birth-rate by the available means will lead to serious 
problems for mankind, problems of suffering, starvation, and possibly even 
the ultimate destruction of mankind. 
It is clear that artificial contraception cannot be, at the same 
time, objectively wrong and objectively obligatory. Therefore either the 
Catholic who condemns birth-control, or the non-Catholic who regards it 
as obligatory, is mistakeno Consequently, if the actions of the Catholic 
and the actions of the non-Catholic (in both cases based on moral conviction) 
are describable as subjectively right, we have a case of a conflict 
between subjective wrongness and objective rightness. If artificial 
contraception is objectively morally right or even obligatory, then its 
subjective wrongness for the Catholic conflicts with its objective right-
nass. If it is objectively morally wrong, then the non-Catholic's sub-
jective obligation to practise it, or, in other words, his subjective 
obligation to. refrain from contributing to the population4 problems of the 
world, conflicts with the objective rightness of avoiding artificial 
methods of contraception. Without, then, coming down on one side or the 
other, we can say that at least for one of the parties concerned, 
subjective wrongness ccnflicts with objective rightness o It might con-
ceivably be argued against this that there is no conflict, since one of 
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the sides is not only mistaken, but culpably SOo But I do not think 
that this is a tenable positiono The Catholic cannot blame the non-
Catholic for not knowing a revaaled truth which has not been revealed 
to him. The non-Catholic cannot blame the Catholic for believing some-
thing which he has been told by the person he holds as the ultimate source 
of moral knowledge 0 He might blame him for believing it unthinkingly, or 
for unthinkingly accepting the Pope as his authority, but presumably not 
all Catholics accept either the individual pronouncements, or the general 
authority, of the Pope, without giving some reasonably deep thought to 
the questiono 
We may, therefore, say that, just as there can be a conflict between 
objective wrongness and subjective rightness, there can equally be a 
conflict between objective rightness and subjective wrongness. This is 
important, for if we identify conscientiousness with moral goodness, we 
must be able to show not only that it is always morally good to act con-. 
scientiously, even when the action is objectively wrong, but also that a 
failure to act conscientiously is always a failure to be morally good, 
even when by fatling to be conscientious one performs the objectively 
right action. 
The background to the argument that it is always morally good to aot 
.;-
consCientiously, and always morally poorer (at least poorer, and possibly 
~) to fail to act conscientiously, is now filled in. I shall, accord-
ingly, turn to the arguments in favour of this claim. 
5. Nowell Smith's position -
First, I shall concentrate ~n the claim that it is always morally 
good to act conscientiously. The second part of the claim is not entirely 
separable from this, but there are special cases (e.g. that of thq6-egetar-
ian) which do need to be handled separatelyo 
The chief ojfthe modern opponents of this claim is Nowell-Smith, some 
141 
of whose arguments I considered in the previous chapter. By attacking 
his argument, I shall provide a basis for the development of my positive 
thesis. In the previous chapter, I discussed Nowell-Smith's counter" 
examples to the claim that conscientiousness is always morally good. Now 
I shall discuss one of his examples (Robespierre) again, in the wider 
context of his general attack on conscientiousness. 
First, in attacking Kant's claim that the good will alone is good 
without qualification, and in particular Paton's defence of Kant's position, 
Nowell-Smi th says, " ••• he C Paton J does not even raise the question whether 
conscientiousness is 'higher than' other moral virtues. Nevertheless it 
seems that this is an open question".3 
He b"Oes on, "and it is also an open question whether conscientiousness 
itself is good without qualification. Many of the worst crimes in history 
have been committed by men who ,had a strong sense of duty just because 
their sense of duty was so strong. I should myself have no hesitation in 
saying that Robespierre would have been a better man (qUite apart from the 
question of the harm he did) if he had given his conscience a thorough rest 
and indulged his taste for roses and sentimental verse".4 
Aftcrquoting Patonts defence against this kind of criticism, to the 
effect that, while good men may do harm, this harm may spring from silliness 
and stupid! ty, Nowell-Smith goes on to ask "But may not the harm spring 
from their very conscientiousness? We might adopt the moral prinCiple 
that conscientiousness is so valuable that a man ought to be conscientious 
no matter what harm he does; but it is quite another thing to say that 
their conscientiousness is never the source of the harm that good men do, .. 5 
But while we may adopt the principle that conscientiousness is of supreme 
3Ethics , p.247 
4Ethics , p.247 
5Ethics , po248 
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value, Nowell-Smith sees no reason to accept it. He argues th~t two 
kinds of mistake underlie the adoption of such a principleo First, he 
suggests that defenders of conscientiousness assume that non-conscientious 
action must be both impulsive and selfish. Now while this m~_in some 
cases be true, as a matter of fact, there is no necessary connection between 
the claim that conscientiousness is of supreme value, and the assumption 
that non-conscientious action is both impulsive and selfish. This assumpt-
ion is in my opinion clearly false, and I agree with Nowell-Smith that it 
must be rejected. ,But it does not follow from this that we must reject the 
claim of conscientiousness to be of supreme value. 
The second accusation levelled by Nowell-Smith at the defenders of 
conscientiousness is ,that they are guilty of a confusion. He develops this 
accusation in a discussion of an argument put forward by Ross. Since I want 
to make my own defence of conscientiousness on the basis of an attack on 
Nowell~Smithls position, I shall avoid unclarity of exposition, or unfair-
ness, by quoting Nowel.-Smith1s discussion in full. 
He writes, "Sir David Ross uses the .following argument to prove that 
we must regard a man who acts from a sense of duty as a better man than one 
who acts from any other motive. "Suppose that someone is drawn towards 
doing act A by a sense of duty and towards another, incompatible, act B by 
love for a particular persono Ex hyPothesi, he thinks he will not be doing 
his duty in doing B. Can we possibly say that he will be acting better if 
he does what he thinks not his duty than if he does what he thinks !! his 
duty? Evidently not. What those who hold this view mean by 'acting from 
the sense of dutyl is obeying a traditional, conventional code rather than 
" following the warm impulses of the heart. But what is properly meant by 
the sense of duty ts the thought that one ought to act in a certain wayo •• 
,'. 
And it seems clear that when a genuine sense of duty is in conflict with 
any other motive we must recognize its precedence. If you seriously think 
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that you ought to do A, you are bound to think that you will be acting 
morally worse in doing anything else instead. ",,6 
First, Nowell-Smith objects to Ross's use of the word 'impulse', 
which suggests the capriciousness of m~tives other than a sense of duty, 
and he points out that motives such as sympathy, benevolence and so on are 
not necessarily impulsive. This is true, and in so far as this is a part 
of Ross's position, that position must be attacked. Since it can stand 
without this prop, however, we must consider Nowell-Smith's second and 
more detailed objection. 
He says, "Indeed the passage I have quoted is mostly an appeal to the 
self-evidence of the proposition that a man who acts from a sense of duty 
is a better man than one who acts from any other motive. It is only in the 
last sentence that an argument is used to support this view, and the argu-
ment seems to depend on a confusion between what an agent necessarily thinks 
about his own action and what a critic or spectator necessarily thinks. 
Ross's object is to prove that Jones necessarily regards Smith as a better 
man if he does what he (Smith) thinks he ought to do; but the statement 
at the end of the quotation is only true if 'you' is taken to refer to the 
same person throughout. We must distinguish the following three statements: 
"(I) I think that I ought to do A but that I ,.,ould be a better man 
1f I did E. 
11(2) I think that you ought to do A but that you would be a better 
man if you did E. 
"e:;) You think that you ought to do A, but you would be a better man 
if you did E. 
I~OW there is an air of contradiction about (1) and (2), but not 
about (3). And the reason why (1) is logically odd is that 'I ought to do A' 
6Ethics p.25~ the passage quoted by Nowell-Smith comes from W.D. Ross, 
The Ri~ht and the Good po164. 
" 
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expresses a decision to act in a certain way, and implies that the 
decision is of a certain kind, namely one based on reasons which, in a 
moral case, may take the form of a belief that A would be fitting or in 
accordance with a certain moral rule. A man who said that he ought to do 
A but would be morally better if he did B is in the same breath deciding 
to act on a moral prinCiple and condemning himself for making this decision. 
But to condemn himself is to abandon the moral principle in questiono ' 
"And (2) is logically odd for a similar reasono To say "you ought 
(morally) to do A" is to advise a man to adopt a certain moral principle 
and the force of "But you would be a better man if you did Btl is to 
retract this advice. It is as inconsistent to recommend and to condemn 
a moral principle in the same breath as it is to decide to adopt and to 
condemn a moral principle in the same breath. 
"fut (3) is not logically odd at all; it is the natural way for 
Jones to express his moral disagreement with Smith~ Now conscientiousness 
is an extremely valuable motive and it is so valuable that we often wish 
to encourage a man to be conscientious even in a case in which we think 
that the principle on which he thinks he ought to act is a bad oneo In 
such a case we might well wish to encourage him to do what he .thinks right 
without wishing to endorse the principle on which he proposes to act. We 
should then s~ "l think you ought to' do B; but if you are really convinced 
that you ought to do A, then you ought to do it. For what really matters 
is not that you should act on the right principle but that you should act 
A 
on the principle that you believe to be right." But I do not think it is 
logically necessary that we should rate conscientiousness as highly as 
this nor that, as a matter of fact, we always do. Statement (3) is not 
logically odd except in the mouth of a man who has already accepted the 
very principle of the supreme value of conscientiousness which Ross is 
trying to establish. ,,7 
7Ethics pp 253-4. 
I 
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6. The nature of moral disaereement 
The first point to be made here is that the lurking suggestion that 
Ross's argument begs the question is unfair, since Ross is, as he quite 
clearly says, appealing to the self-evidence of the proposition that "If' 
you seriously think you ought to do A, you are bound to think that you 
will be acting morally worse in doing anything else instead." lmd there 
is no doubt that this proposition is true. Indeed, it is tautological. 
But what I think Ross is trying to say is that it is self-evident that 
'~e (cannot) possibly say that he someone with incompatible motives of 
love and duty will be acting better if he does "That he thinks not his 
duty that if he does what he thinks is his duty". Now if this is what 
Ross means, he is not begging the question in saying that someone is a 
morally better man, and would be regarded as such by a spectator, if he 
oJ-
acts out a sensee. duty than if he ignores his sense of duty and acts from 
an incompatible motive. On the other hand, !! he is saying that this 
follows from the tautological proposition about what the agent himself 
thinks, he is wrong, unless we add more premises to the argument. It 
will be seen that the necessary premises can be obtained from Ross's 
claim that when a sense of duty conflicts with some other motive, I~e 
~[my emphasiS] recognise its precedence". 
It is, unfortunately, difficult to be sure of Ross's precise position. 
But it is clear enough that his main point is that one ought to do what one 
believes one ought to do •. How, then, does Nowel1-Smith's argument hold up 
against this point, which is the one I wish to mruce? Ideas of supreme 
value are irrelevant here. What is in question is ,.,hat an agent ought to do 
when he is motivated by a sense of duty to do one action, and by some 
incompatible motive to some other action. Ross's reply, and mine, is that 
he ought to do the action towards which he is prompted by his sense of 
duty. 
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Nowell-&n.ith's argument is based mainly on his claim that that 
there is nothing logically odd about the third of the assertions above, 
viz. "You think you ought to do A, but you would be a better man if you 
did :B", and that, not only is this not logically odd, but it is a perfectly 
\ 
natural ''lay to express moral disagreement. My reply to this will· be two ... 
fold. In the first place, it is !!2i a natural way to express moral disagreement: 
In the second place, although we may accept (after slight emendations), his 
statement that the third assertion "is not logically odd except in the 
mouth of a man who has already accepted the very principle of the supreme 
value of conscientiousness which Ross is trying to establish", this amounts 
to saying that the assertion ~ logically odd, since we must accept the 
principle which Ross is "trying to establish". This prinCiple is not, 
however, that conscientiousness is of supreme value, but that one ought 
to do what one believes one ought to do. In this sense, conscientiousness 
is the moral motive - it is the motive which over-rides other, incompatible 
motives. Thus conscientiousness as a moral motive has a value which other 
motives do not, viz. moral value. 
First, however, we may consider the idea that 'tie quite naturally 
express moral disagreement by saying "You think you ought to do A but you 
would be a better man if you did :Bo" It is worth showing that this is not 
so, since Nowell-Smith believes that it is he, and not the deontologist, 
who expresses the beliefs of the ordinary man. Thus if we can show that 
he is mistaken in this, his position will be weakened, though not destroyed. 
Suppose, then, that someone expresses to me his intention to perform 
an aotion,A, which be believes to be his duty; I believe that he is mistaken 
(whether culpably or otherwise) and that objectively his duty is to perform 
action B; When he tells me that he thinks that he ought to do A, I might 
well reply, "You think you ought to do A, but it would be better if you did 
B". But if I say this I do not mean "You would be a better man if you did 13, 
.H' 
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even though your conscience tells you that you ought to do Alt. If I mean 
to imply anything about conscience, it is that it would be better if his 
conscience ,yere different. The point of my reply is that he is mistaken 
in believing that he ought to do A. If I hold him to be blameworthy for 
believing that he ought to do A, I could also say that he would have shown 
himself to be a better man if he had said (and meant) that he believed 
that he ought to do B. 
Now if I disagree with someone like this on a moral issue, I do not 
state that he '-1Ould be a better man if he performed some action which he 
believes to be wrong. Nor do I say (holding conscientiousness to be of 
great value) that his belief is mistaken, but that he ought to act in 
accordance with it. Yet it is because Nowell-Smith apparently sees only 
these two alternatives that he is able to ridicule the idea that the spec-
tator would regard the conscientious man as morally better. Ross seems to 
identify the agent with the spectator. Nowell-Smith takes up the idea of 
. the spectator, complete with the notion of passivity (he watches and judges, 
but doesn't take part), and then identifies the spectator with a participant 
in a moral argument. This participant has th~ spectator-characteristic of 
passivity. But of course the participant in the argument is not a passive 
spectator, unable to do anything but judge and pronounce judgment. What he 
can and does do is argue. 
There are therefore three possible lines of argument for the 
participant. 
1. "You think you ought to do A but you would be a better man if you 
did B." This is the liflle which Nowell-ani th would speak. 
2. ttl think you ought to do B ••• but what req,lly matters is ,not that 
you should act on the right principle but that you should act on the 
8 principle that you believe to·be right". This is the line Nowell-Smith 
8Ethics p. 254. 
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offers the deontologist. 
3. "You think you ought to do A, but you are mistaken. You ,really 
ought to do B. You haven't considered that doing A involves ••• or, Look, 
~ 
it's clear that you ought to do B, because... ~ is the line which most 
normal people, including deontologists, would speak.' 
It is obvious that if the deontologist's position is expressible only 
in the second line of dialogue then we need not regard acting in accord-
ance with one's beliefs as of supreme importance, of such importance that 
we would not even venture to argue with someone whose beliefs were mistaken. 
But of course the deontologist need not hold such ab absurd position. Since 
he regards acting in accordance with one's beliefs as being very important, 
then he will also hold it to be important that people should hold the 
right beliefs. He will, therefore, argue with anyone who expresses a 
belief that he ought to do an action, A, which is objectively the wrong 
action. By arguing~ he hopes to change the agent's beliefs, so that the 
objectively right action becomes, for that agent, the subjectively right 
action also, that is, the action which that agent accepts, after due 
reflection, as his duty. 
Thus, moral disagreement is not normally expressed in statements to 
the effect that people would be morally better if they did what they 
thought was wrong, or that doing the right thing is unimportant in compar-
ison with acting in accordance with one's principles. It is normally 
-expressed in argument, and in an attempt to convince some that he is mis-
taken and why he is mistaken. 
In many cases, we do manage to convince our opponent that he is 
wrong. If we succeed, then we have done what we set out to do, i.e. we 
have brought about a fusion of objective and subjective rightness. But in 
other cases, we do not succeed. And finally of course there are those 
cases, where we cannot express our disapproval by arguing with the agent, 
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since the agent is dead or fictional o But in these cases, though we do 
disagree, we disagree with the beliefs and not with the agento In a 
sense, I disagree with Robespierre's beliefso But I do not disagree with 
Robespierre. I cannot utter any of the allotted lines to himo This is 
not, therefore, the kind of disagreement Nowell-Smith has in mind, since 
he did, after all, write two of the lines himselfo 
'{hat are we to say when we have failed to convince our opponent? 
What do we say of the object of our disapproval when, being dead, he can 
be judged but not argued with? I think that in both cases we must admit 
the rightness of genuinely conscientious action, and say that people really 
ought to do the action4 which is subjectively right, i.e. which they 
conscientiously believe that they ought to do, and that the good man ~ 
the conscientious man. 
1. Identification of the good man and the conscientious man. 
This may be argued for in the following manner. Now I want to argue 
that the good man is the man who does what he ought to do,i.eo his duty, 
and that duty is to be defined subjectively, not objectivelyo One's duty, 
what one really ought to do, is the subjectively right actioDo Now, the 
good man is defined [ see Part onJ as the man whose goal is the righto He 
is, therefore, an agent who intends to do what is right. Row does he 
execute his intention? Unless people are infallible over matters of right 
and wrong (which obviously they are not, as the fact of disagreement shows 
conclusively) we cannot Bay that they never make mistakes. Thus, although 
they intend, if they are good, to do what is right, they might be mistaken 
about what is righto So if we demand, not only that the good man intends 
to do what is right, but also that he executes his intention, we shall have 
to say either that one cannot always execute one's intention, and that 
goodness is therefore sometimes impossible, and sometimes unknowable, or 
else we must say, if goodness is always to be possible, and if we are to 
150 
know that and when people, including ourselves, are good, then one can 
execute one's intention to do what is right by doing what one has judged 
to the best of one's ability to be right. 
Since it seems odd to say that one can at the same time execute one's 
intention to W, and yet fail to ¢, it is more appropriate to say that the 
good man intends to do, as far as possible what is right, and that he tries 
as far as possible, to execute his intention. Otherwise, goodness would be 
beyond the grasp of most of us, whereas of course it is precisely goodness 
that is within ones grasp, and rather saintliness or holiness that is 
beyond us. 
If goodness, therefore, is to be possible or achievable, I think we 
must say that the good man is the one who tries to do what is right. (It 
was necessary to switch from the concept of intending to that of trying for 
the sufficient reason that a definition in 'terms of intending is incompat-
ible with the inevitable failures that will occur, whereas one in terms of 
trying making goodness achieveable, through effort, by everyone. 
But if the good man is the one who tries to do what is right, then it 
can be shown that the good man and the conscientious man are the sarne. For 
how can we try to do what is right? There is only one way: to think hard 
about what ane ought to do, to make a judgment about it, make a decision 
on the basis of the judgment, and act on the decision. And this is precisely 
doing what one believes, after due reflection, one ought to do. In other 
words it is acting conscientiously. Goodness, therefore, consists in being 
'conscientious. Noral goodness and moral conscientiousness are identical. 
For moral goodness is achievable only through trying to do what is right, 
and trying is possibly only through conscientious action. This being so, it 
is impossible to argue that someone who fails to do what he sincerely 
believes to be right (even through something respectable like love), is, or 
would be, a morally better man than the conscientious man. In repudiating 
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one's moral beliefs, one repudiates whatever chance there is of achieving 
moral goodness, and cannot, therefore, be described as morally good in the 
act of repudiating. In that act, one gives up the attempt to do what is right, 
and leaves rightness to chance. 
It seems to me to be undeniable, therefore, that I ought always to do 
what I believe to be right, though all th~arlier provisos are to be 
understood here, that I must try to discover what is right, and so on. 
One objection might be made to this argument, that I have not really 
justified the claim that in refusing to act on my moral beliefs I am 
leaving the rightness of my actions to chance. For instance, Nowell-Smith 
nught say that in aroiding reference to moral beliefs, and relying instead 
on, say, a1 truism, I am justified in that reliance. As he says, "A man 
can consistently adopt a policy of doing good to others, not because he 
regards it as his duty, but because that is what he most wants to do or 
enjoys doing... But his altruism is not necessarily less consistent or 
more easily shaken than that of the man who tries to do good because he 
thinks it his dutYe,,9 Of course, this is perfectly true. AI truistic men 
may be extremely reliable. But my original contention still holds 0·· For 
if the altruistic man adopts a policy of doing good to others because that 
is what he wants to do, he is, as I said, abdicating his moral agency, in 
rejecting the one means to trying to do what he ought to do. His actions 
are,·· indeed, likely to be right, but they will not be right because he has 
decided to do, as far as possible, what he ought to do. Ultimately, what 
he has decided is that he will do what he most enjoys doing, which happens 
I' 
to be doi~ good to others, and this is not a moral pre-disposition, in the 
sense that the adoption of a consistent policy of doing what one enjoys 
precludes the possibility of doing something else when one ought to do some-
thing else. Thus, the link between goodness ~as manifested in, say, altruism 
9Eth1cS p.253 
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and rightness would, on Nowell-Smith's argument, be contingent. 
However, it seems unlikely that the altruistic man has adopted his 
altruistic policy for this reason (enjoyment) alone, and that is why 
Nowell-Smith's argument appears fairly strong. The man who is consistently 
altruistic does appear to others to he a morally good man, but that is 
because they assume, from knowing how he acts, that he believes that it 
is good (not just enjoyable) to help other people. Some people may think 
~ (&::; 
that thinking ~ about morality is a bad thing, and that it is best to rely 
on one's instincts (which would include benevolence, sympathy, and so forth) 
to tell one what one ought to do. 'fulle I would not agree with this, it 
is at least a belief that is compatible with, indeed presupposes, the moral 
attitude which characterizes the conscientious man. For ultimately such 
people (among whom Nowell-Smith seems to be included), base their moral 
lives on an ultimate moral principle to the effect that one will achieve 
the best one can by spontaneity. Someone who never thinks about mora ity 
does, as I said, abdicate his moral agency. Entirely spontaneous spontaneity, 
as it were, is incompatible with acceptance of one's responsibility to try 
to do what is good or right. But a policy of spontaneity~ such as that 
which Nowell-Smith seems to advocate, is itself amoral policy, based on a 
principle adopted by a moral agent. Thus, Nowell-Smith cannot have it 
both vays.' He can advocate a 'natural' life and say that it is morally 
good. :But it cannot be morally good unless at least one moral decision has 
been tru{en. And'if the necessary moral decision has been taken, the 
'natural' life is, as I understand it, one version of the life of the 
conscientious man. 
Nowell-Smi th 's failure to realize this is, I think, again based on a 
misunderstanding of what it is to be conscientious, or to act 'for the sake 
of duty'. This is illustrated by the final paragraph in chapter 17, entitled 
"Conscientiousness". He writes, "To ask whether conscientiousness is the 
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highest virtue is not unlike asking the question whether money is more 
valuable than other goods. The answer depends on how much you have. More-
over this is a question the answer to which is a moral judgment and it 
cannot therefore be answered either by observation or analysis of moral 
language 0 Aristotle held that a man was not really good unless he enjoyed 
doing what is good, and I am inclined to agree. The sense of dutY.o.plays 
little part in the lives of the best men and could play none at all in the 
lives of saintso They act on good moral principles, but not from the sense 
of duty; for they do what they do for its own sake and not for the sake of 
d t ,,10 u y. 
Conscientious action is doing what one believes one ought to do. It 
is not defined by reference to a specific kind of conscientious man, viz. 
the plodder. There are different ways of conscientiously accepting one's 
moral Cl.o0'9ncy. One may decide to decide each case On its merits; one may 
decide to govern one's life by principles; one may decide to be spontaneous. 
Now, in saying that the question about the value of conscientiousness is 
itself a moral question, Nowell-Smith gives the game away. For in judging 
that the best life is not the life of the conscientious man, understood in 
its narrower sense, but rather the life of men who "do what they do for its 
own sake", he himself states his belief that this is how one ought, ideally, 
to live. In doing so, he makes a moral judgment about what constitutes the bes 
life, and about the life which one ought, as a.moral agent p to try to live. 
If he not only believes this, but also acts in accordance with his belief, 
he affords us a very good example of a conscientious man. 
A final point which may be made about this revealing paragraph is 
that to suppose that it is one thing to act from a sense of duty, and 
another to Itact as good principles" and to "do w~at they the best men·· do 
for its own sake lt , is to misunderstand what it is. to act from a sense of 
10 Ethics pp. 258-9. 
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duty. For to act from a sense of duty ~ to do what one does for its own 
sake. It is to do what is the kind. of thing that can be done for its own 
sake. It is not to do what one wants, but neither is doing good actions 
for their own sake doing what one wants. It is to do them for their own 
sake in·the sense that one does them for the sake of their goodness. As 
Kant would say, a human being feels obliged to do such actions, and in 
doing them doesn't act in accordance with principles by which his behaviour 
is necessarily governed. But to recognize obligation is not to do good 
things reluctantly, but to do them responsibly. And the best men and . 
saints recognize obligation, for they are human. God and the angels are 
different, but Nowell-Smith's concern, like mine, is with human beings. 
No human being is necessarily good - if he were, he would not be a moral 
agent, since he would not be free. Some human beings do enjoy being good. 
But if they 'are good' because they enjoy it, and for no other reason, then 
they may ~ good, but they are not morally good. Aristotle is surely right 
in saying that a truly good man enjoys doing what is good, but that still 
makes the doing of good logically prior to the enjoyment, . And if he does 
what is good with pleasure, and is the better for the pleasure he feels, 
his moral superiority lies in the fact that he enjoys what is good, rather 
than ~ is good. That is, his pleasure is in the goodness of good acts, 
and not in the acts (which will, after all, be of numerous kindS) themselves. 
8. Conscientiousness, obligation and goodness. 
Now it may seem that I have offered a fallacious ar~lment, rather as 
Ross appears to Nowell-Smith to have done. Even if it,is true that I must 
accept my own obligation to do what I believe I ought to do, it does not 
follow that I am really obliged to do these thinGS which I believe I ought 
to do, nor does it follow that it is always and only morally good to do 
wh t I believe I ought to do. Actually, it is the reference to goodness 
a 
which provides the link between illl necessary acceptance of the authority of 
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~ convictions and the duty of the moral agent to act in accordance with 
his convictions. 
Now, in sayin~ that the moral agent ought always to do what he believes 
he ought to do, I am not, obviously, saying that objectively the right 
action is always the one the agent believes he ought to doo But if it is 
true that oUGht implies can, then the most we can say of the moral agent 
is that he has a duty to try to do what is right, for since he cannot always 
do, knowingly, what is objectively right (for he is not infallible), then 
he must simply do his best. Thus, we cannot say that all moral agents at 
all times have a duty to do what is objectively right, for we would be 
asking the impossible. But if we are to say that moral 8.oo-ents have duties 
at all, then in general, what they ought to do is to ~ to do what is 
right 0 And as I have shown, acceptance of this duty implies acceptance 
of the authority of one's moral beliefs. So it is not merely that I think 
I ought to do what I think I ought to do, but that, because I ought to accept 
my duty to do my best, I really ought to do what I think I ought to do. 
And this is not just a statement about me, but about me qua moral agent, 
and consequently about moral agents as such. Thus, moral agents really 
ought to do what they think they ought to do. 
Does it follow from this that they are morally good if, and only 
if, they do what they think they ought to do? I think that it does. They 
cannot, for a start, be morally good unless they do what they think they 
ought to do, for they cannot be morally good unless they accept their 
responsibility as moral agents to do the best they can. Doing whaV6ne 
thinks one ougnt to do is therefore a necessary condition of moral goodness o 
But it is also a sufficient condition of moral goodness, since adoption of 
the principle that one ought to do the best one can, and that this can be 
done only by doing what one believes best, is, precisely, adoption of the 
moral pre-disposition, and acceptance of one's moral agencyo And if it is 
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not morally good to adopt the moral pre-disposition, then I don't think 
that there could be such a thing as moral goodness at all, since there is 
no other candidate. As I have stressed, the moral attitude may take 
different forms, for there are different ways of approaching an attempt to 
lead a good life. Thus, not all conscientious men will be of precisely the 
same type. But unless at some point they have taken the decision to do 
their best, they have not fulfilled the necessary condition of moral goodness. 
It might be argued (and I think that Nowell-Smith would take this line) 
that the truly good man must enjoy doing what is good. I shall leave a 
11 . full discussion of this until later. But for now, I shall point out 
that in saying this, Nowell-Smith must mean one of two things. First, he 
might mean that unless a man enjoys doing good, he is not morally good at 
all. Since this would put moral goodness outside our control, I cannot 
• 
accept this. For one cannot make oneself enjoy doing what is good, though 
one may certainly train oneself to become reasonably accustomed to it, and 
consequently at least to dislike it (if one does dislike it) less. Secondly, 
he might mean (as the passage I quoted above, where he cites Aristotle p 
would SU&~st) that the £ill men enjoy doing what is good. :But then there 
can still be good men who do not enjoy it, and though they are not ~ good 
as the best men, we can only make sense of the concept of the best in terms 
of the concept of the good. The best men are best in relation to the good, 
not in relation to the bad. I do not think, therefore, that we can describe 
enjoyment of doing good as a necessary condition of moral goodness. Con-
sequently, conscientiousness, or acting in accordance with one's moral 
beliefs (arriVed at after due reflection), is both a necessary condition of 
, 
moral goodness, and, since there are no other conditions, a sufficient 
condi tion, too. 
The conscientious man, i.e. the one who does what is subjectively right, 
IlSee Part III, conclusion 
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is therefore morally good, and the morally good man is the conscientious 
man. He cannot, therefore, say of anyone that he would be morally better 
if he acted against his moral beliefs. vIe can, if we blame him for holding 
the beliefs that he holds, deny that what he does is subjectively right, 
and therefore that he is conscientious, and we may possibly agree with 
Nowell-Smith, that Robespierre would have been a morally better man if he 
had tended his roses. That depends on whether we consider that he could 
have avoided the mistaken beliefs that he holds. But if we believe that 
he was genuinely conscientious, we cannot say that he would have been 
morally better if he had acted otherwise than he did, for he would not even 
have been morally good, let alone better •. The point is not that he should 
have given his conscience a rest. Mistaken consciences Beed exercise, not 
rest, though of course one may conscientiously decide that it would be 
better to take one's mind off one's moral problems, so that one may come 
back to them in better form. That is another matter than forgetting about 
<1$ 
one's moral a.eency, 0f Howell-Smi th at some point implies one ought to do. 
9. Special cases 
It remains, in this chapter, only to consider the special case of the 
subjective duty to do what is objectively neutral. It clearly follows from 
the argument of the previous sub-section (8) that if one believes oneself to 
have a duty to perform an action which objectively is not a duty? one ought 
to perform that action. Here, the example of contraception might not apply 
since that was a situation where one of the two parties had a subjective 
duty to do what was objectively wrong, not neutral. But we may shift ,the 
example round, so that we may say that it is neither wrong nor obligatory 
to practice artificial contraception. The Catholic is mistaken in supposing 
that it is wronG, and the non-Catholic is mistaken in supposing that it is 
obligatory. (And actually it is odd to suppose that it is obligatory, 
since the duty is surely that of avoiding contributing to the population 
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problems of mankind, and there are means other than artificial contraception 
of doine one's duty in this matter.) \'/e may also, for the sake of argument, 
take my~getarian example, and suppose that eating meat is objectively 
neutral, i.e. that it is neither wrong nor obligatory to eat meat. (The 
difficulty here is a minor one. There can be little doubt that people do 
sometimes believe that they have a duty to do what is objeotively neutral. 
It is merely hard to think of non"tendentious examples.) 
As I said, it follows from my previous argument that if one believes 
oneself to have a duty to perform an action which objectively is not a 
duty, then one nevertheless oueht to perform that action. People can, 
therefore, be said to have a duty to perform objectively neutral actions, 
that is, actions which are neither obligatory nor wrong. This is a view 
which has been regarded with some suspicion because of some of the 
oonclusions to which it apparently leads. But, as will be seen, it need 
not lead to those conclusions, though where it does they must be accepted. 
The Catholic believes that he has a duty to avoid artificial contra-
ception, although, we may suppose, the practice is objectively neutral. 
The vegetarian believes he has a duty to avoid eating meat, though eating 
meat is objectively neutral. Now I am committed to saying that the 
Catholic ou,o;ht not to practice artificial contraception, and that the 
. 
vegetarian ou;:ht not to eat meat, even though I am assuming there is 
nothine y~ong with either practice. It seems, indeed, to be perfectly 
natural to speak in this way •. Quite often we believe that people ought to 
act in accordance with their principles, even if we regard those principles 
as rather cranky. I can quite reasonably blame them for failing to live up 
to their principles. If I catch the convinced veget~ian eating a steak, 
I could tell him, and mean it, that he ought to be ashamed of himself, even 
while I myself ~ unashamedly tucking into a steak. Non-Catholics who do 
not accept the Pope's authority may quite reasonably blame Catholics who 
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reject that authority. We both can and do blame people for doing things 
which we ourselves do not consider to be wrong. The fact that this is a 
perfectly natural thiIlG to do bears out my contention not only that we 
really oUCht to perform the subjectively right action, but that this is, tog-
ether with its implications for a theory of conscientiousness, a very 
common belief. In other words, I claim the support of the ordinary 
moral connciousness on this point. And even if its implications are not 
so readily sensed by the ordinary moral consciousness, that does not mean 
that ordinary people do not hold the belief which has 'those implications, 
nor that it does not, after all, have those implications. 
The suspicion with which this view on subjective rightness is sometimes 
regarded by philosophers, arises from the assumption that it will commit 
us to sayine that anything at all can count as a moral principle. My 
reply to this is twofold. First, it does not commit us to saying that 
any thine can count as a moral principle, merely that i!. someone holds a 
belief conscientiously as a moral belief, he really ought to act in 
accordance with it. Some cranky beliefs may slip through, but given the 
proviso that the belief must be reached after due reflection, after an 
attempt to discover what is right, there should not be too many of these, 
though there may be some. Secondly, why should we !!2i say that anything can 
count as a moral principle? Immoral principles constitute a special case 
(as with fanatiCS), but objeotively ~-moral principles could, for their 
c.~ 
adherents, eann&t as moral principles, in which case we can reasonably 
eXpect them to act in accordance with them, and blame them for not acting 
in accordance with them. 
10. '.fuat one ou,,;ht to do. 
Last of all, after this discussion of objective and subjective duties, 
do we not seem to be left with an indeterminate realm of things we 'really 
ought to do' which are neither objective nor subjective duties? I do not 
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think that we are. Objective duties are those actions which may be said 
to be duties in the sense that they'are the right actions in the circum-
stances. But I think it is really a mist~~e to use the word 'duties' for 
these. Objectively, they are right or fitting. But if one's duty is to 
do what one oucht to do, and if ought implies can, then one does not always 
have a duty to do the right or fitting action. Subjective duties are those 
actions which the agent believes, after due reflection, that he ought to 
perform. Real duties, as they might be called, are those actions which 
the agent really ought to do. They are, therefore, identical with subjective 
duties properly defined, since one really ought to do one's subjective 
duties. But real duties span the objective/subjective gapo For the basic 
moral duty is to try, or to do one's best, to do what is right. In other 
words, the basi~mora1 duty is to accept one's responsibility as a moral 
agent to find out, and to do, what is right. To understand this is to 
underst~~d what it is to be a moral agent, and what it is to have a duty. 
The basic duty is therefore seen to be to try to make one's subjective 
duties conform to the objectively right and fitting, not to do what is right 
and fittine, since that is not always possible, but to try to do ito And 
ultimately, one must try by adopting the only available means, i.eo by 
using one's ability to judge, and by accepting one's judgments as the 
basis of action. 
Therefore what duty is can be understood only if we understand what it 
is to be a moral agent, and if we understand the interplay between the 
subjectively right and the objectively right, and if consequently, we under-
stand what it is to be truly conscientious. 
Tn this chapter, I have tried to elaborate and clarify the concept of 
true conscientiousness. Some considerable stress has been laid on the notion 
of judgment. This notion will be discussed fully in the next two chapters. 
It is clearly of great importance, since I am ~ng that one's real duty is 
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to do what one judges to be besto I shall, therefore, attempt to show 
a1 
that such reliance «s judgment is not only necessary, but justifiedo 
That is to sa.;;', although it is the best we have, it is not a ;poor best, 
the Oxford don and Robespierre notwithstanding. 
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Chapter Three 
The Justification of MOral Judgments 
1. Introductory 
So far, I have argued that if we are properly to understand the 
notion of moral goodness, we must explain it in terms of conscientiousnesso 
The morally good man is the conscientious man who does what he believes to 
be right because he believes it to be right. He acts on the basis of 
conscientious judgments and decisions. In accordance with .this analysis of 
goodness, we must explain duty in terms of subjective rightness. A moral 
agent's duty is to do what he conscientiously believes to be right. However, 
it has been seen that objections have been raised against this position on 
the ground that there are some people of whom we may predicate conscient-
iousness while at the same time denying that they are morally goodo Further-
more, it might be argued that some actions performed in good faith are 
nevertheless morally wrong, so that the conscientious man may perform wrong 
or even outrageous actions merely because he is conscientious o 
These objections, however, rest on a misunderstanding of the nature 
of conscientiousnesso We have seen that there are different senses of the 
term conscientiou~ and that it is important to be clear which sense is 
involved when we identify the good man with the conscientious mano We do 
not commit ourselves, in making such an identification, to claiming'that 
the narrow minded, over-scrupulous, uncritical or unimaginative man who 
, 
ri&idly acts in accordance with his 'princbples' is morally good, for such 
a man is not conscientious in the relevant senseo 
As for the second objection, that wrong actions are sometimes (or often) 
performed in good faith, two types of answer may be offeredo First, we may 
deny that such actions are perfonned in good faith, or are truly conscientiou~ 
Secondly, we m~ m3intain that the objection is beside the point, since 
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there is no incompatibility between the claims that an agent did what he 
ought to do (in doing what he believed to_be right), and that he acted 
wronGly (in failing to perform the action which was really the best, or 
most appropriate, in the circumstances). Meither of these replies is 
sufficient if taken on its own. Which of them is appropriate depends on 
the particular case. Sometimes we want to say that a particular action 
which has been brought to our attention is "r.rong, but was not performed in 
good faith, since the agent had failed to think sufficiently about what he • 
ought to do, or had not used his imagination, and so forth. But on the 
other hand, we do sometimes want to say that an agent did perform an action 
in good faith, but neverbeless acted wrongly. In saying this, we are not 
sayine that he ought to have acted otherwise, since in doing what he 
conscientiously believed he oUJ-ht to do, he did the (moral) best that we 
can expect of a:ny agent. In such a case, we cannot blame him for acting as 
he did, but we may still say that his action was not the appropriate one 
in the circumstances. Sometimes we may speak out of hindsight, having 
discovered that the consequences of the action were not those which were 
legitimately expected, and sometimes we may judge from a position of 
greater lmowlede;e. We mow something that the ao""9nt does not know and 
cannot be expected to know. When the agent learns the fact, he too will 
be in a position to say that· his action was the wrong one, while maintain-
ing as we do that he did what he ought to do in doing what he sincerely· 
thou-rht best. 
In this context, the question arises, 'iVhat justification can we have 
for our moral beliefs?' There are two main types of reason for wanting to 
find an answer to this question, both of which arise out of the previous 
considerations. First, in order to say whether or not a particular judg-
ment or decision is a conscientious one, we must lmm., what sorts of 
process~e agent must go through in order to make a conscientious decision. 
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We cannot describe the agent as conscientious unless it is the case not 
only that he acted in accordance with his moral beliefs, but also that 
he was justified in holding such a belief. Secondly, if the distinction 
between judging an a~nt to have acted rightly, and judging his action 
right is to hold, we need to know at ~east that the criteria for the 
judgment of actions are different from those for the judgment of agentso 
Of course, it should be pointed out that the case for conscientiousness 
would not be affected by a failure to discover criteria of objective right-
ness, or even by a discovery that there are no such criteriao If there is 
no way of judginJ with certainty what actions axe rieht, that does not make 
us deny that the agent should do 'what be believes he ought to do. On the 
contrary, the case for conscientiousness would be strengthened by the 
necessity to reject an objectivist position on the criteria of rightness o 
But I wish to make it clear that my adoption of the view that conscientious-
ness and moral goodness are identical does not depend on a pessimistic view oj 
the possibility of moral knowledge. Rather, my analysis of conscientious. 
action, and consequently the nature of the vie,V' of conscientiousness that 
I do adopt, depends to some extent on the belief that the conscientious 
man is essentially reasonable. In order to eleborate this belief, it is 
necessary to show that reasonableness in moral belief is possible, and 
what sort of reasonableness is possible. 
First, it is necessary briefly to distinguish different senses of the 
terms 'reason' and 'reasonable', and to explain in which sense moral 
judgments ~ay be said to be reasonable. 
One of the tr..il1t:,'rB which can lead to misundersta.."'1dings when the term 
'reasonable' is used is that the term 'reason' is itself ambiguous. In the 
first place, 'reason' may be understood as the name of the faculty possession 
of which distinguishes men from other animals. Thus, one may hold that 
reason (man's special characteristic) is involved in something, whether a 
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judgment, a proposal, or an attitude. We may perhaps say, for instance, 
that reason is involved in emotion, meaning by this that emotions are 
peculiar to rational beirloJ'1'S, say as involving recognition of th~ object 
of the emotion. But to say this is not to say that emotions are essentially 
reasonable. Only a rational being can have a phobia, but a phobia is an 
irrational feox. 
\·le may however wish to suggest that something involves reason more 
closely than this. For example, we might say that a particular judgment 
involved reason in the sense that the person who makes the judgment has 
reasoned it out. lie has argued step by step from certain premises to the 
judgment wluch is the conclusion of the process of reasoningo But a 
reasoned judcment is not necessarily reasonable, for it is possible to 
reason correctly !'rom untrue or even bizarre premises to an untrue or 
bizarre conclusion. The valid! ty of the reasoning does not guarantee the 
acceptability in all senses of the conclusiono 
. 
Perhaps, thOUGh, when we speak of judgments and so forth as reaonable, 
we do not mean primarily that they involve the faculty of reason, but that 
they are such that reasons can be given for themo So here we have the 
concept of 'a re~on'. But this is also an ambiguous term, for it is 
used both of explanations and of justifications. Again, the availability 
of an explanatory reason does not guarantee the acceptability of a judgmento 
If I judgo that whistling is morally wrong, there may be an explanatory 
reason for my judgment, for instance that I have been told, by someone 
I respect, that whistli~ is wrong. But that does not mean that the judg-
ment is acceptable. 
For my purpose, the sense of 'reason' which is important is that ~ ~ 
'justificatory reanon'. A judgment may be said to be reasonable if a 
reason can be &i~n in support, or justifioation, of ito We must still be 
careful, thouch, for the phrase 'can be given' is in this context ambiguouso 
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It may !:loan that the agent making the judgment can give a justificatory 
reason for his judgment, or it may mean that support could be given, 
thoUGh the aeent does not in fact know what the support is. But if a 
ju~ent is to be 'reasonable' in the sense in wlrich I am usine the term, 
it must be the case both that there is a (good) supporting reason for the 
judgment, and that the agent knows the reason and bases his judgment 
upon it. J~ acceptable judgment, then, is one made by an agent who can 
support his judgment by giving the reason upon which it is based, but 
the reason must genuinely support the judgmento Then we may say that the 
judgment is reasonable, and that the agent is reasonable 1n judging. 
Clearly, much more could be said about this, but at present my 
main concern is to clarify the terminology I shall use in the ensuing 
arguments. 
I propose, therefore, to argue that the conscientious man holds 
reasonable beliefs. This position must be distinguished from the pessimis-
. . 
tic one that the conscientious man is justified ~ holding his beliefs, mere 1: 
because the alleged impossibility of moral knowledge renders morality an 
irrational affair, in which one view is as good as another. On the 
contrary, one moral view is not as good as another, but some are acceptable 
and others are not. Conscientious action, action in accordance with 
conscientious judcments, is therefore to be understood not only in terms 
of the ao~nt's acceptance of certain beliefs, in accordance with which 
he makes his decisions, but in accordance with the acceptability of those 
beliefs. The beliefs of the conscientious man are reasonable in the sense 
explained. 
2. Moral Bclip.fs as statements 
In order to defend this position, it is necessary to tackle the 
questions whether or not we may be said to know the truth of moral beliefs. 
In order to approach this problem, however, we must have some idea whether 
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it makes sense at all to speak of moral beliefs as being capable of truth 
or falsity. For if we adopted a theory in terms of which moral utterances 
are to be understood entirely as, say, expressions of emotion, we would 
not be justified in saying that such utterances are true or false. If, 
on the other hand, such utterances are taken to be, not expressions of 
the speaker~~ ~motions, but statements about the feelines or attitudes 
of the speaker, we would be able to say that such statements can be true 
or false, but this would ,not be enough to secure reasonableness for moral 
beliefs, since someone could quite truthfully say that he feels abhorrence 
for kindness, or approval for 'murder, without our being entitled to say 
that the statement, being true, is reasonable. This is not to suggest that 
it is impossible to speak of its being reasonable to approve of somethings, 
or to abhor others, but that the mere accuracy of the statement as a 
report of the speaker's feelings is not itself evidence of the reasonable_ 
ness of those feelings. Consequently, if we want to define moral utter-
ances as descriptions of the speaker's feelings, ,.,hile at the same time 
wishing to speak of the reasonableness of such utterances, we must attempt 
to shm., that approval or disapproval are appropriate responses in some 
circumstances and not in others. 
It is, I think, pretty clear that most people who do construe moral 
utterances as descriptions of the speaker's feelings really do want to 
allow for the reasonableness of such utterances. The mere use of a term 
such as 'approval' sucgests this, for usually such a word is chosen in 
preference to, say, 'liking' precisely in cases where it is not thought 
1 that the response is purely a matter of taste. We approve of actions, 
states of affairs and so on, whereas we like ice-cream, or beer, or the 
II should in fact contend that genuine liking is not merely a matter of 
taste, in tr~t to justif.y one's liking x, one must be able to point out 
features of x which one considers to be li~ableo Thus judgment is 
involved in liking. But one may not wish to insist that other people also 
like or ought to like x, whereas, as I shall argue, one does , in approving 
of x, demand that others also approve, crcdl.sc claim that they ought too 
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colour yello\{. If one man says that he approves of the present Prices and 
Incomes Policy, and another says that he does not, we would normally 
aSsume that they disagreed with each other, and our assumption would 
be supported by the fact that they would most probably proceed to have 
an argument about the merits of the policy, each offering reasons in 
support of the view that h~ holds o The ~e who approves of the policy 
might point to the danger of inflation, while the other might claim that 
risk of industrial unrest is too great. They do not, at least at the 
outset, agree to differ. Prices and Incomes policies have both purposes 
and effects, and one may justify one's approval' for them by reference to 
their fitness for achieving their purpose (eog. a more stable economy), or 
one's disapproval by reference to the consequences they are likely to have 
(e.g. industrial unrest, poverty for those on fixed incomes, and so on). 
Normally, then, one approves of something which one has considered and 
assessed. In other words, to say that one approves of something is to say 
that one has judged it. And judgments can be reasonable or unreasonable o 
But to say that one likes something is different. It implies, not that it 
has been judced and has passed the test, but that it has been tried, tasted 
2 
or experienced, ~,a has proved pleasant. 
In deciding to speak of moral beliefs as reasonable or unreasonable, 
then, I am not lpso facto ruling out an analysis of moral utterances as 
statinG that the acent approves or disapproves of something, since 
approval can itself be reasonable or unreasonable. Even if we accepted 
the succestion that moral utterances express the speaker's approval (rather 
than statinc ~ he feels it), we could still say that in so far as what 
1s expressed is approval, there must be some foundation for what is felt. 
Consequently, theories of ethics which concentrate on approval and 
21 do not want to press too far this distinction between approval and 
l1kinc. ""nat I wish to stress is that,: whether or not liking involves 
rational evaluation, approving certainly does, and to a greater degree. 
LikinG is, I think an emotion. Approval is more. 
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disapproval need not be (though specific theories in fact often are) 
opposed to the view that moral judgments are, or can be, reasonable. 
Hm.;ever, the belief that moral utterances are merely equiValent to 
ejaculations expressing likes or dislikes is, I thinl~, in conflict with 
the claim that moral utterances are susceptible to tests for reasonableness. 
't. ."sc 
At .ees-t, if this argument is taken to an extreme, it conflicts with my own 
claim. The extreme version of the argument, however, would find few 
adherents, for it does not merely reduce moral utterances to the status of 
expressions of emotion, but to that of expressions of primitive feelings, or 
instinctive attractions and revulsions. If the feeling expressed is not of 
this primitive instinctive kind but is an emotion we will be able to re-
introduce the claim that moral utterances are in some sense reasonable or 
unreasonable, since emotions can be described as reasonable or unreasonable, 
in term3 both of their intensity and of their appropriateness as responses 
to certain situations. 
We can say, therefore, that reasonableness must be ruled out of morality 
only on the assumption that we must accept an extreme form of emotivism which 
equates moral utterances with expressions of primitive instinctive feelings. 
In deciding whether it is legitimate to speak of moral judgments as reason-
able, then, it is necessary first to decide whether or not moral utterances 
are merely expressions of primi ti ve feelings 0 If they are more than this, 
then it will be necessary to consider whether they are expressions of more 
sophisticated feelings, i.e. emotions, or statemertts that the speaker 
feels a certain emotion, or has a particular attitude, or whether they are 
not properly to be analysed in such terms at all, but are rather to be 
taken as propositions about certain actions, states of affairs, and so one 
Once this has been settled, it will be possible to say what, if any, kind 
of reasonableness attaches to moral judgements. 
First it is, I think, fair to dismiss as implausible the extreme claim 
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that moral utterances are expressions of primitive feelings. In order 
to see the implausibility of this claim, it is helpful to consider various 
types of moral utterance. If we concentrate on an agent's immediate 
response to the action of another, we may feel that this response is simply 
an expression of disgust, aversion, attraction and so forth. But of course 
not all moral utterances are of this type. Indeed, in using the term 
'utter~~cel as a fairly neutral replacement for 'judgment l g we beg the 
question in favour of the extreme emotovist. For instance, 'That's wrong' 
could be thought to be similar to 'Ohdon'tl' or 'Disgusting!' if it is 
uttered by someone watching the activity he condemns. But if we consider 
instead an agent's examination of various courses of action open. to him, 
or his memory of actions, which he regrets performing, it is more difficult 
to construe his thought that he ought not to do this, or that he regrets 
having done that, as expressions of simple revulsion. Situations in which 
the agent considers future courses of action, or reviews past courses of 
action, may, and often do, involve awareness of the pleasure he will 
achieve by doing a particular action, or the pleasure he did achieve from 
performing a past action, at the same time as awareness of the moral 
undesirability of the action in question. In such cases, then, the response 
is mixed, but the primitive element in the response seems to involve the 
attraction held out by the action, while the moral element opposes this 
primitive element. To say that an agent regrets having performed an action 
is not, therefore, to say that the memory of having done it evokes disgust 
or aversion. Furthermore, what are we to say of more general utterances? 
If, for instance, to say, 'stealing is wrong' is to express an emotion, it 
is certainly not to express a primitive aversion. It'is difficult to make 
sense of the idea of primitive feeling responses, whether of aversion or 
attraction, to anything but a particular object of experience. If, there-
fore, we consider moral utterances as including, not only immediate responses 
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to particular experiences, but also as responses to the thought of future 
actions, the memory of past actions, and the thought of classes of actions 
(such as stealing, lying or killing), we can see that they are not, on the 
whole, expressions of primitive emotions. 
He are now left with types of emotive theory which not only admit 
but presuppose that moral responses are in some sense reasonable, though 
they miGht not meet the requirements I laid down in my definition of a 
'reasonable judgment' in so far as they may not require that the agent be 
able to state his (good) reasons for a response. The types of theory may 
be classified as suggesting that moral utterances are expressions of non-
primitive emotions, that they are statements about the speaker's emotional 
state, that they are expressions of approval and disapproval, and finally, 
that they state that the speaker feels appfoval or disapproval. 
I am not concerned to choose among these types of theory, or to 
support anolyses in terms of expression of, rather than, say, statements 
about, emotional states. My chief concern is with the contrast often 
drawn between theories which treat moral utterances as statements of belief, 
capable of truth and falsity, and those which treat them as not being 
capable of truth and falsity. My argument, broadly speaking, will be to 
the effect that although on one level cognitive theories of ethics are 
different in important respects from non-cognitive theories, nevertheless 
there is a point at which they can be said to meet, viz. at the point of 
justification. This sounds paradoxical, for we may well suppose that it is 
over the question of justification of moral judgments that cognitivists and 
non-cognitivists part company. But I hope to show that the differences 
are not really of very considerable importance. 
One useful approach here lies in a consideration of the main reasons 
which lead some philosophers to insist upon, and others to reject, the 
view that moral judgments can be true or false. After considering these 
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reasons, I shall go on to show that acceptance of the underlying views 
of cognitivists a~d non-cognitivists does not commit us to accepting 
or denyine that moral utterances are capable of truth and falsity, but 
that there are still reasons for treating moral judgments as statements 
of belief. 
3. Non-CoF,ni tivism 
First, then, we may consider what appear to be the chief reasons for 
rejecting the view that moral judgments are capable of truth and falsity. 
In the first place, there are two views, one more extreme than the other, 
concerning the verification of moral judgments. The mor e extreme view,. 
held by logical pos~tivists, is that there is no way of verifying moral 
judgments and consequently that such judgments are meaningless. Since 
people do indeed make what they believe to be meaninu7ful moral judgments, 
it is necessary for the logical pos.:fJtivist to sh01.v that these judgments 
are really no more than expressions of the emotions or attitudes of the 
speaker. The less extreme view is, not that there is no method at all of 
verification, but that there is no way of conclusively verifying or 
falsifying moral judgments. In other words, we cannot prove them. 
I do not think that either of these views need cause the cognitivist 
much concern. The more extreme theSiS, if true, would lead us to reject 
the claim that moral judgments are statements of belief, but the thesis 
in its extrem~ form may convincingly be disputed. The less extreme thesis, 
once its implications are drawn out, might be acceptable, but the conclusion 
that moral judgments are not capable of truth and falsity does not followo 
First, is it the case that there is no method of verification of 
moral judgments? And secondly, if this were the case, would it commit us 
to saying that moral judgments are meaningless? We may answer the second 
question first. There are notorious difficulties involves in the logical 
positivist position, the craef of which concerns the defensibility of that 
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position itself. FOr if the meaning of any proposition is the method of 
its verification, how are we to defend the statement that this is so? 
There see~s to be no method of verifying the statement about meaning that 
is the basis of the positivist positiono This is not necessarily a fatal 
objection to the theory, however, for it is possible to regard the basie 
premise of the theory as a rule of procedure rather than as a statement. 
Thus we may consider it to be a piece of advice, to the effect that an . 
investigation into the truth of propositions may usefully be conducted by 
means of an enquiry into methods of verification. Alternatively, we may 
reeard it as a definitive rule of investigation. Uow, as far as some of . 
the sciences are concerned, this may well be a useful approach. But there 
seems to be no strong reason for accepting the verifiability criterion 
tor the falsifiability criterion) as a criterion of all investigation, 
including non-scientific. Or, we might say that in order to assign 
meaning to a proposition or judgment, we need to know something about what 
could count for or against its truth. But if '<fedo take this position 
(which I do not think we must) we are no longer committed to the view that 
moral judements must be meaningless, for the nature of the evidence for or 
against a judgment will depend on the field of enquiry. to which that 
judgment belongs. Not all enquiries are scientific enquiries, and 
scientific evidence is not the only kind of evidence • Thus, bearing in 
mind that acceptance of some kind of verification or falsification principle 
does not automatically rule out the meaningfulness of moral judgments, we 
may turn to the first of the two questions asked above, viz. is it the case 
that there is no method of verification of moral judgments? This question 
may now be repr~ased in terms of the availability of evidence for and 
against moral judgments. So long as we do not demand evidence of a 
scientific nature, then there seems to be no reason why we should deny that 
some sort of evidence is available, and consequently that reasons can be 
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given in support of moral judgments. As for the kind of reasons which 
might be available in support of moral judgments, we must leave consider-
ation of that for the time being.) 
The less extreme view concerned with verificiation which has led 
some people to deny that moral judgments are statements of belief, is 
that such utterances are not capable of proof. If what is demanded here 
is logical certainty, then we may agree that moral judgments are not 
capable of proof. Indeed, they may be said to be significant precisely 
in so far as they do not express logical certainties. If we want to make 
moral discoveries, we are ill-advised to work for tautologies. }fureover, 
if logical necessity is taken to be a necessary condition of our saying 
that moral judgments are statements of belief, we must suppose that 
tautologies alone are statements of belief. It follows from this that 
most of our claims to knowledge and belief are misplaced, and even more 
seriously, that the concept of belief becomes inapplicable, since we are 
denied the possibility of believing anything but tautologies, and it would 
be pointless to speak of believine tautologies g" 
On the other hand, if the claim is that moral utterances are not 
capable of proof in some less strict sense, presumably this again involves 
the s1.1g.:;estion that there is nothing that could count as a justificatory 
reason for the acceptance or rejection of moral judgments. The reply to 
the objection in this form is in the same terms as the reply to the strict 
logical positiv.~b. There is, we may point out, no reason to rule out in 
advance the possibility of giving justificatory reasons in support of 
claims in the field of morality. There may be such reasons, and I shall 
discuss their nature in the next chaptero 
Thus, although we may accept up to a point the claims made by non-
cogn1tivists concerning the non-verifiability of moral judgments, the 
3See Part II chap_ 4 below. 
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parts of the argument which may (but need not) be accepted are not 
incompatible with a cognitivist position. :t-Ioral judgments, one might 
agree, are perhaps fully comprehensible only if we know what sorts of thing 
can count as good reasons in the field of moral enquiryo It does not 
follow from this that moral judgments are meanineless, or are not state-. 
ments of belief, since we need not accept the necessary additional 
premise that no reasons of the relevant kind are available. 
~1e second consideration which has led philosophers to reject the 
view that moral judgments are statements of belief is of a different kind. 
This is a recognition of an element involved in the making of moral 
judgments which is not always brought out by a cognitive analysiso When 
we make mor~ judgments, it is said, we are in a sense involved in what 
we say. Unless we feel something about the action, motive, or whatever it 
might be, we do not make a judgment about ito vlhen we say that an action 
is wrong, for instance, we express some emotion or attitude which we do 
not normally express when we remark that it is a fine day, or that there 
is no post today, and so ono Emotions of liking, approving, disapproving 
and so forth are involved in moral judgments, and to construe 'x is wrong' 
as a statement of belief or knowledge as we would 'x is red' is to ignore 
the emotion or attitude which is conveyed by the judgment. However, while 
it is no doubt a feature of moral judgments that they are bound up with 
emotions or attitudes, this feature is not peculiar to moral judgments, nor 
is it the case that this element in moral judgment cannot be accounted for 
in a cognitive analysiso The meaning of a statement is not to be confused 
with the reason for making that statement, or the speaker's intention in 
making it, or the feelings which give rise to his uttering it. And even 
if it is always the purpose of anyone using the word 'wrong', say, to 
express or convey disapproval, that is not to say that one cannot convey 
one's disapproval by uttering a true or false statement. Suppose we take 
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a statement such as 'Smith's house is painted purple'. This statement 
is either true or false, and there are perfectly adequate methods of 
verifying it. But in certain circumstances, I may m~~e such a statement 
not only to convey information about SQith's house, but also to express 
disapproval of Smith's taste in colour. It may be replied to this that 
'purple' is a neutral term, and that my disapproval is conveyed by my tone 
of voice, for instance, whereas moral terms are not neutral, and necessarily 
express approval or di$approval. That does not ans\.,er the point, however, 
since even if it is part of the function of moral terms to express app~oval 
or disapproval, and even if we were willing to admit that anyone who failed 
to recognise this fact about moral terms did not really understand such 
terms, we would still not be committed to the view that the meaning of 
these terms must be defined solely by reference to their use. 
Thus, a cognitive analysis of moral judgments can include reference 
to the emotive element in moral judgments, and the second objection is, 
like the first, true only up to a point, but not beyond the point at which 
we would be compelled by accepting it to reject the view that moral judgments 
are statements of belief. 
Here, though, the third objection may be put forward, to the effect 
that it is impossible to assign any meaning other than a functional one 
to moral terms, and that we cannot therefore meaningfully make statements 
in which moral terms are predicated of the subject. There is some force 
in this view, for there are difficulties involved in defining moral terms, 
whether naturalistically or non-naturalistically. But I think that the 
problems can be avoided, and that it is possible to give a working definit-
ion of moral terms. An examination of what will count as a good reason 
tl\i~itlf 
for a moral judgment will help us in dete~ what the meanings of moral 
terms are. 4 
4See Part II ch. 4 bel01oJ. 
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Finally, problems arise over the practicality of moral judgmentso 
Since moral judgments are to a very great extent concerned with conduct, 
it seems to be necessary to find some relation betvleen moral judgments 
and action, so that we can explain why it is that making a particular 
judgment should somehow commit us to acting in accordance with our judgmento 
One way to secure such a connection is to construe moral judgments imper-
ativally, so that to make a moral judgment is to commit oneself, under 
• pain of inconsistency if one fails, to obeyqng the self-addressed moral 
,imperative. But if all that is wanted is to secure a connection between 
judgment and action, it seems unnecessary to take the strong view that judg-
ments ~ in some sense imperativeso And one disadvantage of this view is 
that it ties up judgment and action so closely that one cannot sincerely 
make a moral judgment and fail to act in accordance with ito This 
conclusion appears to be incompatible with experience, since there do 
appear to be occasions when we do not do what we judge to be morally righto 
Nevertheless, the feature of practicality is one which must be 
accommodated in an adequate theory of moral judgment. It is necessary to 
show how judgment can (and may legitimately be expected to) lead to actiono 
But in order to accommodate this feature, we need not go to the extreme 
of identifying judGments and imperatives. Instead, Vl8 can revert to the 
point that moral judements do involve attitudes and emotions, whether or 
not they also involve anything furthero Now, if my moral judgment, 
",hether or not it is a statement of belief, serves to express an emotion 
or attitude towards the subject of the judgment, then we can see how 
moral ju~~ents can lead to actiono An attitude of disapproval will, 
in nOl~al circumstamces, lead to avoidance of the object of disapprovalo 
An attitude of approval involves, other things beine equal, an attempt 
to secure the object of approvalo Avoidance of the disapproved object 
is the typical manifestation of disapproval, as pursuit of the approved 
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object is of approval. 
It is therefore possible to deal with these objections to cognitivist 
theories of moral judgment. For it is possible to show that we need not 
rule out a priori the possibility of giving good reasons in support of 
judgments made in the field of moral enquiry, and that there is consequent-
ly no loCical impossibility in regarding moral judgments as statements of 
belief. But it is also possible to show that there is no need for a 
cognitive analysis to ignore important elements of moral experience, such 
as the element of emotion which is involved in moral judgmento And the 
inclusion of this element enables us to deal with the feature of practi-
cality w~~ch is necessary to an adequate theory of moral judgmento 5 We 
have, therefore, a lot to learn from the objections commonly made to 
cognitive theories of moral judgment. 
In addition to the more specific features which we have seen to be 
necessary to a theory of moral judgment, we may draw a more general 
conclusion from the previous considerations. That is to say, we can now 
see that it is necessary to distinguish between judgment as an act,and 
judgement ~s the form of words in which the act of judgment issues~Judging, 
or the act of judo~ent, must be considered in the light of the agent's 
reasons, motives and intentions in judging, and in the commitments he 
acquires by judging. If he judges, he does express some kind of emotion; 
judging involves evaluating, and evaluating involves valuing. He expresses 
an attitude - he is for or against what he is judging. And in so far as the 
attitude is directed towards conduct, his judgment will supply him with 
a motive for acting in one way rather than another. All these features 
can be brought out by a consideration of the act of judgment. 
But we must consider also the form of words in which the act of judg-
ment often issues. And it is with the form of words, the utterance, that 
5cf• the discussions of pre-dispositions in Pt. I above. 
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the cognitivist shows his concern. :But his concern, like the non-
cognitivist's, is one-sided. A theory of judgment must deal with both 
the act of jud..,rrrncnt, and with the verbal judgment which is the result 
of the act. 
4. Cogni tivism 
vn1at, then, are we to say of the verbal judgment? Is it, or is it 
not, a statement of belief? Various reasons have been put forward in favour 
of accepting some sort of cognitivist position. In other words, although 
many philocophers have wished to hold that moral judgments are statements 
of belief or knowledge, they have had different reasons for holding this 
position. Before reaching any conclusion on the status of moral judgments 
(Understood as verbal formulations rather than acts), it is necessary to 
cI i.snlfS 
aeeess the reasons which are most often ad~uced in support of cognitivism. 
First, it is often held that, if moral disagreement is to be possible, 
there must be some facts which moral judgments express. If one person says 
that Smith's action is right, and another that it is wrong, it seems, both 
to the people making the judgments, and to observers, that they genuinely are 
disagTeeing, and that one of them must be mist.iken. If it were the case 
that 'Smith's action is wrong' merely expressed disapproval of the action, 
then it seems that 'Smith's action is wrong' is loeically compatible with 
'Smith's action is right', and two people making these judgments are not . 
really disagreeing; they simply feel differently. This apparent reduction 
of moral judgment to a matter of taste does not square with our experience. 
Our judements about the moral merits of actions do not seem to be at all 
like our jud.ements about the relative m·:;ri ts of rice pudding and blancmange. 
This is true, and it seems to me to be a strong reason for rejecting a theory 
that it conflicts with common experience.' 
nevertheless, the objection is pressed too far if it is taken to 
. 
establish, on its own, that there is some fact about which people making 
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moral judgments disagree, viz. the fact that a Given action possesses a 
property of rightness or wronu711ess. All that is established is that, in 
judging action~to be right or wrong, we do not merely express preferences. 
In judging Smith's action to be right, Jones does not take himself to like 
somethiIlG which Robinson, who regards the action as wrong, dislikes. The 
discrepancy is not like the discrepancy involved when Jones chooses rice 
pudding and Smith chooses blancmange. But this does not establish that 
the disaereement between them is of the same type as that between two 
people who maintain respectively that the Eattle of Hastings was fought 
in 1066 and that it was fought in 1067. We are not necessarily confronted 
with an all-or-nothing situation where the matter is one of straight~ 
forward fact or mere taste. 
Following the earlier discussion of the theory that making moral 
judgments involves expressing attitudes of approval and disapproval, we 
may e~opt the position that, while expressine approval does not necessarily 
involve stating a matter of fact, neither does it involve expressing simple 
preference. It is possible to say, therefore, that our moral experience is 
not in accordance with the view that moral judcments are merely expressions 
of taste, but that this need not commit us to saying that they are statements 
of fact. Ue can accommodate disagreement on moral issues in a compromise 
theory, by reference to the nature of approval and disapproval, and the 
implications of expreSSions of such attitudes. 
It is natural to speak of appropriateness and inappropriateness with 
regard to attitudes of approval and disapproval. Certain objects are 
taken to be suitable objects of such attitudes, while others are not. If 
I say that I disapprove of something, I lay mysefl open to the question 
why I have such an attitude, and this question concerns justification 
rather than explanation. (It is of course possible to explain attitudes 
of approval or disapproval, e.g. by reference to my upbringing"but anyone 
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asking why I have such attitudes is likely to be dissatisfied with an 
explanatory rather than a justificatory answer.) Now, in attempting to 
justify a given attitude of disapproval, or in trying to show that it is 
appropriate, I am likely to start off by showing that the object of my 
disapproval belongs to a class whose members in general I disapprove. If 
my questioner continues to ask why I disapprove of objects of that type, I 
6 
may appeal to some more general justification, and so ono If, however, I 
am unable to offer any justification for my attitude, my questioner is 
entitled to doubt whether what I feel is really disapproval at all. To 
return to the earlier example, if I claim to disapprove of rice pudding, 
I will normally be taken to be misusing words, and incorrectly trying to 
express my dislike of rice pudding. This is not to rule out completely 
the possibility of disapproving of rice pudding. I may be able to make my 
attitude intelligible by reference to some health hazard which I believe to 
attend the eating of rice puddingo But in general, disapproval of some-
thing innocuous seems unintellieible unless I can show that the object 
is, or seems to me to be, in some way harmful. But this does not apply 
only to innocuous objects. For if I claim to disapprove of, say, lying, 
without being able to offer any justification of my attitude, it could 
reasonably be doubted whether I r4ally did disannrove of lying. 'Perhaps 
I dislike it, or'perhaps I accept the views of my friends, but if I have 
no justificatory reason for disapproving of it, then it does seem true to 
say that, whatever I do feel towards the object, it is not disapproval. 
Though more general ppints arise in this connection, these may more usefully 
be discussed below in the final section of this chapter. For the time 
being, it is enough to point out that, if we are to follow normal usage, 
attitudes of approval and disapproval are susceptible of justification, 
and an attitude which cannot be justified, on which the agent is unable to 
61 do not at this state wish to go into this question in detail, as I 
shall be discussing it in ch. 4 below 0' 
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justifY, is unlikely to be one of approval or disapproval. Thus, when 
I express my approval of somethine, I commit myself to offering a justif-
icatory reason for my attitude, and, as it were, tacitly pledge that I have 
a justificatory reason for adopting the attitude. Consequently, even if 
we analy~e moral jUdG-ffients in terms of expression of attitudes of approval 
and disapproval, we can accommodate moral disagreement in the analysis, since 
there may be disagreement about the reasons which are to count as just-
ifications for the attitudes.7 
A second reason for claiming that moral judements have cognitive status 
is to be fo~~d in the necessity for explaining the importance which is 
generally attached to morality. If, it is argued, morality is ultimately 
a matter of choice, preference, or even commitment, then it is hard to 
see wl~ people should take it so seriously. \~ should it matter what 
moral choices we ma~e, or what moral preferenceswe have, if there is no 
such thing as the rip:ht choice? This ties up ",i th the claim that morality 
is not an arbitrary matter, but is rather a rational pursuit, and that if 
we are to account for this, we must be "Tilling at least to assume that our 
moral judgments are at least capable of being true. Now again, this claim, 
while perfectly acceptable up to a point, can be taken to prove too much. 
People do take morality seriously. We use words like 'moral' and 
'morality' partly to indicate that what we are talldng about is important. 
If a choice is a moral, one, or described as a moral one, we may~e it 
for granted tha~ the choice is more important than a choice between objects 
of pleasure, for instance. If a claim is a moral one, it is usually taken to 
over-ride a:r.y claim other than a moral one. If ,"e attach importance of 
this kind to moral matters, or if, perhaps more accurately, we identify 
those judo~ents, choices and claims which we regard as most important by 
describing them as 'moral', ~hen it would certainly be odd to say that 
7 Such a'view about reasons may commit us to some kind of cognitive account 
at that level. This ~ll be discussed below. 
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morality was purely arbitrary, and (that one judgment or choice was as 
good as any other, depending only upon the taste of the agent involved •. 
In accepting the importance of morality, we commit ourselves to regarding 
it as a r~tional pursuit. Whether it is so or not perhaps is unprovable, 
but we cannot consistently regard it as being important and irrational o 
But these considerations do not force us to postulate objectivity of 
morals in the strong sense that we must somehmv reify moral propertieso 
Such a conclusion rests, I think, on the acceptance of some theory of 
meaning and truth which need not be accepted. Philosophers who draw this 
conclusion accept the challenge offered by the logical positivist on his 
terms, but this, as I have tried to show, is not necessaryo vIe need not 
accept that only two kinds of statement have meaning, namely those which 
are analytic and those which are empirically verifiable 0 Consequently, we 
t' ere need~accept that, in order to defend the reasonableness of moral judgments, 
we must show that they are analytic, or else that they are, or can be 
translated into, empirically verifiable statements. Because of thiS, we 
do not have to say that there exist in the world such properties as 
goodness, rightness, or obligationo All that we need to do is to show that 
moral judcments are or can be reasonable, since justificatory reasons can 
be given for themo 
50 Reconciliation 
We must, therefore, be careful in repudiating non-cognitivist theories 
of moral judgmento What I mean by this is primarily that we must not allow 
ourselves to be pushed into what is called a 'cognitivist' position and is 
held to involve commitment to one of a set of unacceptable theories about 
moral propertieso So far, I have argued that non-cognitivist theories of 
judgment need not be accepted if it can be ShOi-ffi that some judgments are 
reasonable and others are noto If there are justificatory reasons which 
entitle us to make one judgment rather than another, then we are justified 
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in speakinc of the judgments supported by those reasons as true, and those 
which are contra-indicated as false. If evidence of this entitling kind 
can be found, then I think we are forced to accept some form of cognitivist 
position: that is to say, we must accept that moral judgments are capable 
of truth or falSity. But we do not have to go on to say that their truth 
or falsity is dependent on the existence of properties, whether natural 
or non-natural, which can correctly or incorrectly be predicated of the 
subject being judeed •. Our acceptance of their truth depends on the 
adequancy of the reasons for the judgment to establish the conclusion drawn~ 
, 
The ar~~ents adduced against non-cognitivism, that non-cognitivism 
cannot allow for moral disagreement; the importance of morality and its 
non-arbitrariness, seem to be perfectly satisfactory arguments for the 
moderate conclusion which I wish to draw. But the conclusion is not so 
much that non-cosnitivism as such must be rejected, but that there is 
more cognitivism in the non-cognitivist's theory than he realizes. If he 
takes the view that moral judgments are expressions of approval and dis-
approval, a cOnGideration of the meanings of the terms 'approval' and 
'disapproval' will show us that he is committed to a view very much like 
the view I have outlined as constitutinc a moderate and acceptable 
cognitivismo 
Ee miCht not, however, accept the conclusion I have drawn from the 
fact tbatcttitudes ouch as approval or disapproval are essentially based 
on reasons for adopting a given attitude towards certain actions. For I 
have suggested that if justificatory reasons are available, then we need 
not deny that moral judgments are statements of belief, and may conse~ 
quently be true or false. But the difference between us is now chiefly 
a terminolo~ical one, which can easily eboueh be resolved. 
Consider the judgment, 'Smith's action is right'. The non-cognitivist 
takes this to be an expression of the judge's approval. If he is right in 
supposing that what is expressed is approval, as opposed to liking or 
attraction, then he is committed, in virtue of the logic of the term 
'approval', to sayine that the judge has justificatory reasons for his 
approval. But he may still wish to deny that the judgment is itself a 
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proposition, since the utterance of the judgment expresses approval, and does 
not state that the approval is appropriate. So long, however, as he· 
(lNl 
accepts that the judgment commits the judge to"claim that his judgment fs 
appropriate, then there is no real disagreement between us. For while I 
would say that the adequancy of the reasons for approving renders the 
judgement true.. he must at least say that such adequacy justifies the judge 
in adoptine an attitude of, and expressing, approval. Now if the utterance 
of the judcrr.ent '3mith's action is right' is justifiable if and only if, 
approval is justified, and if in any given case approval is justified, then 
in that case the judement is reasonable. And in saying that the judgment 
is true, that is really what I want to say. Thus the non-cogni tivist, 
in saying more than he realizes, is saying very much the same thing as I 
am, but sayine it in a different way. If my use of the word 'true' is 
rejected on the ground that it rilisleaiiing-ly, S1.l£b'ests that I am assertihg 
the real existence of moral properties, I am quite willing to give up the 
word 'true' and use in3tead the terms 'reasonable' or 'justified'. But I 
would expect the non-cogni tivist in return to \vi thdra\'/ his claim that moral 
judgments are ~ expressions of approval, and to admit that it makes 
sense to speak of judgments as reasonable, justified or acceptable. 
This does leave us, then, in a compromise position. There is no need 
to draw peSSimistic conclusions from the non-cognitivist's case, for he is 
himself committed to speaking of the reasonableness of moral judgments. 
But we need not embroil ourselves in the difficulties caused by adopting 
a full-blown objectivist position concerning the status of moral propertieso 
.... 
The arB,.:unent so far has not yet established the possibilIty of 
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reasonableness, of course. All that has been shmffi is that if there can 
be justificatory reasons for moral judgments, then those judgments may be 
described as reasonable, justified, or acceptable. ~~e questions remain 
whether there are such reasons, and, if so, what they are, and how we are 
to establish their relevance and streneth. In the following chapter, I 
shall discuss these questions, and try to shoyl that 've are entitled to 
speak of the reasonableness of moral judgments, and that there are legit-
imate ways of establish1~ it in given caseso 
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Chapter 4 
The Justification of l>Ioral Judgments. 2. 
In the Inst chapter, I argued that it is possible to do justice to 
the arguments of both cognitivists and non-cognitivists by stressing both 
the features of moral judgment as an act, and of moral judgment as a verbal 
utterance. B-1 doing this, we can in the first I)lace allow for the emotive 
elements in the process of judging, and by doing so link up judgment and 
action, while in the second place we can, by construing judgments qua verbal 
uttera.l1ces as statements of belief, allO\" for the reasonableness of moral 
judgments in such a w~ that we are entitled to speak of them as true or 
false. IIowever, although it was shown that it is theoretically possible to 
speak of jud.&mcnts as reasonable or unreasonable, true or false, since there 
is no logical necessity to rule out the availability of reasons which might 
be offered in juotification of judgments, it was apparent that we cannot 
speak of moral judgments as being actually justifiable or justified unless 
we can identify reasons which will count as justificatory reasons for 
judgments in the field of moral discourseo It is necessary then both to 
identify such reasons, and to sho,., that we are entitled to treat them as 
justifying judgments. 
At this point, it is helpful to distinguish three different types of 
moral judgment. First, there is the particular judgment, \"hich has refer-
ence to a particular action, ~nt, or state of affairs, whether past 
present or future, actual or intended, real or imagined. Secondly, there is 
the general judemcnt, which has reference to classes of action, types of 
motive, and so on. Finally, there is the basic judgment, which has 
reference to a wide area, if not the whole, of morality. The common names 
for these types of judb~ent are, respectively, judgments, general rules, 
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and funda.mcntal principles I :But it is useful to remember that general 
rules and fund~~ental principles are properly to be described as types of 
judgment, disti~uishable from particular judgments by reference to their 
generality and comprehensiveness. Thus, to tclce an example of a funda~ 
mental principle, the principle of utility, that actions are right in so 
far as they rnazicise pleasure and minimise pain, is itself a moral judg~ 
mente Equally, 'One ought not to lie' is both a general rule and a judg-
ment. 
Consequently, in discussi~ the nature and justification of moral 
judements ~d justificatory reasons for them, it is important to remember 
that ju~~ents ~ay be of these various types. 
First, it is important to have some idea of the nature of the 
relationships between rules, principles and particular judgments, for only 
when we have this will we be sure that our justification is of the right 
thing. Particularly must we decide whether the general is to be decided by 
reference to the particular, or vice versa. For it seems that a certain 
amount of cor..fusion is generated by a failure on the part of some modern 
philosophers to m,ike it clear whether they are concerned, in adopting 
naturalism, non-naturalism, intuitionism and so on, with methods of 
discoverinc ~~d adopting or establishing judgments of the particular, or 
basic principles. 
If we arGUe that particular judgments are established by reference to 
general or basic principles, we are, I tlrlnk, relying upon a particular 
concept of the pattern of moral discussion and argument. First of all, 
we have a particular ju~~ent. For instance, Smith says to Jones, 'You 
ought not to !;D.ve done that.' Jones then plays the part of the question-
ing philosopher, askine for justification at each point in the argument, 
while SIni th, in providing answers, present::! an argu.l1ent going backwards 
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from the particular to the general. A typical example of such a dialogue 
may be prese~ted like this. 
Smith: 
Jones: 
Smith: 
Jones: 
Smith: 
You ou,:;;'ht not to have done that. 
~n~ not? It seems perfectly proper to me. 
"olell, it fS stealizu. I agree that ,.,re expect perks in this job 
but taking th1no~ like that is going too far. 
So ,,[;,at? In conderr.ning stealine, you're just paying lip-service 
to conventional morality. There's nothing really wrong about ito 
But in stealing, you Ire doing a great deal of harm. You're 
deprivin; people of what they're entitled to. 
Here the arcumcnt might stop, or it might take a different turn. It 
would seem odd for Jones to ask what is wrong with doing harm, or why one 
shouldn't deprive people of what they are entitled to. So at this point 
he miGht t~ee with Smith that one oughtn't to deprive people of what they 
are entitled. to, Thus Smith's appeal to a basic principle of justice might 
succeed in convincing Jones that his action, being classifiable as an act 
of injustice, is condemned by a basic principle accepted by both of them. 
On the other hand, Jones might deny that his action is classifiable as an 
act of injustice, since he regards capitalism as an evil, and considers 
that the directors, shareholders and so on are not entitled to their ill-
gotten gains. lIe and Smith agree in condemning injustice, but they have 
different concepts of injustice. Consequently, if the argument conforms to 
the pattern, the result could be that Jones convinces Smith that his 
original judgDent was mistaken, since it is not after all supported by the 
principle of justice which he has in mind. But whichever way the verdict 
goes, successive jude-ments are justified by reference to judgments of wider 
ger~ra1ity. Final justification of judgments is thus seen to be a matter 
of the juntification of fundamental principles. A particular judgment is 
supported by reference to a general rule, and the ceneral rule by reference 
190. 
to the fun~cnta1 principle. The fundamental princip~e is then 
unsupported. At tlus point, philosophers trute different lines concerning 
the fundanental principle. They may appeal to intuition, or claim that 
the principle possesses a priori validity. JUternatively, they may claim 
that the fundamental principle possesses explanatory force, pinning down 
features which are common to particular judements. An appeal to the 
common moral consciousness might be lodged at this point. But before 
considering these various ways of attempting to justify basic moral 
principles or judu~ents, we must ask whether the assumptions which lead 
to the bolief that final justification is concerned with basic principles 
are accept~ble assumptiona. 
The previous p~ttern of moral argument goes from the particular 
to the ceneral. Particular judgments are justified by reference to more 
wide-ran.:;irlti jude:.'1'!'lents. J3ut it is possible to turn this argument round, 
and to suC'C'?st that the basic ju0.urment by reference to which others are to 
be justified is the particular judgmento So it micht be argued that when 
someone states a l;'elleral rule, such as 'One ought not to lie', the justif-
ication he would offer if challenged might consist of an appeal to 
particular inst:mces of lying which were (accordil'lG' to him) recognizably 
wrong. A ccneral rule would thus presumably be an inductive generalisation 
from particular instances of judgment. Possibly Hill would say this of 
general rules, wluch he regards as rules of thumb based on the collective 
experience of cankind. In support of this position, it could be argued 
that particular ju~ents are more solidly-based tl~ general ones, since 
it is in the particular situation that we can obtain the relevant inform-
ation about motives, consequences, and so on. But if we regard particular 
judgments as besic, what are we to say about fundamental principles? 
Surely a funUaffiental principle, which has reference to different types of 
action and situ~tion, cannot be simply an empirical generalisation. If we 
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are justified in saying, on the basis of the juggment tl1at this lie is 
wrong elld that lie is wrong, that lying is in general la-ong, are we 
similarly justified in saying that since this lie is wrong, that theft 
is wronc and so on, that (say) causing unhappiness is wrong? The ans\ver 
to this could be that fundamental principles are not simply generalisations 
of particular judcments, but are based on an investigation into the reasons 
we would ~ive in support of particular judgments. Thus, we might say that 
this lie is wrone because it causes unhappiness, a particular theft is 
condemned because it causes unhappiness, and that some act (of, say, beneficenc~ 
is right or BOod because it brines about happiness. Since the common 
denominator of particular judgments is the reference to the happiness or 
unhappiness caused by the actions which are judged, then the basis of judg-
ments would appear to be the happiness-potential of actions o1 
Now it is clear that in practice people may offer arguments conforming 
to either of these patterns. That is to say, they sometimes justify part-
icular judcments by reference to more general judgments, and sometimes 
appeal to particular judgments in support of tl~ rules or principles which 
they advocate. The reason"for this, I suppose, is the different types of 
challenge are issued. Sometimes a particular·· jud8'l11ent is challenged, in 
which case one may show that the challenger shares a principle which covers 
the particular judgment 0 But sometimes it may be a rule that is challenged, 
and one may be able to support it by getting the challenger to agree with 
a set of judv~ents which give rise to some generalisation. 
IIm.;ever, although both patterns of a:gument are to be found in 
practice, and it is the case both that particular judgments are cited in 
support of general judgments, and that general rules or principles are 
cited in support of particular judgments, it is reasonable to assume that 
one form of arcument has 100ioal priority, even though the relationship 
II am of course appealing to the principle of utility merely as an example 
of a possible fundamental principleo I am not arguing that it is fundamental. 
between particular and general judgments is such that we may argue 
indiscriminately from one to the other. 
The important question might thus seem to be whether the basic 
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judgment (by reference to which other forms of judgment are to be justified) 
is the particular or the fundamental. For I do not see that the general 
rule or judgment could be basic, or useful as a justification, since it 
is essentially one which has exceptions. 'Lying is (usually) wrong' does 
not serve to establish 'This lie is wrong' since the point at issue may 
be precisely whether this lie is one of the ones which are wrong, or 
whether it is one of the exceptions. 
Roughly, what I want to say is this. It is by malting particular 
judgments that we come to be able to formulate what we think but the 
features basic to moral judgments are the common elements expressed by 
fundamental principles. Thus the basic justification of moral judgments 
is to be found in the criteria according to which we make moral judgments. 
These criteria may conveniently be condensed into statements of prinCiple, 
but the criteria .... lhich support particular judgements and find expression in 
fundamental principles are the hard currency of judement. If this is so, 
it explains the form taken by many moral discussions and arguments, where 
a particular judgment is justified by being shown to be covered by a 
basic principle, but where people differ about the meaning and scope of 
the principle. For example, when Smith and Jones differ about the right-
ness of taking valuable'perks', Smith argues that Jones is acting wrongly 
since he is stealing and stealing is unjust. ~i th knm'ls that Jones also 
condemns injustice, and therefore hopes to convince him that he is acting 
wrongly by showing that his actions are unjust. But Jones replies that 
Smith is wrone when he supposes that stealing is unjust. What is really 
unjust is exploitation of the workers, and it is necessary to undermine 
the property-system in order to bring about a just state of affairs. It 
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thus becomes apparent that genuine discussion can be achieved only if 
each man states ~~d clarifies his criteria for his particular judgments, 
since such clarification alone can show whether or ~ot they agree as to 
the basic principle of justice. 
In practice then we do not always need to go into all the ramifications 
, 
and presuppositions of our judgmentso For there is no reason why people 
who share common assumptions should spell. out everytlung they say. But 
. where there is disao~eement over judgments, and justification is demanded, 
it does become necessary to exhibit the criteria by ,..,luch one makes part-
icular judgments, and thereby explain the rationale of one's particular 
judgments and basic principles. 
In order to show what will constitute a reasonable and adequate 
justification of moral judgments, whether particular, general or basic, 
it is therefore necessary to discover acceptable and adequate criteria for 
judgments. The task of justification is therefore tvlO-fold, for it is 
necessary to show that various criteria, if they ~e acceptable to support 
moral judgments, and to show that these criteria, themselves embodying 
moral assumptions, are themselves acceptable. For example, if we accept 
'It causes unhappiness' as a reason for calling a particular action wrong, 
we must be able to show that this reason is relevant to the judgment in 
question, in the sense that it must be true that this action muses unhapp-
iness, and also that we must be able to Sh01.., that the reason is acceptable 
in the sense that causing unhappiness is wrong (or a wrong-making character-
istic) •. A reason expressing a criterion of moral judgment points to a fea-
ture in or of the object being judged, and also embodies a moral assumption 
about the moral status (right, wrong, good, bad) of that feature. If the 
reason expressing the criterion is to be an adequate justification, it must 
therefore point to a feature which is there, and it must point to a·morally 
relevant 'feature. 
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vre nmi know approximately what we must do in order to justify moral 
judgments, and moral judgements will be seen to be justifiable if and only 
if the task is a possible one to accomplish. It is nOvT necessary to 
discover criteria which are adequate and 1etitimate in the sense which I 
have explained. 
To start ,.,.i th, we may take several features which are frequently taken 
to be relevant to an assessment of the moral status of actions, ~~d then 
try to relate them to various judgments~ One feature is happiness-production. 
The utilitarian will justify his judgments by sho1-,ing that actions increase 
or reduce happiness. His justification will be effective if it is the case 
both that his assessment of the happiness-production of the judged action 
is correct, and that his assumption that actions are right or vJrong in so 
far as they produce happiness or unhappiness is acceptable. Secondly we 
have the feature2 of justice. Thtrd, an action may cause or alleviate 
suffering. Fourth it may infringe liberty. Fifth, it may involve respect, 
or lack of respect, for persons.; 
This may not be an exhaustive list of features "Thich are pointed to 
by moral judgments, but at least it enables us to see all the basic 
features wllich are frequently thought to be relevant in an assessment of 
the rightness and wrongness of actions (leaving aside, that is, purely 
formal requirements such as that expressed by Kant's Categorical Imperative). 
It may be observed that each of these features is contained in a principle 
which has been held to be fundamental. The first is enshrined in the 
Principle of Utility, and the second in a Principle of Justice or Equality. 
The third may be expressed in a significant variation of the Principle of 
X2A vague word, but one which must be used in the absence of one more 
precise and less loaded. 
;My point here is not that these features of 'actions are all of the same 
type, or that each is equally relevant a...'ld accept2,ble as the basis of moral 
judgment, but merely that they are all in fact cited in support of moral 
judgments. 
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Utility, in the Principle of Negative utility ':rvIinimise SUffering'. 
vIe also hJ.ve the Principles of Liberty and Respect for Persons. It is 
therefore clear that each of the features I have mentioned has been taken 
very seriously as being not only relevant but basic to moral judgment. An 
examination of them may be expected to yield some information about justif-
icatory reasons for moral judgmentso ',Ie must consider which of them, if 
any, is necessary and/or sufficient for justified judgment. 
~1e principle of Utility, in various formulations, has for a long time 
been connidered to be a, if not the, fundamental principle of morality, 
expressing a or the, criterion by which we may judge the rightness and 
wrongness of actions. According to this principle, an action is right if 
it maximises happiness, wrong if it fails to do so. ~1e rightness of an 
action is held to be determined by its consequences, whether actual, fore-
seen or foreseeable. Vlhat we must refer to in deciding whether or not an 
action is right is therefore the amount of happiness which the action 
produces or may be expected to produce, but we cannot take its happiness-
production in isolation, for what matters is that happiness should be 
maximised ~nd so we must know whether tIllS action produces more happiness 
than ~y alternative action (or inaction). Thus the main point made by 
a utilitarian is that, since any given judgment is to be justified by 
reference'to the happiness brouB'ht about by the judged action, the type of 
reason \-Thich is relevant in the field of moral enquiry is that which points 
to the happiness-production of actions. Given any judgment 'That action is 
wrong' and the challenge 'Why is it wrong?' we can support the judgment 
and meet the challenge, by saying, 'Because of all the alternative actions, 
this one produces the greatest happiness.' Before we decide whether the 
criterion expressed by this reason is or can be morally basic, we must 
consider some of the other features I have referred to. 
One of the commonest appeals made in support of moral judgments is to 
the justice or injustice of actions. Favouritism, racialism, prejudice 
in general, are denounced because they involve injustice. Any action which 
involves discrimination between equals or failure to discriminate between 
unequals, is normally thought to be morally wrong, and a judgment to the 
effect that a Given action is morally wrong can, it is thought, be 
adequately supported by reference to the fact that unjust discrimination is 
involved. Now it is clearly the case that justice and happiness production 
cannot at the same time be features of action to which adequate reasons 
for judgments may appeal. For justice and happiness-production need not, 
and sometimes do not, coincide, so it may be, and sometimes is the case 
that conflicti~; judgments are generated by appeals to these two features 
of action. We must therefore conclude that one of these features might be 
morally basic, or that neither of them are, but not that both of them are. 
That does not mGan that they cannot both be morally relevant, or even 
important, but that reasons appealing respectively to happiness-production 
and justice cannot both be adequate and sufficient justificatory reasons 
for moral judgment. Before deciding which, .if either, has priority, we 
must consider reasons appealing to the features of negative utility, 
liberty, and respect for persons. 
The feature of negative utility may also be called the feature of 
suffering-production. If we hold that this is a, or the, basic moral 
feature, what we are saying is that the fact that an action muses more 
suffering than alternative actions is an adequate reason for saying that 
that action is wrong. Moral judgments can be adequately supported by refer-
ence to the criterion of negative utility. Again it is clear that if this 
is the basic moral feature of action, then neither utility nor justice can 
be basiC, though they m~y still be important. For if a judgment that an 
action is wrong is adequately supported by reference to the fact that that 
action fails to minimise suffering, we cannot adequately support moral 
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judgments by showing that an action produces maximum happiness, or is 
just. For it need not be the case, and it sometimes is not the case, that 
the features of utility, negative utility, and justice are compatibleo An 
action may at the same time produce maximum happiness and fail to minimise 
suffering. It may minimise suffering but be unjust, and so ono Conse-
quently, reliance on any one of these features as morally basic precludes 
reliance on either of the others as basico 
The same can be shown to be true of liberty ru1d respect for persons o 
If an action is right in so far as it respects the liberty of individuals, 
or refrains from violating it. then a judgment as to an action's moral 
status cannot be adequately supported by reference to utility, negative 
utility, or justice (understood as equality)o Fbr sometimes it may be 
possible to respect liberty only at the price of producing less happiness 
or more suffering, or of treating equals unequally, unequals equallyo 
Finally, we must consider respect for persons, for although this 
feature may not be compatible with all the other morally relevant features· 
of actions, it may be compatible with some of them. Respect for persons may 
be said to be manifested in actions performed in recognition of the moral 
status of human. or rational agents. In Kantian terms, it is manifested in 
treatin~ a rational being as an end in himselfo The emphasis is consequently 
on :rat ionrui ty rather than on humanity, and we may s a:y that essentially 
respect for persons is manifested in treating them as rational beings 
capable of ,·rlllinc and ch01ce o If then the rightness of actions depends on 
whether or not persons are respected, and the fact that persons are 
respected or not is a sufficient reason for calling an action right or 
wrong, vie must ask whether this moral reason can be basic, and whether 
it is compatible with the other. criteria which claim to be morally basico 
It seems clear that if respect for persons is a morally basic feature, then 
utility cannot beo For it is quite easy to conceive of a Brave New World 
situation in which the happiness of the majority is produced by means 
which must be condemned if respect for persons is the basic moral criterion. 
Secondly, negative utility and respect for persons are incompatible as 
basic moral criteria. For again, we can conceive of a situation in which 
sufferinG is minimised at the cost of failure to respect persons, or 
conversely respecting persons involves failure to minimise suffering. vie 
may assume that suffering is not necessarily confined to the rational 
element in human beings, or even to human 'beings. Very often, suffering 
is c.:lused by physical phenpmenao Pain is not always mental paino Conse-
quently, if vre could minimise physical suffering by, for example, adminis-
tering druG's which cause mental confusion, we could not a t the same time 
perform the action which minimises pain, and still respect persons 0 4 
However, it seems more likely that respect for persons, as a basic 
moral criterion, is compatible with justice and individual libertyo To 
take justice first, it seems unlikely that an act of discrimination between 
equals would or could be demanded by the requirement of respect for persons, 
since recocnition of the moral status of persons must involve recognizing 
their equqlity in possession of rationalityo And even if we wanted to 
speak of justice with regard to non-rational beings, the requirements of 
justice as a basic moral criterion would be at least compatible with 
respect for persons, since rational beings are not equal to non-rational 
beings, and we could treat them differently if it vlere required by respect 
for persons without being unjust, while if there is a requirement to treat 
non-rational beings equally there is no reason to assume that such action 
would necessitate a violation of respect for persons. It is reasonable to 
conclude, then, that justice (with regard to equality) and respect for 
persons could at the same time be basic moral features, and that one form 
fof justice, that concerned with equal treatment of rational beings, is 
4But see below pp'l.t3-h o Negative utility and respect for persons do 
conflict, but we may have to effect some compromise. 
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involved in respect for persons. The two are conceptually related in such 
a way that if respect for persons is a basic moral requirement, then so 
is justice with regard to rational beings. Nor is it, I think, conceptually 
possible that justiceis a basic moral feature even if respect for persons 
is not. 
~ne same is applicable to liberty. If liberty, qua moral criterion, 
is defined as it commonly is in terms of the right of rational beings to 
choice and decision, then i~especting individual liberty we are respecting 
persons, and if either is a basic moral feature then so is the other. As 
far as the liberty of non-rational animals is concerned, it is hard to 
see how 've are to make sense of the idea that animal liberty ought to be 
respected, unless, that is, we understand the term 'liberty' literally. 
Al though one might well argue that there is an area of morality covering 
human treatment of animals, we would only by analogy speak of treating 
animals justly, and respecting their liberty. \'That does seem to be 
involved here is the minimisation of suffering. If it is wrong to cage 
animals, it is because they suffer in captivity. If we ought to treat 
animals justly, then surely what we mean is that vro ought not to treat 
some animals well and others badly, and if this is so, then it is simply 
because we ouC:ht not to treat any animals badly. But if, with regard to 
animals, the basic moral feature of action is that actions causing 
suffering are wrong, then it is not the claim to liberty that is incompat-
ible with respect for persons as a basic moral feature, but the claim to be 
spared suffering, and we have already seen that negative utility and 
respect ,for persons appear to be incompatible as basic moral features. 
Justice and liberty are therefore each compatible with respect for 
persons as basic moral criteria, but we have seen that they are not at 
first sight compatible with each other. However, this apparent conflict 
can be resolved, so long as we recognize the subordinate status of justice 
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and liberty. 
Conse~uently, if we are looking for a basic moral feature, or a 
group of them, ,.,e must (assuming that the original list was exhaustive) 
pick ono of this set: utility, negative utility, justice, liberty, respect 
for persons, justice and respect for persons, or liberty and respect for 
persons. In other words, in searching for an adequate criterion for 'moral 
jude;ments, 've may expect to find it among a set of reasons pointing to one 
or other of these features of actiono 
HOHever, although it is the case that I have defined 'basic moral 
feature' in such a way that these moral features cannot all be basic, since 
a feature is basic if and only if its presence is enough to determine the 
rightness and wrongness of actions, it must be borne in mind that there is 
I ... 
another sense of basic in which these features might all be basic. For 
some thine is basic if there is nothing more basic to wbich it can be 
reduced. Thus, utility and negative utility could both be basic in this 
sense, and so could respect for persons, -though it might.be argued that 
justice and liberty are reducible to respect for persons o But the 
implications of the suggestion that all these features might be basic must 
be made explicit before we accept this suggestion. For it seems as though 
in adopting it we commit ourselves to denying what could be regarded as a 
dogma of moral philosophy, vix. that ought implies can, or that we cannot 
have a duty to do what we are unable to do. If, say, negative utility is 
a basic moral feature, then we must say that an action securing negative 
utility is obligatoryo Thus if we were in a situation where negative 
utility, and respect for persons (also basic) conflicted, incompatible 
actions would be obligatory. In answer to this it might be pointed out 
that 'basic' now means merely 'irreducible to anything more basic'. But 
I think it is quite unhelpful to regard something as morally basic in this 
sense aloIl(R, . There 1s no point in describing a feature as morally basic 
unless 've re,:;;ard discovery of such a feature as significant, but if a 
feature is to be significant, surely we must say that knowledge that 
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an action possesses that feature is action-guiding. Consequently, if to 
say that a feature is morally basic means no more than that it cannot be 
reduced to anythinG else, its moral relevance is hard to find. However, 
we may accept tIns and still avoid the conclusion that ought need not 
imply can. For the choice is not necessarily between a feature which 
is basic in the sense that an action possessing that feature is either 
oblisatory or ~rbidden, and one which is basic in the sense merely that 
the feature cannot be reduced to other more basic features. And this is 
where it is helpful to speak of criteria rather than of moral principles 
or particular jUdGments. For to say that a feature of action is morally 
basic is to say that the possession by an action of a morally basic feature 
gives us a criterion for judging that aotion, though not necessarily a 
conclusive one. If ",e say this, we avoid the choice between features 
which are morally basic but insignificant, and those vlhose possession is 
sufficient to render an action obligatory or wrong. 
We can now see that an attempt to discover one feature which is morally 
basic in the sense that a judgment pointing to it is adequately justified 
by reference to it, is misguided. For though a judgment is fully justified 
if and only if there are adequate criteria by reference to which it is 
made, it need not follow that one criterion alone is adequate to support 
any moral judgment. In this context, we may consider the analogy between 
moral and aesthetic judgments. In judging works of ext of various kinds, 
we point' to features possessed by the work. Our reasons for judging a work 
of art to be good, bad, or indifferent contain references to features which 
we consider to be aesthetically relevant. But we would not suppose that 
all types of work of art are judged by the same criteria, or even that all 
vlOrks vii thin one particular type are to be judged by the same criteria. 
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Thus it is obvious not only that we point to different types of thing 
in judging paintings and literary works, but also that we look for features 
in lyric poetry that we would not expect to find in novels. So although 
vIe may judge a lyric poem by reference to its rhymes and scans'ion (let us 
suppose), in a novel we are more likely to judge the handling of the 
characters. But although scansion may be an aesthetically basic feature 
of the lJTic poem, and character of the novel, ,~ can still say that a 
poem, or that a novel in which character-development is well-handled is 
still not a good novel. Saying this does not commit us to saying that 
scansion is not basic to the poem, or character-development to the novel, 
but merely that we need to know more about the poem or novel before we can 
really judb~. The poem is good in so far as its scansion is satisfactory, 
but on balance the poem might fail o It may even be the case that two 
possibly-incompatible features are basic to a work of art such as a novel, 
so that in a particular type of novel, satisfactory characterization might. 
preclude balanced structure, or theme-development is possible only if the 
characters are parodies. So in general terms we miGht say that a novel 
in which psychological realism is pursued is likely to be thematically / 
weak, vlhile a fable can be thematically pm'<'erful only if the characters 
are universal rather than particular, but we can still maintain that 
theme and characterization are both basic features of the novel. This 
could lead us to say that the best novels are those in which theme and 
character mutually intezract, but even if ~'le regard. the fable or the 
psycholobical novel as inferior forms of the novel, we will still be· able 
to judge them in terms of their respective basic features, vizo theme and 
psychological realism, so long as we are aware of the nature of the work 
which we are judeingo 
It would be misleading to press this analogy bet1veen moral and. 
aesthetic judgements too far p since the objects of moral judgments, say, 
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actions, motive and character, do not fall into types as works of art do, 
nor into genres within types. The point of the analogy is to show that 
in makinc judgments we rely upon a range of features which are morally or 
aesthetically basic, and do not necessarily regard one feature as the most 
basic, or even as relevant in all cases. What "Te do is to isolate the 
features which we regard as important and make judGIDents on balance. The 
action, say, is good in so far as it possesses the feature of positive 
utility, bad in so far as it possesses the feature of injustice, and on 
balance is, let us say, bad. To express this in terms of reasons, we may 
say that vIe have a reason for judging it to be eood and a reason for . 
judeinc it to be bad, but the conclusive reason or criterion is that which 
leads us to call the action on balance bad. 
But we must not suppose that judgment is possible only when we are 
in a particular situation and know all the facts about that situation. 
For the morally basic .features may be arranged in a hierarchy. For example, 
we might say in adv<L'1.ce of any action possessing the features both of 
utility and injustice that it is bad or wronG because justice comes higher 
in the hierarchy than utility, but still in a case "1here considerations of 
justice do not enter into the matter the possession of utility by an action 
may provide us with a conclusive reason for calline the action good. 
If then we are to avoid the conclusion (surely false to experience) 
that we cannot make accurate moral judgments except in a particular 
si tuation, "Te may argue that there is a group of moral criteria, some of 
which take priority over the others, but each of ,,,,hich must be taken into 
account in judging. The obvious candidates are clearly the five I have 
been discussing, viz. utility, negative utility, justice, liberty and 
respect for persons. Some of these as we saw can be taken in groups, 
for instance Respect for Persons with liberty and/or justice. It is now 
necessary to show which of these if any is morally basic, and which take 
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priorityo If we can show that some of them are morally basic and that 
some take priority over others, we shall have succeeded in showing that 
moral judcments can be reasonable, since the criteria by which we judge 
are themselves acceptable. (I do not intend to discuss in detail the 
question of the moral relevance of those lower in the hierarchy - if some 
are sho\m to be basic, others may still be relevant, and I shall assume 
that they areo Thus, if utility cannot be the one basic moral criterion, 
I shall nevertheless assume that an action which causes happiness is, 
other thin£~ being equal - in the absence say of injustice - righto) 
In order to show the priority of some criteria, I propose to examine 
the idea that the concept of morality is such that if we practise the 
activity of morality we must accept certain features of action as morally 
basic. If this can be shown, it will follow that if we accept a moral 
commi tment, v,e must in order to be moral accept certain moral judgments, 
decisions and actions. We can if we choose opt out of morality, and 
thereby reject the concept of moral obligation, but if we opt out of 
morali ty we repudiate an essential part of our humanity. 
The concept of morality is essentially tied up ,>[i th that of sentient 
beings, that is to say with beings capable of feeling, both physical and 
emotional. Any relation between morality and inanimate objects is mediated 
by the li~ between inanimate objects and animate beings. Thus stealing 
~ . 
and va~dalism are wrong not because they involve maltreatment of valuable 
objects but because in stealing we deprive someone of something which is 
hiS, and in vandalism we destroy things which belong to or are of use to 
other living beings. Basically then, in concerr~ng ourselves with 
morality, we concern ourselves with the lives ruld welfare of people and 
non-human animals. This may be taken as a fact about what people conceive 
the concern of morality to be. So also may the. fact that morality has 
both a positive and a negative aspect, in the sense that we accept that 
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some forms of treatment of people and animals are wrong, while others are 
obligatory. 
lYO\{ one basic fact from which many moral beliefs stem is that there 
exist in the world sentient beings other than ourselve~, who are capable 
of feelinJ pain and pleasure. If this were not the case we would have no 
use for the concept of morality which we now have. Since it is the case, 
however, it is possible to say that our moral concern has an empirical 
basis. On the basis of the fact that there exist beings capable of pain 
and pleasure, we found one of our most basic moral evaluations, vizo that 
unnecessary suffering is bad, and that to cause it is wrong.' This basic 
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evaluation can be seen to underlie many of the moral prohibitions which 
are expressed in our jucJ.ements. vIe believe that vTe ought not to be cruel, 
to kill indiscriminately and so ono But there is also a range of positive 
judements which are based on a positive evaluation of certain forms of 
life, activity and achievement. 
Ve start off therefore with a statement of hm., things are, their actual 
nature (e.&,o as sentient beings) and proceed to argue tovrards morality by 
means of a value-judgment as to what it is good that things should be. I 
would ar&~e then that the concept of morality begins at the point where 
our concepts of fact and value merge together, ard that for the normal 
human beine it is impossible to view the world neutrally. Our actual 
experience is itself evaluative, and the concep~ of nature is itself an 
evaluative concept. We ourselves playa vital role in our experience of 
the world. In a Kantian sense we structure it. Thus we cannot be aware 
that there is pain or suffering without being aware that the object of 
our experience, suffering, is bad. It might be objected to this that 
there ore people who remain indifferent to the suffering of others, and 
even people who take pleasure in it. Now the fact that some people enjoy 
others' suffering does not run counter to my thesis, since the point about 
this kind of cruelty or sadism is ~recisely that pleasure is taken in 
what is known to be bad. There could be no pleasure in gloating over 
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the sufferer unless one mew that his experience 'vlaS a bad one. By this, 
I do not mean morally bad, but rather something ~disvalue, something 
harmful., Admittedly the sadist sees the sufferinc as something good for 
him, but it is cood for him in so far as he takes pleasure in an object 
whose badness for otr~rs is valued by himo As for the people who are 
indifferent to others' suffering, which clearly includes most people some 
of the tiee, and some most of the time, the reply to this is that one 
remains indifferent only in cases where a\.,rareness is lacking. Awareness 
of suffering and indifference to it are incompatible. 
It is clear that the point I am trying to establish is intended to 
be sit;n1ficant, and yet it may seem that ,.,rhat I am sayi:ne about suffering 
and disvalue is simply analytiC, since nothing can constitute a counter-
example. Awareness of suffering involves a nee-ative evaluation, other,.,ise 
we do not have a case of genuine a,.,areness (or alternatively not a normal 
human beine - e.~. a psychopath with no moral sense). This statement 
cannot be merely an empirical generalisation, for if it were we could 
consider it to be falsified by experienced cases of indifference to 
sufferine. But if it is analytic, then it says nothing more than that the 
term 'D.,·rareness' is used in a particular way, and tells us nothing about 
human beinGS and the evaluation of suffering. The proposition is therefore-
both justifiable and useful only if it is a synthetic a priori proposition. 
If it is a priori it is not merely empirically based (and therefore false), 
but if it is synthetic it avoids the triviality of an analytic proposition. 
NO'..f it is obvious that if the proposition is true, it is not an 
empirical eeneralisation, but how are we to shoH that it is true if we 
cannot appeal either to empirical evidence or to the meaning of the term 
'awareness'? Following a Kantian line, we can arGue that the proposition 
2070 
is valid if it states a necessary condition of experience. \'le can there-
fore defend the view that evaluation of this Id.nd is an essential part 
of human experience, and at the same time avoid triviality, if we can 
show that mrman experience would not be as it is if it were not the case 
that a\ .... areness of certain things involves an evaluation, favourable or 
adverse, of those things. 
The experience which is made possible by the evaluative activity of 
the human being in relation to the objects of his experience, is the 
moral experience. If awareness of certain objects did n~t involve an 
evaluation of them, there would be no such thine as the experience of the 
moral aeent and judge. ·But since the moral experience, i.e. the experience 
of approving and disapproving of some things, of feeling obliged to do and 
refrain from others, is a datum, then we can say that it must be true 
that awarness involves evaluationo But how are we to show that a synthesiS 
of awa~eneS3 and evaluation is a necessary condition of moral experience? 
'llhe anSi.,rer to this is that this alon~can close the gap between fact and 
value, a~d that the openness of the gap is incompatible with moral exper-
ience. It is accepted that an evaluative conclusion cannot be derived 
from premises containing no evaluationo Thus if we do draw evaluative 
conclusions our premises must contain evaluations.. .An aeent who, after 
deliberation, concludes that he ought to perform action x must therefore 
include ev~luations in his premises. But the process of deliberation 
could never cet soing if he started from neutral facts since he could not 
get from a neutral factual premise to an evaluative premise from which 
he could draw a moral conclusion. We must assume therefore that unless 
all moral arguments are fallacious then not all fa~tual premises are 
neutral. :But we cannot accept that we are moral Doo-ents and that our moral 
experience means something, while at the same time asserting that all moral 
arguments are necessarily fallaaious. Thus if "Te take a moral standpoint, 
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we have to accept the possibility of the validity of moral deliberation 
and artilli~cnt. Since the yalidity of moral argument depends on the 
existence of non-neutral premises, while its point depends upon their 
factual status, it follows that the adoption of a moral standpoint commits 
us to asserting the non-neutral factual status of certain premises. But 
since their factual status depends on experience a...'1d tl".eir non-neutrality 
depends on evaluation, experience must itself be evaluative. Therefore the 
ev.:lluative activity of the human agent in r elation to some of the objects 
of his experience is a necessary condition of moral experience. The 
proposition that awareness and evaluation are inextricably linked must 
therefore be accepted as a synthetic a priori truth, at least by anyone 
adoptinc a moral standpoint. If someone refuses to adopt a moral stand-
point, or refuses to believe tllat the moral experience is anything more 
than a ,·lidespread illusion, he cannot be proved "{rong. But I am concerned 
with the justification of moral belief from the inside, i.e. on the part 
of anyone Hho accepts the validity of moral experience. It is therefore 
enough to sho:-I' that the argument holds on the assumption of such validi tyo 
This arcument shows that the human moral a~nt contributes the eval-
uative element in the experience of certain basic objects. But it does 
not sho'., which objects are basic, or which way they are evaluated, 
positively or negatively. To find that out, we must examine moral exper-
ience more closely. 
As an illustration in the exposition of the previous argument, I used 
the point that it is impossible to be aware of suffering without at the 
same time recognizing its badness. To say this is to say that the propos-
ition that suffering is bad is valid in virtue of its being a necessary 
condition of moral experience. If it is the case that some part of moral 
experience is dependent on the validity of the proposition, we can say 
that the proponition has been validated. As I admitted, it is true that 
some people remain indifferent in the face of suffering, aLd that others 
even take pleasure in it. But these facts do not invalidate the 
proposition, since a failure to respond to suffering indicates a lack 
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of moral commitment. If I am unmoved by the suffering of others, I shall 
not do anything, or believe that I ought to do anything, to alleviate it. 
Conversely, if I do not recognize a duty to alleviate suffering, I 
manifest a failure in awareness. Awareness of suffering involves a 
negative evaluation of it. But if I recocnize the badness of suffering, 
the likelihood is that I shall conceive it to be a duty to alleviate ito 
For the moral agent associates the evaluative awareness of what is good 
and bad with the moral judgment that the good is to be pursued and evil 
avoided. This, I contend, is what it mea..""1S to say that the moral agent 
possesses a conscience, or moral sense. vfuen we say that people have 
consciences, we mean in the first place that they perform the activity 
of evaluative recognition of the objects of experience, and in the second 
place that tllls evaluative recognition is, in the normal agent, a necessary 
and sufficient condition of moral judgment and of a.cceptance of one's role 
as a moral agent, as someone who can and should act to bring about and 
maintain '-that is good, and abolish and diminish i-that is bado Thus con-
science is not merely a cognitive faculty, but is a capacity on the part 
of moral agents to recognize value and disvalue, and to recognize their 
role as ag-ents of charll:,J'9o 
Thus, if we can say of anything that it is judged by moral agents to 
be good or bad, a..""1d which is for that reason something to be pursued or 
avoided, maintained or diminished, then that object is the possessor of 
a basic moral featureo 
Before going on to discuss the possible hierarchy of basic moral 
features, it will be helpful to recapitulate and reOorder the conclUSions 
which have been reached so faro The human being is colled a moral agent in 
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virtue of his possession of conscience, which is to say that he has 
moral ex,pe::ience o The moral experience may be said to consist in a 
recognition of a moral demand, i.e. in a recognition that one is capable 
bY,one's &otions of affecting the objects of experience, and that one 
oUGht to act in accordance with the basic principle that the good is 
to be pursued and evil avoided. Eut this experience is possible only 
if the Dora! acent is capable of recognizing ,,,hat is good and bad. Not 
only docs he recognize it, but he plays an active part in the evaluation 
of objects of experience and it is upon this role that the objective 
validity of certain evaluative propositions depends. Furthermore, we 
can no"." see how the claim that the good life is to be pursued can be 
vindicated, for this claim is an elaboration of the principle that good 
is to be pursued and evil avoided, and recogniUon of the claim of the 
good lifo is an essential part of the evaluative activity of the conscience 
of the Doral agent. :But the question remains, "That, specifically, is 
to be pursued as good and avoided as evil. If vTe can answer this question 
in terms of the set of morally basic features v,hich has already been 
. postulated, ~~d if we can order that set, then vffi shall have succeeded in 
providi~ a frameivork of justification for moral judgments. 
The features which have been most widely conzidered to be morally 
basic are, as I explained earlier, those of utility, negative utility, 
justice, liberty and respect for persons. If vie are to see that these 
features are morally basic, '-Ie must see whether our moral judgments pre-
suppose their value or disvalue. If they do then vIe may legitimately 
assume that the hunan being's evaluative activity, wIuch makes possible 
the objective validity of moral judgments, centres on these features 
or objects of experienceo 
First then ''ie should consider the feature of negative utilityo' An 
, action or state of affairs possesses this feature if it is the case that 
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the action causes or the state of affairs contains more suffering than 
there vmuld be in some alternative situation. It is indubitable that 
human beines cannot be aware of suffering without considering it to be 
bad. This is of course most obvious in the case of personal suffering. 
I cannot reGard my sufferi~ as being in itself anything but bad. I may 
consider it to be necessary as a means to some end, but its value consists 
in its uoe as a means and not in the suffering as such. But the same is 
true of the suffering of others. I cannot be aware that some other living 
being is suffering without recognizing that their experience is in itself 
bad. '!There I can fail is in my awareness, but given the awareness I must 
recognize the object as bad. On the basis of this recognition or ev.aluation, 
I judge that suffering ought to be alleviated and that I ought to do as 
much as I can to alleviate suffering and. to avoid causing it. This eval-
uation and judgment are presupposed by a great many of our moral judgments. 
Specific acts of pain-infliction are condemned, as are unkindness, excessive 
teasinc and so on. On the whole it is considered to be necessary for the 
advancement of science and medicine to perform experiments on non-human 
animals, but to be unjustifiable to cause even a minute amount more 
suffering than is necessary. There is really no need to discuss this 
point in detail, since the instances of moral judu~ents which presuppose 
a negative evaluation of suffering are obvious and unnumerab1e. It is 
clear without areument that one must always have a good reason for causing 
suffering if one's action is to be justified. Disagreement will. arise 
over what counts as a good reason, but not over the necessity for one. 
Secondly, utility is considered to be a morally basic feature, So 
that an action ",hich maximises happiness, or a state of affairs which 
contains it, is considered to be better than one which causes or contains 
it, is con3idered to be better than one which causes or contains less 
happiness. Again, it is part of the concept of happiness that it is good 
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in itself, thouGh 1-1e may have reasons for condemnine certain instances 
of huppiness. Again, too, it is clear that m2ny of our moral judgments 
pres"!.lppose a positive ev31uation of happinesso Charitable and philanthro-
pic acts are aFprovedo That an action causes happiness is a reason (a 
morally relevant one) for performing it. A failure to cause or maintain 
happiness requires justification. Our concept of morality is such that 
a failure to recognize this betrays an inadequate concept of moralityo 
Tnus, utility and negative utility are both morally basic features, 
in that a positive evaluation of the one, and a negative evaluation of the 
other, are parts of our conceptual scheme of moralityo But is one of them 
more important than the other? That is, is it the case that in situations 
of conflict, one must take precedence over the other? lIe can easily 
conceive of examples where the maximisation of happiness involves the 
creation of some suffering, or where the alleviation of suffering lessens 
the aoount of happiness o In order to resolve such conflicts, I think we 
must appeal to the judgment that the avoidance of ,.,hat is bad is more 
importal1:t than the pur sui t of what is good, if the bad and the r;ood are 
of the SD.rile type. Thus since pain and suffering are bad, a..'1d pleasure or 
happiness are good, and since suffering and happiness belong to the same 
category in the sense that we can meaningfully oppose one to the other or 
weigh one against the other (without making the misleading assumption that 
happiness and suffering are simply contraries) then suffering is (morally) 
more important than happiness. In other words, if we had to choose between 
a world ' .... here there was no suffering but no\ positive 'happiness either, and 
one where there was both suffering and happiness, ' .... e should, morally, 
choose the ' .... orld free of suffering. In this ser-se, we might regard 
happiness as a moral luxury, which ought to be promoted, but only when 
sufferine and happiness have been eliminated, or at least only when 
happiness is acl1ievable without the creation of suffering. This is not to 
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say that there is .!l2.. positive value which can out'veigh suffering, but 
that if there is such a value it is not happiness. Thus if we have to 
choose between rr~nimising suffering and maximising happiness, the moral 
choice is that of minimising suffering. The best support of this is an 
example. If a number of people would be made happy by the pain of one 
man, it is morally better that the man should not suffer pain. 
Given a moral choice between utility and negative utility, then, we 
must choose negative utility. But how do these features weigh against the 
other features of liberty, justice and respect for persons? And how do 
these weicht against each other? Although liberty and justice may conflict, 
I think lie must argue that their value depends upon the value of persons o 
If we did not consider that human beings were of importance or moral 
significance, we would not believe that the freedom of the individual or 
the equal treatment of human individuals, were of moral significance o It 
is therefore clear that the value of the person is morally more basic than 
the value of personal liberty or justice. The comparative value of 
liberty and justice will in any given case be determined by the value of 
the person. They are different aspects of personal value, and in some 
cases regard for the value of a person may be manifested in a regard for 
liberty, and in other cases in a regard for justice o 'Je cannot say that 
justice as such is more important than liberty, or vice versao "le can 
say only that whichever action manifests res~ects for the worth of the 
person is right, and that sometimes the liberal action and sometimes the 
just action will manifest such respect. There is no real conflict between 
liberty and justice o The apparent conflict arises from a misguided attempt 
to attribute a definite value to either ?f them, instead of recognizing 
that they possess value in relation to the personal value which is 
fundamental. 
This means that we should not try to determine whether liberty is 
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more important than utility, justice than negative utility, and so on. 
The important question is whether the positive value of persons is more 
or less important than the positive value of happiness and the negative 
value of suf.t;ering. First, I think, 've must say that an understanding 
of the concept of morality commits us to valuing persons more highly than 
happiness. If we can maximise happiness only by failing to respect 
human rationality, personal equality or individual liberty, we must say 
that morally we OUGht not in such cases to maximise happiness. As I 
have argLled, the concept of a good life is an essential part of the concept 
of morality. .But happiness has a relatively small part to play in a 
good or complete life o A complete life is achieved by the development 
or actualisation of potentialities. In so fox 2.S this is compatible 
with happiness, then h~ppiness is not only good, but a morally legitimate 
goal. nut if happiness can be achieved only, at the expense of failure 
to develop human potentiality, it does not come in as a morally possible 
goal. The happiness of the inhabitants of Huxley's Brave New '''arId 
cru1not justify tl~ means employed to achieve it - the brainwashing, the 
drugs, wd t:1e abolition of judgment, art and digni tyo To maintain that 
happiness is more important than any of these thiU0~ is to deny the value 
of morality. Thus if we opt into morality we C&~ot place utility above 
respect for persons, and as I pointed out, I am not concerned to argue 
with those who opt out of morality. 
This leaves us with two rival candidates for the role of basic moral 
feature, viz. negative utility and respect for persons. vIe cannot be 
aware of suffering without recognizing its badness and acknowledging a 
moral obligation to do what we can to diminish it. But we cannot be aware 
that someone is a rational being, with all the potentialities which 
rationali ty creates, without recognizing his special ,vorth. Yet there 
can be conflicts. For instance, a doctor may alleviate suffering by 
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performinG an operation which renders someone unable to make choices 
judgments a~d decisions. Or we might find that in order to enable someone 
to recocnize his freedom, we must let him endure alone the suffering caused 
by a loss of security. 
liow it seems to me that the evaluative activity of the human conscience 
creates a concept of morality wlllch includes a funda~ental negative eval-
uation of suffering and a fundamental positive evaluation of personality. 
've cannot so.y that our concept of morality commits us to placing one of 
these above another. It commits us to both. ,\le cannot view ourselves 
as moral agents and remain uncommitted to the alleviation of suffering 
in all circumstances, but neither can we regard ourselves as moral agents 
and remain uncommitted to the development of human and personal potent-
ialities in all circumstances. There is consequently a central tension 
between the t't/O basic elements of our moral thinking. On the one hand 
we have the Cisvalue of suffering and on the other the value of human 
potentiality. ~re cannot accept moral commitment without accepting that 
we have a duty to lead a good and complete life, and also a duty to 
alleviate suffering, but often the two are incompatible. When it comes 
to making particular judements and decisions, vTe may opt for one rather 
than the other, and some people may regard one as being more important 
than the other (so, for instance, some people are doctors and others 
teaChers). but even when we choose one of them we are uneasily aware of 
the other. I do not think that this conflict can be resolved o Sometimes 
we are pulled in opposite directions, and it seems that whatever we do 
will be wrong; but also whatever we do will be right. Recognition of 
the existence of this conflict will not make the moral life any easier. 
but it does at least enable the philosopher to explain the tensions of a 
moral life, and to contend that not only are moral judGments reasonable, 
but that even 1:/hen they are ultimately unjustifiable because they conflict, 
, 
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they are also essentially rational, since acceptance of one's role as 
a moral ~~nt is a necessary part of one's acceptance of one's rationality, 
and indeed humanity. The objective validity of morality springs from the 
activity of reason and judgment in the evaluation of the objects of 
experience. Hefusal to perform this activity involves a repudiation of 
the pm ... er of judgment, and a failure to be fully humano 
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Conclusion 
It will now be possible to draw together the arguments and conclusions 
of the preceding chapters. In setting out to discover whether it was pos-
, ." 
sible to defend the view that conscientiousness possesses Ul1ique value, it 
proved necessary to examine the concepts of virtue and the virtues in order 
to establish a basis upon which a theory of moral value could rest. 
Accordingly, in Part I, I discussed the general concept of virtue, and 
several examples of specific virtues, both cardinal and minor. I defined a 
virtue as a 'pre-disposition' in order to emphasize the point that a man 
who possesses a particular virtue has set himself in advance to perform the 
action demanded by that virtue in particular circumstances. Virtue in gen-
eral may also be said to be a pre-disposition, in that a virtuous man is one who 
has set himself to perform virtuous actions whenever they are demanded by the 
circumstances in which he finds himself. Now, although virtue in general ar.d 
goodness may be identified, it is important to remember that, just as we speak 
of goodness in a general sense and of moral goodness specifically, so we must 
make it clear whether our concern is with virtue in a general sense or-with 
moral virtue. 
Before we can find out the relationship between goodness and virtue, and 
moral goodness and moral virtue, we must first establish what we recognize as 
their value. It seemed likely that an examination of specific virtues and 
the part they play in the life of a human being would yield some clue as to 
the nature of the value they possesso Indeed there seemed to be an essential-
link between the concepts of virtue, virtues, and of human llfe. Consequently, 
I sugzested that we should adopt the hypothesis that what we value is a good 
human life, and that we regard certain pre-dispositions as good, and hence 
as virtues, because of their role in a good or complete human life. The vir-
tuous man, I SU&3ested, is the man who lives fully as a human being, and be-
comes what we regard as a good human being. An examination of the nature 
-2180 
and value of the virtues of justice, wisdom, temperance and courage sup-
ported this hypothesis, though we saw that it was necessary to distinguish 
between personal and inter-personal virtues, since some virtues contribute 
to the good life of the agent, and others primarily to that of other people. 
\lie hu ') 
A further discussion of minor viLa!es showed that an analysis of virtues 
in terms of the concept of a complete life enabled us to make sense of the 
worth placed on different predispositions at different times, in different 
1 places and by different people. 
We could therefore say that the value of a given pre-disposition, which 
, 
renders it virtuous, is to be explained in terms of the part played by that 
pre-disposition in the achievement. and maintenance of a good or complete 
hwnan life, i.e. a life in which human potentialities are actualized. But 
. this is not to say which virtues possess distinctively moral value. A pre-
disposition may be said to possess moral value, and hence to be a moral vir-
tue, if the agent who has cultivated that pre-disposition has done so in 
response to his awareness of a moral demand. One of the human potential-
ities is the moral potentiality. Recognition of this can lead us to develop 
in ourselves those pre-dispositions or virtues which will enable us to res-
pond appropriately to the moral demands of the situations in which we find 
ourselves. But since the man of moral virtue is the morally good man, and 
since the man who develops various virtues in response to his awareness of 
a moral demand is, precisely a conscientious man, i.e. one who sets himself 
to do whatever may be morally demanded of him, and who prepares himself as 
well as possible to meet moral demands, then the morally good man is the 
IThe fact that some virtues were I changeable I in this sense did not of course 
show that some pre-disposition that once was a virtue could cease to be such. 
It could cease to be valued, if those who valued it saw it merely as a means 
to an end, but then they never regarded it strictly as a virtue in the first 
place. Alternatively, in some Circumstances, it could cease to llave applic-
ation, though if and when it has an application it is of course good. Thus, 
thrift, as a form of prudence is good, but sometimes the situation is such 
that it is not prudent to be thrifty. 
- --- ... 
219. 
conscientious man. 
Somet1.rnes, though, this position is attacked on the ground that it 
leaves insuffioient room for the special value of love. However, this 
objection is based on a misunderstanding. For however much we may value 
love, we do not attribute to it specifically moral value unless we consid-
er it to be a pre-disposition and therefore a type of conscientiousness. 
For unless love is a response to a recognition of a moral demand, it can-
not posses3 moral Vlorth, while if it is a response to such reco3nition, 
then it is not a rival to conscientiousness, but is itself a conscientious 
response. Nor need we sUGgest that the conscientious man is unloving or 
cold-hearted. If he is to respond ap,ropriately to a moral demand, we do' 
not expect him to be grudging in his response. 
These conclusions lead naturally enough to a discussion in Part II of 
the nature and value of conscientiousness. First, if we are to say just 
what conscientiousnesG is, [rnd why it uniQuely possesses moral value, we 
must dispose of some misunderstandings. It is a mistake to suppose that 
conscientious men are dull, or cold-hearted, boring, pig-headed, fanatical· 
and so on. But some objections to the claim that conscientiousness alone 
is morally good are based on precisely such presuppositions. The conscien-
tious nan, is, quite simply, one who has set himself to respond to the 
moral demand because of its unique claim on the hQrnan being. Because he 
sees that there are actions which he is morally obliGed to perform, and 
others from which he morally ought to refrain, he prepares himself to do 
as best he can whatever he ought to do. This preparation !nvolves thought 
and deliberation and the cultivation of virtues. It does not necessitate 
a rigid adherence to rules. The conscientious man realizes that situations 
may vary and that he must be ready to cope with special circumstances. Ult-
imately, then, he is prepared to do whatever actions he believes, after de-
liberation, he ought to do. 
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It has been objected to this that the conscientious man may be wrong. 
Examples are cited of men who are conscientious in the performance of 
wrong actions. But this does not mean that conscientious people are to 
be recognized on account of a rigid adherence to an abhorrent code (fan-
aticism and conscientiousness are not identical), nor does it mean that 
it would be morally better to ignore the dictates of conscience. Rather 
it suegests that we should be specially conscientious in making moral de-
cisions. ~~t even when we are mistaken, we must, if we are to be moral 
at all, do wllat we conscientiously believe that we ought to do, since if 
we refuse to judge, and to trust our judgment, we abdicate our moral res-
ponsibility. We really ought, then, to do what we believe we ought to do, 
since there can be no other way of acting morally, 
Since so much stress must be laid on the beliefs of the conscientious 
man, it seemed necessary to discuss the justification of moral judgment. 
First, we want to see whether moral judgments are to count as meaningful 
statements, since if they are not, we fall into a serious confusion in our 
concept of morality. Merely because our moral judgments are not like other 
statements, we must not suppose that they are meaningless or indefensible. 
Thus while acknowledgine and incorporating the claims of the non-cognitiv-
ist to the emotional element in moral judgment (in the act of judgment) we 
must consider possible justifications for moral judgments qua statements. 
B,y adaptin3 a Kantian argument, we can show that the objective validity of 
moral judgments is the product of an interaction between the objects of ex-
perience and the evaluative activity of the human conscience. If conscience 
did not play this constructive validating part, our experience would not be 
as it is. ~e must therefore say that conscience does perform this activity, 
and that so lone as we accept the reality of the moral experience we are 
committed to recoenizing the essential rationality of the judgment-act, and 
the objective validity of jUdgment-statements. FUrthermore we can establish 
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a hierarchy of basic moral features, though we must accept a tension 
between the nesative value of suffering and the positive value of human 
development. 
The conscientious man, therefore, is the man who accepts the res-
ponsibility of his moral agency, and lives the complete life of a h~l 
being in which actualization of the moral potentiality is included o The 
man who denies the power of the conscience in its validating activity, 
and its authority as the exponent of the moral demand, must opt out of 
morality. The true moral agent is, precisely, the conscientious man who 
accepts the power and authority of his conscience. He is the morally good 
,,. 
man. 
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